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Abstract: This thesis examines the tension between the notions of free will and 
determinism, and how such a tension emanates from a view of freedom which 
is erroneous. The project starts by showing the presentation of the tension in 
traditional philosophy, before showing why such a presentation is misplaced 
once we come to see that freedom itself is only comprehensible within the 
world. Such an observation provides a way of constructing a new and original 
notion of freedom, which is more than just a matter of being free to choose, 
but also encompasses the effect these choices have on us in the form of self-
disclosure. Thus, our freedom to choose makes possible self-evaluation and 
re-evaluation in the context of the world within which our choices are made. 
Such a notion of freedom affords us the benefit of being able to see that 
determinism, which is taken here to result from our scientific understanding 
of ourselves and the world around us, itself rests upon, or is only intelligible 
on the basis of, our being free in the first place. The thesis thus achieves two 
goals: on the one hand, it provides us with a new and original notion of 
freedom, which coheres with the sense-making activity of creatures in a world. 
On the other hand, it demonstrates how such a notion of freedom can defend 
itself against the traditional determinist criticism.  
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     Part One 
Concerning the Problem of Natural 
Necessity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Opening Remarks 
When questions of freedom arise, the debate generally centres on 
whether the will is free – or, as the case may be, determined by factors beyond 
our choosing. And when debate regarding our status as free agents is had, 
freedom is usually thought of as an ability, peculiar to humans, to choose 
between different possibilities, or courses of action, and in so doing, choose 
things for and about ourselves. The challenge for those who oppose such a 
view, is to demonstrate that what appears to us to be such an ability, is really 
illusory, and all that is in fact happening are (natural) responses to events, and 
these responses are not something we can initiate. The challenge for those that 
endorse the former view, that of freedom, is to try to curtail the suspicion that 
even if it seems we are free to choose things, we are in fact not. There are, of 
course, various nuances to the way these two opposed positions can be 
expressed. However, they tend to share in the essential feature of viewing 
freedom as an ability or a power, as described above, that we either have or do 
not have. 
 What I intend to argue in this thesis, is that a fruitful option is being 
overlooked by both sides of the debate. I shall propose the view that freedom 
is not really an ability, as such, that we possess as subjects, but a result of the 
way that we relate to the world we find ourselves in. Part of the process of 
constructing such a notion of freedom will be to elucidate, in detail, exactly 
what this relation between self and world is, by showing how both are 
correlated with one another in a primordial way. One of the major benefits 
that emerges from the view I propose is that it shows that the determinist 
position itself depends upon the sort of freedom that I will come to argue for. 
Put simply at this point: there could be no determinist argument at all unless 
that argument was constructed and argued for by a being that possesses a 
fundamental freedom through their relation to the world – this kind of 
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freedom I will call “Freedom-in-the-World” – the central concept of this thesis 
and one which will be detailed in depth in Chapter 7. The other major benefit 
of the notion of freedom here outlined is that it is comprehensible, in the sense 
that in locating our freedom in our relation to the world we are in, it is found 
that this is the only place freedom could be that makes real, practical sense.  
 What is apparent, is that existing notions of freedom seem detached 
from the world in which the beings that are supposed to possess freedom 
operate. A key feature of the observation of the way people live their lives is 
that they do so alongside each other. This itself comes with certain challenges 
which can be seen to place constraint on our ability to exercise our freedom. 
Such an observation is generally missing from the standard accounts. It is not 
necessary to hold that our social interactions and position determine the 
choices we make, merely that the social world is the only arena in which our 
freedom can be meaningfully played out. This social world is part of the world 
we find ourselves in and is an essential component of our relation towards it 
and as such, is a phenomenon that will form part of the account of Freedom-
in-the-World.  
 Resulting from such a position are important epistemological and 
metaphysical issues and as the account develops, we will see how these 
potential issues become less worrying, as the effectiveness of Freedom-in-the-
World becomes more apparent – in other words, as it begins to become clearer 
throughout the course of this work how effective Freedom-in-the-World is as 
a position on the free will debate, it will also become clear that it has 
implications far beyond this scope, making it something more than another 
nuanced position on the freedom of the will. Because of this implication, part 
of the task of this work is to carry out a sustained examination of the 
relationship between freedom and knowledge of the self and the world it 
occupies. It is with this observation in mind that I will argue that what 
conventional accounts of freedom lack is not merely a worldly aspect, but 
instead, an essential relation to the world. This amounts to arguing for the 
point that was alluded to in preceding paragraphs: that the very manner in 
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which agents relate to the world they occupy, draws upon comprehensible 
freedom. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Project 
Before the idea that our freedom and our relation to the world are tied 
together can be thoroughly established, some prior groundwork needs to be 
carried out. Therefore, Chapter 2 will set out the understanding of free will 
and determinism I intend to work with in the form of what I term the problem 
of freedom and natural necessity. Although there may be prima facie simpler ways 
of expressing the initial problem, I will use Chapter 2 to highlight the 
specificity of the problem with which I aim to deal: namely, that the problem 
is one of finding a way to make the very notion of freedom itself intelligible 
within a world that is determined by natural processes. This issue finds what 
I believe to be its most interesting and traditional expression in the work of 
Immanuel Kant, and whilst the problem is certainly related to the broader 
debate between those who endorse the freedom of the will and those who 
proclaim determinism to be correct, the introductory chapter will attempt to 
present a more refined debate. Another reason I turn to Kant is because he is 
seen as someone who presents us with a way to reconcile the tension between 
free agency and a physically deterministic universe, with his transcendental 
idealism. Thus, Chapter 3 aims to elaborate Kant’s proposed solution to the 
problem. Kant informs us that the fact that a human being can interpret the 
world within which it dwells as being natural and mechanistic can and does 
say nothing about the way things are in and of themselves.  
 Chapter 4 draws on the work of Hegel, who, I argue, offers an attack 
on Kant’s transcendental idealism in various portions of his work, but 
importantly, in a relatively overlooked section of his Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Here, Hegel deals with forces and the scientific laws which are constructed to 
describe their underlying relation to things. I offer an interpretation of this 
section of the Phenomenology which presents Hegel as saying that Force, as 
generally conceived, has as an essential feature its very observation. Thus, part 
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of how it is in and of itself is that it is observed. This ambiguity in the nature 
of Force, I argue, allows, Hegel to advance a rejection of transcendental 
idealism and, it follows, Kant’s proposed solution to the problem of freedom 
and natural necessity.  
 Chapter 5 takes the direct focus away from freedom for a time, instead 
to analyse the Heideggerian notion of Worldhood. The exegesis of the relevant 
portions of Being and Time presents a view of the world that can explain the 
peculiar observation in Chapter 2 that certain ideas pertaining to the natural 
world have at their source an essential reference back to the being performing 
the observation. Thus, Chapter 6 uses the theoretical tools afforded by the 
analysis of Worldhood to investigate the phenomenon of Disclosure, found 
again in the work of Heidegger. Disclosure gives a strong account of the 
correlation between human interpretative behaviour and the way that things 
in the world and in nature “present themselves” to us. It allows us to read 
certain sections of Heidegger’s work post-Being and Time as offering an 
account of freedom, which in turn, affords us the benefit of re-interpreting 
Worldhood and Disclosure in Being and Time as always referring to human 
freedom. This serves as a transitional point into the foundation and 
construction of the central idea of this work: Freedom-in-the-World, which 
takes human interpretations to be meaningful only if an interpreter is 
essentially free, but also understands that freedom is only intelligible upon the 
basis of humans being in a world (rather than merely observing one).  
 Chapter 7 is an attempt to develop the notion of Freedom-in-the-World. 
It progresses by presenting four features of the account: (1) that it is non-
transcendental in nature, meaning that its intelligibility is not in any way 
dissevered from the world itself; (2) it is irreducible, such that its features 
cannot be reduced to any mechanical process; (3) it is world-disclosive, therefore 
it is the basis upon which things in the world are disclosed to an interpreter; 
and, finally (4), it is self-disclosive, whereby the self is disclosed to itself through 
its world. But then the chapter raises some critical questions that must be 
answered if the account of Freedom-in-the-World is to be satisfactory. Thus, 
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those fundamental features of the human being that we do not choose would 
seem to form a set of things which directly affect the things that we can choose. 
Or, perhaps more severely, the set of things we cannot choose seems to come 
to bear upon the manner in which the self is disclosed to itself. The latter part 
of Chapter 7 aims to assuage these important challenges, which I term the 
argument from the facticity of the free self.  
 Chapter 8 probes deeper into these challenges, citing the 
counterexample in the work of Susan Wolf that she uses to address issues she 
sees with the account of the free, self-interpreting agent – specifically those 
accounts presented by Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt. I argue that Wolf’s 
position in her own work on sanity and responsibility can comfortably be read 
as an argument from the facticity of the free self. As such, her counterexample 
is a particularly clear example of a more general concern one could have with 
the notion of Freedom-in-the-World. It is here that a revisiting of the 
Heideggerian notion of “Throwness” and its relationship to facticity furnish 
Freedom-in-the-World with the necessary theoretical backing to strengthen 
the position. For what makes one free does not hinge upon whether or not one 
interprets oneself and one’s world in a “sane” way, but that one is ultimately 
able to do so in the first place.  
 The work concludes by asserting that what is presented here is not a 
“phenomenology of freedom”, but more an account of freedom which makes 
use of Heideggerian phenomenology to shed light on a debate within the 
Anglo-American tradition. On this topic, I have made every effort to deliver a 
standard of clarity that would be acceptable within the Anglo-American 
approach. However, sometimes, the norms and conventions of modern 
philosophical writing in the United Kingdom and United States (and it goes 
without saying, other countries as well) can on the one hand convolute and 
yet on the other, oversimplify crucial subtleties in the work of the European 
thinkers I draw upon. This can become particularly evident in the heavier 
exegetical portions. In this vein, the selection of secondary literature and the 
use of new terms is largely neutral to both strands of thought and instead aims 
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to present ideas, arguments and analyses with faithfulness to the primary 
sources.  
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The Problem of Freedom and Natural Necessity 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Philosophy must … assume that no contradiction will be found between freedom and natural 
necessity in the same human actions, for it cannot give up the idea of natural necessity any 
more than that of freedom.1 
 
This quotation, extracted from Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals by 
Immanuel Kant, sheds light on the inherent tension between freedom in 
human action and the limit placed on us by nature. This tension emanates 
from the opposition between two initially plausible concepts: that of human 
freedom and that of natural necessity; the kind of necessity that presents itself 
in the observation of the processes of nature.  
 For Kant, each of these concepts is indispensable to understanding 
human beings and their interactions with the world around them. For on the 
one hand, and from within, human beings experience agency – the ability to 
act in such a way that these actions have their source in the choices one makes 
for oneself and these choices in turn have their source in the agent. Yet, on the 
other hand, human beings are, at base, still nonetheless natural beings. What 
this means is that they belong to the very same world as the rest of nature. 
Human beings are still subject to the same laws that any other member of 
nature is; be it plant or animal. In the passage above, Kant observes that a 
human being’s place in nature is as inescapable an aspect of ourselves as our 
freedom to choose.  
 Despite observing this indispensability, Kant also observes the tension 
that arises by trying to retain both concepts, when he states that “[man] is also 
conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense, in which his actions are 
found as mere appearances of … causality … Those actions belonging to the 
                                                 
1 Kant, I. Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:387 
8 
 
world of sense must be regarded as determined by other appearances …”2 This 
problem, whereby we have two initially plausible concepts that appear to 
contradict one another, I will term the problem of freedom and natural necessity. 
Not only did Kant observe the opposition between freedom and natural 
necessity, but he also presented us with a novel solution. In order to approach 
this problem, it will be essential to see how Kant tries to dissolve this tension. 
He attempts to do this by rendering showing that freedom and natural 
necessity can coexist. However, what I am to show, is that such a coexistence 
is not an issue, because when freedom is considered properly as freedom-in-
the-world, we need not buy into such an opposition in the first place.  
 All the same, whilst I feel it is essential to examine Kant’s position in 
some detail, I do not aim to focus this project as a whole on Kant’s work. The 
preliminary exposition of the Kantian position will merely serve as a point of 
departure from the problem of freedom and natural necessity towards the 
goal of developing a worldly, comprehensible account of freedom, which 
focuses on the way an agent is always already in the world, rather than the 
way an agent operates with the world.  
 
2.1 Freedom of the Will versus Determinism 
From what has been stated, the problem of freedom and natural 
necessity is one of trying to see how two equally plausible concepts contradict 
one another. We cannot escape the observation of nature’s lawlike structure, 
any more than the our seeming ability to author our own actions. But this 
specific problem can be used to introduce a broader concern. For at base, the 
problem of freedom and natural necessity is at the heart of the disagreement 
between those who argue that we have freedom of the will and those who 
argue that we do not. The proponent of the freedom of the will is going to 
argue that: 
The choices we make about ourselves and our actions are genuine 
choices, based on our ability to be the author of our own lives.  
                                                 
2 Ibid. 4:453 (Italics are my own) 
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Contrary to this, the determinist is going to state: 
 
There are no such choices (as described above). Even actions which 
appear to result from the deliberations of a free agent are not actually 
free. The apparent “authorship” of the agent always depends upon 
physical/neurological/biological/socio-cultural phenomena, which 
are the true causes of the agent’s action and utterly beyond the agent’s 
power to choose and control. 
 
However, natural necessity encompasses indeterminism: the idea that there are 
at least some events that are not caused deterministically. But, this is distinct 
from the assertion of the freedom of the will, as events at the quantum level, 
whilst only probable and not necessary, will only ever manifest themselves in 
the world of the macroscopic as events of necessity. Ultimately, this says 
nothing about agents being the primary cause of their own actions.   
The debate here can be said to centre on the idea of whether or not, or 
to what extent, an agent can set up a “causal chain”. A causal chain would 
look as follows: 
 
(1) A is reading and wants to carry on, but it becomes too dark to read. 
(2) A decides to turn on the light and presses the light switch. 
(3) The light comes on. 
 
So, as laid out above, we can see that our causal chain is one in which (2) issues 
from the situation described in (1) regarding it being too dark for A to continue 
reading, which in turn leads to the action A performs in (2) and determines 
illumination of the room in (3). These chains can quickly become quite large 
and complex, hence, I will deal here with only three steps.  
 What is it about the above causal chain that is likely to cause 
disagreement between proponents of free will, or those who claim 
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determinism is ultimately true? Given our definitions of these positions above, 
we can say that the two positions are apt to disagree about the nature of agency 
involved in (2). For the free will proponent (FWP), (2) demonstrates the power 
of a free agent to initiate causal chains. 
 The determinist, on the other hand, is going to deny this claim. She will 
say that it may appear to A that they chose to go to turn on the light with the 
intention of lighting the room, but this “choice” is brought about by factors 
such as the sun’s position and the physiological features which make it so that 
A wants to continue to read. And were the FWP to raise the point that initially, 
it was A’s choice to act upon such an impulse to turn on the light, the 
determinist will merely cite other features of A’s situation. We may even 
compare the causal chain of the FWP to the case of a street light. As the sun’s 
position changes and the region becomes darker, photosensitive cells in the 
light detect the dimmer illumination, which in turn causes the light to switch 
on. Thus, the determinist will deny that A has any real ability to set up causal 
chains. A determinist may re-write the causal chain as: 
 
(1) A is reading and wants to carry on, but it becomes too dark to read. 
(2) A’s visual apparatus and brain detect that it has become too dark 
which causes A to turn on the light.  
(3) The light comes on.  
 
So, translated into determinist terms, the possibility that any choice A 
has made starts off the causal chain is denied, in favour of reducing A’s choice 
to physiological factors beyond their control: A cannot truly initiate a causal 
chain. Whilst simplified, the above example clarifies what is going on when 
FWPs engage with determinists.  
Importantly, the move made by determinists works towards explaining 
away freedom of action as well. For if there is no meaningful way in which an 
agent can be said to author an action, then there is no meaningful way in which 
her actions themselves are free. The act of turning on a light, under the 
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determinist picture, is at base, nothing more than an involuntary response to 
A’s eyes and brain no longer being able to process data due to it being too 
dark.  
 This reduction is characteristic of some scientific attempts to explain 
away freedom. The consensus between philosophers and scientists who are 
committed to some form of determinism, is that the weight of empirical 
evidence leaves no space in nature for agent causation. Their reasons are 
interesting, strong and cannot be easily dismissed. It may seem then that if we 
do not want to let go of freedom of the will, but also do not want to deny the 
effectiveness of scientific discourse in explaining the way the world is, we may 
be pushed into a position that gives freedom a transcendental nature, as 
alluded to in the opening of this piece. This brings us back to our original 
motivation; the problem of freedom and natural necessity (where “problem” 
here indicates the conflict or opposition between the two).   
 In the end, the concept of freedom-in-the-world will undercut this 
debate, by showing how determinism depends upon the deliberations of a free 
agent. Put another way, freedom-in-the-world will show that freedom is a 
condition for the possibility of the very intelligibility of determinism.  
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Kant’s Transcendental Solution 
 
 
 
3.1 Transcendental Ideality and Empirical Reality 
I now intend to take some time to lay out the Kantian view that a 
solution to the problem of freedom and natural necessity, and by extension 
the problem of the freedom of the will and determinism, can be reached via 
the introduction of the “transcendental”.  
This chapter will aim to lay out what Kant deemed to be a solution to 
the problem of reconciling freedom and natural necessity. It will do so by 
clarifying Kant’s important introduction of the transcendental, what is meant 
by this term, and whether it provides a successful solution to the problem 
under consideration. It also aims to restate the problem of free will and 
determinism in a way which brings to the fore the epistemological problems 
that can relate to it, which will come to bare later in the thesis. Under this 
picture, whatever freedom will turn out to be, its nature will be beyond 
immediate appearance and thus beyond the realm of natural necessity.  
To this end, I will offer an analysis of Kant’s transcendental idealism 
and the relationship between ideality of the transcendental kind on the one 
hand, and empirical reality on the other. But, in looking at Kant’s distinction 
of all things into phenomena and noumena, we can see how Kant reveals an 
essential relationship between the self and the external world. So knowledge 
of the self will turn out to depend upon the external, but the meaningful 
appearance of the external will turn out to depend upon the self. This idea will 
be a running theme throughout the thesis and will become central to the 
formation of freedom-in-the-world. 
 To begin with, I shall draw attention to the following statement found 
in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
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We therefore assert the empirical reality of space … though to be sure its transcendental 
ideality…3 
 
This is a crucial characteristic of Kant’s position. That space and time and the 
things within them are empirically real, but, simultaneously, are 
“transcendentally ideal”. If empirical realism is the assertion that things exist 
externally to us and have objectivity, then what can be said of transcendental 
idealism? 
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all 
together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and 
accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not 
determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects in themselves.4  
 
Above is an explicit statement, in Kant’s own words, of what transcendental 
idealism amounts to. Appearances are “mere representations” and thus do not 
deliver to our faculties things as they are in themselves. As he states in the 
passage, Kant believes space and time to be “sensible forms of our intuition” 
and they are therefore not features of things in themselves. Whilst it seems like 
objects are “in” space and time, according to Kant, this is only the result of our 
intuition, which is conditioned in the very representation of those objects.5 
Things “in” space are always external in virtue of the fact that matter, or 
objects that consist of matter, cannot occupy the same position in space. They 
are external to one another and thus external to the subject. However, space 
itself is still a form of intuition, hence, Kant’s proclamation that space is 
“within us”. External things consequently receive their externality, or are 
intuited as being external, due to their representation as being in space, which 
happens within the subject. Transcendental Idealism thus amounts to the 
doctrine that space and time are intuited in the subjective representation of 
objects and that things in and of themselves are not determined or conditioned 
in space and time beyond the subject. 
External things consequently receive their externality, or are intuited as 
being external, due to their representation as being in space, which happens 
                                                 
3 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A28 
4 Ibid, A369 
5 Idem. 
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within the subject. It is at this point that it can be said that transcendental 
idealism amounts to a realism regarding the way things appear for us but 
stops short of saying anything about the metaphysical status of things as they 
are in themselves, for such a thing is not possible – things as they are in 
themselves cannot be represented, merely things as they appear. Kant’s 
position is that because space and time are intuitions, they are forms of the 
subject’s intuition; they are ideal in nature.   
 This is important because this means our knowledge of objects as they 
appear is still objectively valid – we can still say true and false things about 
objects. As such, our talk of objects as having spatiotemporal relations and 
properties is still very much true. But owing to the transcendental ideality of 
space and time, we cannot infer from the validity of our talk of appearances 
anything at all about things in themselves. Validity and objectivity, for Kant, 
are limited to appearances. However, this limitation need not mean that the 
effort towards valid and objective descriptions of objects is a project in vain. 
But, the caveat is: 
 
It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these things are objects of 
our senses; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, 
thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of things in general.6 
 
Kant’s idealism affords us the benefit of still being able to treat objects as being 
empirically real. However, what it does deny is that we are able to infer from 
appearances anything valid about things as they are, considered in 
themselves. Validity and objectivity are only intelligible insofar as they refer 
to appearances.  
 The cost of Kant’s position is that things as they are in themselves can 
never be known about – we have no access to them. We know only the world 
of appearances and from this we cannot know anything of the nature of things 
beyond how they appear for us. However, the condition for the possibility for 
meaningful appearance in the first place is the subject itself.  
                                                 
6 Ibid. A35 
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 What I aim to show now is, that whilst Kant gives us valuable insight 
into the notion of the self being the condition of meaningful appearance, the 
very idea that things may be considered as they appear and as they are 
considered in themselves is extremely problematic. This leads me to turn to 
the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose view on scientific 
understanding may offer also a compelling critique of the Kantian distinction 
between phenomena and noumena.  
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The Hegelian Dialectical Response 
 
 
 
4.1 Hegel’s Critique of Kant 
 In this chapter, I aim to show that Kant’s transcendental project is 
ultimately unsuccessful. This is the main motivation for my turn to the work 
of Hegel. Whilst I do not intend to present Hegel as providing theoretical 
apparatus from which the notion Freedom-in-the-World can be constructed, 
his work in particular sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit provide valuable 
historical insight into why exactly Kant’s project of the transcendental fails to 
overcome the problems it sets out to dissolve.  
 Hegel's criticisms of Kant's idealism have long been subject to various 
interpretations. This is due in part to the lack of references Hegel makes to 
Kant directly, with the exception of his essay “Glauben und Wissen”. There is 
also an element of confusion regarding Hegel's use of language, which he 
tentatively attempts to defend by claiming he wants to “teach philosophy to 
speak German.”7 Paired up with the fact that the Phenomenology of Spirit as we 
have it is haphazardly assembled, as he rushed to complete the work, the task 
of finding a correct way to interpret Hegel is a challenging task.  
 These difficulties aside, it would be wrong for us to dismiss Hegel's 
criticisms on this basis. When we cut to the core of this element of his work, 
what we find is actually an illuminating and original attempt at exposing 
certain worries about Kant's position. Firstly, we can look to Hegel's 
methodological concerns in the Introduction to the Phenomenology. The 
motivation for taking this as our lead is because this section is, by far, the one 
that has received the most attention both on the Continent and in the Anglo-
American tradition (with regards to Hegel's attitude towards epistemology at 
least). Also, it is easier to see, by beginning with this section, traits in Hegel's 
                                                 
7 Hegel, G.W.F. “Letter to Voss” 
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thought that run throughout his body of work. Hegel remains consistent in 
his concern for the same basic problems; the only thing that really changes is 
the angle from which he approaches these same problems. In fact, we might 
think of Hegel's whole approach, particularly in the Phenomenology, as 
exploring different “layers” of consciousness’s experience of itself and the 
world. In other words, on my reading, the Phenomenology charts 
consciousness’s intellectual development – a point which will become 
important later. 
 Once it is clear what Hegel is offering us in the Introduction, it will 
allow us to see the moves being made further on in the Phenomenology, at the 
tail end of the section on “Perception” and the picture Hegel paints in “Force 
and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World”. It is in 
this section, I argue, that Hegel attempts a reductio ad absurdum of Kant's 
distinction between phenomena and noumena.  
  
4.1.1 Epistemology 
 In the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel assembles a 
criticism of epistemology as attempted by his predecessors. However, Hegel 
is characteristically unspecific about which thinkers exactly his argument is 
aimed at. Part and parcel of Hegel's philosophical approach is to avoid getting 
entangled with individuality, both in terms of particular thinkers or their 
theories. So any attempt to clarify his position in the Phenomenology will 
require a certain amount of interpretation without, of course, speaking for 
Hegel too much. What we can take from the argument in the Introduction is 
that whilst the criticism applies as much to Locke as it does to Fichte and 
Schelling, for our purposes, it is also aimed at the work of Kant.  
 For Hegel, previous attempts at epistemology have made a significant 
mistake. The error lies in separating the external object that consciousness is 
aware of from the processes that go to make up this awareness in the first 
place. This may not sound so counter-intuitive. In fact, it is quite natural to 
assume that the external things we encounter are fundamentally different 
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from the “internal” apprehension we have of these things. Hegel himself 
admits this: 
 
It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to deal with its proper subject-
matter, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an 
understanding about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get hold of the 
Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it.8  
 
In fact, with regards to this point, Kant makes use of both of these erroneous 
metaphors. “The medium through which one discovers” the external object, 
for Kant, would equate to “sensory intuition”; the sense organs as they are 
exposed to the properties of objects. On the other hand, Kant would also make 
use of the “instrument” analogy, as that active aspect of cognition which 
operates on sensory intuition so as to make it intelligible: the categories of the 
understanding. Hegel criticises such a distinction, because it creates a chasm 
between the object as it is in-itself and our knowledge of it. In his lectures on 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Theodor Adorno sets up the problem like this: 
 
… [T]his duality in the concept of things inevitably leads to certain difficulties, huge 
difficulties, in fact, for the theory of cognition. The effect is that the world can be said to be 
doubled, in the paradoxical sense that true existence at the same time becomes something 
wholly undefined, abstract and ethereal, while conversely what we definitely know, positive 
existence, is turned into the mere delusion of appearances, the mere interconnection of the 
phenomena at our disposition. And at the same time we are denied the right to reach 
compelling conclusions about the true nature of existence.9 
 
Kant’s transcendental idealism proceeds by attempting to demonstrate 
that whilst reality does exist in and of itself, the very structure of the human 
understanding imposes structures onto the world that are not in fact there in 
reality. We can never know the in-itself, merely the way things appear for us. 
Reality as it is in itself remains unintelligible. This, of course, is the upshot of 
                                                 
8 Hegel, G.W.F, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 46 
9 Adorno, T. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 108-109 
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Kant's Transcendental Idealism: the operation of the categories upon sensory 
intuition means that the object as it is independent of consciousness is 
unknowable. We can only know what appears to us, but what appears to us is 
conditioned by the pre-set structures of the understanding, in the form of the 
categories. On this issue, Hegel states: 
 
This feeling of uneasiness is surely bound to be transformed into the conviction that the 
whole project of securing for consciousness through cognition what exists in itself is absurd, 
and that there is a boundary between cognition and the Absolute that completely separates 
them.10 
 
In the context of Hegel's criticism, these metaphors cannot secure for us the 
nature of the thing-in-itself because the instrument/medium necessarily 
distorts the object in our awareness of it.  
 This may seem like no sort of criticism at all. In fact, when we dwell on 
Kant's idealism, we see that this is really his conclusion, and it must be. This 
is the way Kant reconciles the tension between a scientific account of the world 
as composed of matter, following mechanical laws, and the seemingly 
autonomous way the self interacts with this world. As we have seen in the 
previous section, to overcome the apparent way in which the materialist world 
view and the “moral” world can seem incommensurable, Kant allocates each 
view to a specific aspect of reality. The phenomenal aspect, the world as it is 
for us, is subject to the laws of science. However, the noumenal aspect, the 
world as it is in itself, transcends these laws, for we can know nothing of it. It 
is for this aspect of reality that we can reserve questions of God, immortality, 
and morality. 
 Thus, it would seem at this point as if Hegel is merely repeating Kant's 
conclusion. This is not Hegel's aim. Hegel thinks this kind of separation is 
destructive. It is destructive because we have already presupposed a picture 
of cognition, as opposed to building one by paying careful attention to the way 
                                                 
10 Idem.  
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that cognition actually works as it is working. Though probably not the source 
of the problem Hegel is identifying, we can see an early and obvious example 
in Descartes’ Meditations. The whole progress of these meditations is entirely 
dependent upon an epistemology which has its starting point a separation of 
mind and body (although only implicit at the start). What is more, it assumes 
that the sensory (that is, bodily) part of the separation somehow fools the 
mental part: 
  
Everything I have accepted as being most true up to now I acquired from the senses or 
through the senses. However, I have occasionally found that they deceive me, and it is 
prudent never to trust those who have deceived us, even if only once.11 
 
The most immediate problem here is that for Hegel, doing epistemology 
properly would rule out statements such as “the senses deceive me” as it 
would need to be shown that it is in fact sensory distortion, or whether it could 
be, say, the effect of our cognition on raw sensory input, that causes such 
“deceptions”. Descartes presupposes that the realm of the mental or rational 
is pure, absolutely personal (implied by Descartes’ consistent use of “I” or 
“me”) and subject to the distortive forces of the senses (which are impure and 
impersonal). None of this has been demonstrated by Descartes. In fact it is this 
very presupposition that gets his argument moving.  
 We may think that Kant moves beyond this, but for Hegel, he is still 
trapped in this Cartesian approach to epistemology. Take for example an 
opening section of Kant’s ‘Second Analogy’ in the ‘Transcendental Analytic’: 
 
I perceive that appearances succeed one another, that is, that there is a state of things at one 
time the opposite of which existed in a previous state. I am therefore really connecting two 
perceptions in time. Connection is not the work of the mere sense and of intuition, but is 
here the product of a synthetic power of the faculty of imagination …12 
 
                                                 
11 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 19 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B233 
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Now, Kant is careful not to fall into the same trap as Descartes in terms of 
assuming some inherent feature of sensory perception that deceives the 
subject. In fact he does state, with the last sentence, that something else besides 
rational intuition and sensory perception does the “synthesising”. But for 
Hegel, the above passage from Kant would, like Descartes, stand as an 
example of the passive approach to epistemology he is trying to oppose. The 
assumption that the “I” can somehow “stand back” from cognition and 
analyse it from the outside is flawed, and is, for Hegel, the source of the 
“epistemological-gap”. “I” should not come into any enquiry until its proper 
link to cognition has been ascertained. Until then, all we have is consciousness 
– a dynamic awareness of things, including the “I”.  
The very concepts that we are meant to be discovering - “cognition”, 
“subject, “object” - presupposed at the outset in both Descartes and Kant. 
Although Descartes will go on to doubt the existence of objects, he comes to 
the conclusion that he cannot possibly doubt the existence of the “I” - and he 
relies as a matter of principle on doubt, which is a form of cognitive activity 
itself.  “For to give the impression that their meaning is generally well known, 
or that their Notion is comprehended, looks more like an attempt to avoid the 
main problem, which is precisely to provide this Notion.”13 Hegel also puts it 
nicely in the Preface to the Phenomenology: 
 
[T]hese [terms] are used just as thoughtlessly and uncritically [in philosophy] as we use them 
in everyday life, or as we use ideas like strength and weakness, expansion and contraction; 
the metaphysics is in the former case as unscientific as are our sensuous representations in 
the latter.14  
 
The point is this: how can epistemology, or philosophy in general, 
progress as if it already knows about the things it is trying to discover? What 
Kant should be doing is explaining what cognition is, or what it is to perceive 
an object, from within these very operations themselves. Hegel's accusation here is 
                                                 
13 Ibid. p. 48 
14 Ibid. p.30 
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that Kant is an example of a philosopher who does not do this; his first Critique 
proceeds as if these issues have already been illuminated and the problem is 
really about showing how these things impress on one another. In proceeding 
in this manner, Kant cannot move beyond the idea that consciousness is 
internal, and therefore closed off from the things it is aware of, which are 
external. Hegel’s point here is simple: just because this seems intuitive, does 
not mean it should be presupposed. In fact, this leaves our epistemology wide 
open to scepticism. If we presuppose a gap between consciousness and the 
things consciousness is aware of, then it becomes impossible for us to bridge 
the gap. We cannot escape the internal nature of consciousness in order to 
apprehend what exists beyond it, externally. This methodological malaise is 
particularly evident when philosophers refer to the objects of perception and 
the cognitive processes associated with them as always already belonging to 
some underlying “I”. 
 The crux of Hegel's criticism is that if we cannot escape our own 
experience, in order to verify whether this experience really “corresponds”* 
with the things it is “about”, then we cannot hope to conclude that we know 
anything at all. If we suppose, as Kant did, that this distinction accurately 
reflects the way we come to know things, then we may be justified in asking 
how we know anything at all, or at least we could say that this knowledge 
could never be true, in the sense that it could never reflect the way reality 
actually is. For knowledge to be true, presumably we would want it to reflect 
the way things really are. But if our faculties alter the object of awareness in 
their very function as faculties, then it seems we are not permitted to hold that 
our knowledge is genuine knowledge – or that it does not get at the truth of 
the object.  
These metaphors presuppose that there is a distinction to be made 
between the self and the object of knowledge. We can still describe the 
functions of the internal faculties, but the real content of these faculties, that 
                                                 
*  The use of “…“ around “corresponds” here is meant to emphasise the fact that I am not speaking of any sort 
of correspondence theory of truth. 
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which apparently lies outside of consciousness, will remain beyond 
comprehension. In fact, in his essay “Glauben und Wissen”, Hegel accuses 
Kant's idealism, and his whole project, of being thoroughly subjective, 
explaining nothing beyond the confines of our internal life.  
 
… [T]he whole task and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but 
the cognition of subjectivity. In other words, it is a critique of the cognitive faculties.15 
 
The argument Hegel is giving us is an argument against the enterprise of 
epistemology as traditionally conceived. It is not epistemology in general that 
Hegel is rejecting, but the presupposition that there is a gap that needs to be 
closed between consciousness and the world. If we start epistemology from 
this point, we will inevitably end up with a conclusion open to scepticism. As 
such, this will only ever leave us in a position of being able to explain our 
subjective faculties and never what goes on beyond them. 
 The fact of the matter is, despite how “natural” it seems, we need not 
assume that cognition does anything to the object of knowledge. Hegel thinks 
we should in fact assume otherwise, that all cognition does is bring the thing 
closer, or “into view”. We would be much in error if we were to treat cognition 
as doing anything more than “creating a merely immediate and therefore 
effortless relationship.”16 This would seem to indicate that Hegel is in 
agreement with the idea that cognition is in fact passive. However, if we 
conceive of cognition as a medium, and subtract its “law” or “refraction” from 
the end result we would be left with something empty.  If we were to, as Kant 
can be read as arguing*, consider something as it is in itself, we would not have 
insight into things entirely unconditioned, but instead, into something devoid 
of any real intelligibility.  
 
                                                 
15 Hegel, G.W.F, “Glauben und Wissen”, p. 68 
16 Hegel, G.W.F, Phenomenology of Spirit p. 47 
* Cf. the discussion of this  in the previous chapter, under “Transcendental Idealism Reconsidered” 
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For it is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself whereby truth reaches us, that is 
cognition; and if this were removed, all that would be indicated would be a pure direction or 
blank space.17 [emphasis added] 
 
For Hegel, we need to give up the notion that our senses and conceptual 
schemes are “tools” through which we come to know about external objects. It 
is not the case that our faculties are closed off from the world, but are actually 
part of the world we come to know. It is as Heidegger explains, 
 
… '[W]orld' is not a way of characterising those entities which Dasein [human existence] 
essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself.18 
 
The world, for Heidegger as for Hegel, is not to be conceived of as being 
external in the sense that we are separated from it; that group of things which 
we are not. Instead, we are always already in the world, alongside objects even 
when we abstract from everything in order to “think” philosophically about 
them. Consciousness is in fact part of the world that we experience. It is not 
the case that there is the object and the object as it is for consciousness. There 
is just my consciousness of the object. From this we cannot, and should not, 
construct an image of cognition that radically separates what we are aware of 
from that awareness.  
 From this, we resolve the apparent difficulty of there being an 
appearance of the object for consciousness and the nature of the object as it is 
in itself, outside of consciousness. If what we are trying to make sense of is 
how consciousness is related to objects, and to do this we make consciousness 
the focus of our enquiry, then there is nothing that is unavailable to us. There 
is no “beyond” which lies outside of consciousness; even any positing of such 
a “beyond” is a positing done within consciousness, which means that the in-
itself is always bound up with our awareness of objects. For Hegel, what Kant 
failed to realise was that it is not even possible to conceive of a beyond, a 
                                                 
17 Idem. 
18 Heidegger, M. Being and Time p. 92 
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noumenal. Any attempt to do so is an attempt by consciousness, and so such 
a beyond is available to consciousness.  
 So much for Hegel’s criticism in the Introduction to his Phenomenology. 
Perhaps a more incisive, and less analysed criticism of Kant comes further on, 
towards the end of the section on perception and throughout the section on 
Force and the Understanding. Its expression is (somewhat characteristically 
where Hegel is concerned) dizzying, but once you find yourself afloat in its 
content, it is indeed an illuminating piece of work, a reductio ad absurdum of 
Kant’s system. That said, I wish to demonstrate exactly what is going on in 
this part of the Phenomenology.  
 
4.1.2 Perception 
In his chapter on perception, Hegel lays out a broadly Lockean account 
of perception and representation, before showing how it falls apart. 
Consciousness deals with objects as they appear through their properties, but 
is unable to account for the underlying substance in which these properties 
must inhere. This is a familiar philosophical debate: how can an object merely 
be the sum of its properties, when these properties would seem to belong to an 
object? For Hegel, consciousness in the form of perception cannot provide an 
adequate explanation of this appearance, and so it becomes consciousness in 
the form of “Understanding”. Hegel seems to be alluding to scientific enquiry 
here, because he claims the only way consciousness can account for the unity 
of properties with substance is through developing the notion of “Force”; that 
invisible phenomenon which is nothing other than its own external 
expression. This expression in turn is nothing more than that which binds 
properties and substance into a unified perception. But this would leave us 
with a realm of scientific forces and laws which are utterly invisible to the 
understanding, whilst being necessary to overcome the problems of 
perceptual consciousness. We end up with an unseen world, “behind the 
scenes”, which acts as a “substratum” to the objects the Understanding 
attempts to synthesise. However, this is just the return of the Kantian thing-
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in-itself which we were trying to avoid. To see why, we need only focus on 
the fact that for Hegel, a force is only evident at all in its “expression”: the 
effect it has on perceivable items. Recourse is made to a realm of forces which 
we cannot know “in themselves”, only in their effect – which is also their 
(mere) appearance. 
 But, before going into greater detail about Hegel’s description of the 
Understanding, it is necessary first to refer back to the end of the section on 
perception. Here, Hegel states “… but the many are, in their determinateness, 
simple universals themselves. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time 
manifold; it is white and also tart, also cubical in shape … “19 So when we 
perceive an object, say, a grain of salt, we perceive it as a specific thing, a single 
object (a “Here” as Hegel puts it). But this object also has individual properties 
which we might say are brought together in the perception of the specific 
object. Hence: the salt is white in colour, but also bitter to taste, also crystalline 
and so on. The importance of this point is that the perception of one of these 
properties excludes the others. We “shift” through each property, so that 
when we perceive the salt as being salty, this property is perceived in isolation 
from the rest; in effect, we do not directly perceive the salt as being white and 
bitter at the same time. The “manifold” Hegel mentions is this “also”, the fact 
that in perceiving one particular property, we isolate this property from all the 
others the object possesses. 
 But for all that, there must also be a thing in which these properties 
hang together as a whole. We still apprehend that in tasting the bitterness, we 
are perceiving the same grain of salt we were when, a moment earlier, we were 
seeing “whiteness”. We recognise the bitterness and whiteness as properties 
relating to this salt, and in fact, the recognition of properties demands that 
there be a unitary object. This means that the actual object and its recognisable 
properties are inseparable, but this is not to say that the object is merely its 
properties. A property without a substrate is inconceivable. But also, if an 
object were merely to be its properties, presumably its nature would change 
                                                 
19 Ibid. p. 68 
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depending on which property had entered perception. So Hegel wishes to 
retain consciousness's recognition of individual properties, and at the same 
time the unity of these properties in the thing. However, Hegel also notices 
another peculiarity regarding perception's inability to do the necessary work 
at this level; it comes in the form of the “in-so-far-as”. 
 
What the nature of these untrue essences is really trying to get [perceptual] understanding 
to do is to bring together, and thereby supersede, the thoughts of those non-entities … But 
the Understanding struggles to avoid doing this by resorting to 'in so far as' …20  
 
What is being said here resonates with an interesting issue in medieval 
philosophy. The classic example is that of what it is that makes a particular 
old, ugly and wise man Socrates, but also what it is that makes Socrates 
human. The properties of being “old”, “ugly” and “wise” are not properties 
of all humans. However, at the same time, we need to account for how it comes 
to be that being old, ugly, wise and human are properties in the same 
substance; how do all these individual properties hang together in the 
requisite way? Not just that, but the property of being human seems to exclude 
the properties of being old, ugly and wise, in the same way that one property 
of a grain of salt excludes the others in Hegel's example. Thus, on the one 
hand, we have an issue of “substrate”: what is it that allows the properties of 
“oldness”, “ugliness”, “wisdom” and humanity to be held together in a 
particular individual (Socrates)? On the other hand, we have a “formal” 
problem of trying to understand how Socrates can be human in-so-far-as he is 
not merely old, ugly and wise, since we can have a human being that is none of 
these things.21 In Hegel's words, we need to explain how it occurs that we have 
“… the thoughts of that universality and singular being, of 'Also' and 'One', of 
the essentiality that is necessarily linked to the unessential moment, and of an 
unessential moment that yet is necessary.”22 
                                                 
20 Ibid. p. 78 
21 Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy pp. 109-110 
22 Op. Cit. 
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 At this point, perceptual consciousness is unable to account for this 
peculiar observation. It needs to resort to a phenomenon which can unify the 
object with its properties, but this must be something unseen. Therefore, it 
cannot be perceptual consciousness any more, seeing as this form of 
consciousness is trapped within the things it can have presented to it through 
experience. It becomes “Understanding”, the kind of consciousness which can 
synthesise the data given to it through the senses by positing phenomena that 
act unperceived. So it is apparent then that Hegel has been led to Kant's 
position. The Understanding is that faculty which consists of conceptual 
apparatus, which it then applies to reality. That said, for Hegel, the 
Understanding represents only one manner in which the self can interpret 
reality; and this process of interpretation will only ever be, in the last analysis, 
a process of self-confirmation.23 But this is not to say that Hegel is agreeing with 
Kant. In fact, we shall see that Hegel plays “devil’s advocate” here, adopting 
Kant's position in order to show how the Understanding, like Perception, 
breaks down when faced with a certain inconsistency. 
  
4.1.3 Force 
 This unperceived substrate, that allows things to have properties and 
maintain interactions with one another, Hegel calls Force; an allusion to 
scientific enquiry. Force, for Hegel, has two attributes. It operates “behind the 
scenes”, but we come to know of it through its expression in appearances. 
Force in-itself and Force expressed are essentially bound together, such that it 
looks as if Force is nothing other than its expression.  
In Newtonian physics, for example, Newton gave us a mathematical 
definition of Force: mass multiplied by acceleration (m x a). Now if this is the 
definition of Force, are we not thereby defining Force purely in terms of its 
quantification? But Force cannot in fact be mass times acceleration, this is just 
the way we represent and measure it.  
                                                 
23 Solomon, R. “Hegel’s Epistemology” p.40 
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So Force as it acts in-itself gets re-described by the Understanding, such 
that we lose that qualitative action of Force in order to capture its expression 
formally. Force in-itself essentially and necessarily gets “translated” into talk 
of Force as it is observed. Content becomes form. Thus, Hegel’s dialectic of the 
Understanding begins to unfold. But Hegel is more general than to speak of 
just one Force (gravity, say) and instead is thinking more of Force as a term 
which covers all possible forces (by today's standards, the four fundamental 
forces as well). Jean Hyppolite understands Hegel as going on to say: 
 
When we envisage the fall of a body in space, we posit the same being twice: as reality, the 
motion is a juxtaposition that can be broken down into parts … but we can consider the 
“whole of the motion”, the integral of which it is the realization. We then have force, the 
content of which is identical to its manifestation, but which formally differs from that 
manifestation.24 
 
Force itself differs from its appearance but is nonetheless only evident in its 
appearance as a Force that affects objects. Take for example the idea of the 
“composition” of forces in physics. If we want to know the movement of a 
body in motion, we can consider two or more “compositional” forces acting 
upon the body. Thus, the resultant force equals the sum of the compositional 
forces. So, in the case of the movement of a bicycle, we can do the following: 
refer to the “driving force” (which is the force exerted on the bicycle by the 
rider), the weight of the bicycle and the rider, air resistance against the bicycle 
and the rider and the friction of the wheels against the ground. By taking all 
these components together and subtracting those aspects which impede the 
motion of the bicycle, we can generate a single value, which represents the 
resultant force of the bicycle in motion: that is, the force which accounts for 
the acceleration of the bicycle. 
 With respect to Hegel, when we consider the notion of a resultant force 
we end up with something peculiar: the content of the resultant force is the 
same as its manifestation as the sum of the compositional forces. However, the 
                                                 
24 Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 122 
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form of the resultant force is somehow different. It differs in terms of form 
because the value of the resultant force is one, single value, which is different 
from all of the constituent values of the other forces. But, we can only generate 
this single resultant value by taking together the values of the compositional 
forces. The point is that whilst the form is different because we have a different 
value, the content is the same just because that value is composed of the value 
of the other forces in play. It seems then that the Understanding plays the role 
of synthesising the compositional forces into one, expressed Force. This Force 
exists only insofar as it can be expressed, yet it can only be expressed insofar 
as we can ascertain the value of the compositional forces.  
 Through a series of dense descriptions, Hegel shifts from talk of a “play 
of Forces” (spiel der Kräft) to an actual conflict of different Forces. The thought 
being that the initial Force would have no expression at all where it not for the 
interaction it has with another Force. The one Force “solicits” the other. We 
can see this in the idea of a magnet. Magnetic Force itself is “indifferent” to 
which pole is negative and which positive. The Understanding consciousness 
selects these labels quite independently of any essential feature of a magnet. 
All we can really say is that two poles of the same type repel whilst poles of 
different types attract. The point is that whether it be negative-negative or 
positive-positive, the observable phenomenon is the same: repulsion. But for 
all that, we would not be able to understand magnetic Force as doing anything 
at all were it not for the introduction of another piece of metal to “solicit” the 
initial one. This creates an expression which we can observe and attempt to 
describe.   
 Hegel wants to criticise the notion that we are explaining something 
when we posit two forces acting on each other. It seems to be that the 
introduction of two Forces in opposition is just a pragmatic way of explaining 
observable phenomena, but we are not explaining anything about the 
phenomenon of Force itself. The repulsion of two magnets is utterly 
indifferent to the labels we assign to the non-perceivable forces in action. Just 
as in the idea of composition, the values of the compositional forces are used 
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to provide a value for the resultant force, but to what extent is this “resultant 
force” really explaining the acceleration of a body any more than the 
compositional ones? It seems, were Hegel to talk of resultant force, all we are 
really doing is providing a re-description of the observable. A group of bicycles 
differs from an individual one only formally; it tells us nothing about the 
nature of a bicycle. A group of compositional forces gathered together into a 
resultant force only differs insofar as we get one value instead of many. It tells 
us nothing about the nature of Force itself. Pushed to its extreme, we may even 
say that we are positing non-existent forces to account for observations in 
existent entities. And if this is the case, which Hegel certainly seems to be 
saying it is, what we find in the supersensible beyond is not a set of forces 
acting unperceived, but the activity of our own consciousness. 
 
Thus, the truth of Force remains only the thought of it; the moments of its actuality, their 
substances and their movement collapse into an undifferentiated unity, a unity which is not 
Force driven back into itself … but its Notion qua Notion.25 
 
4.1.4 Laws 
If we grant the above as being true, we may still, at this point, rest 
assured that laws do the real explaining; one explanatory law to explain the 
very nature of a Force’s interactions and relations. However, Hegel rejects the 
idea that introducing Laws gives us an explanatory advantage over Force. We 
can witness today the enduring search for a Law/set of Laws that has the 
explanatory power to unite quantum physics with Einstein's physics of 
relativity (action at a distance providing an interesting example of such 
difficulties). Such a set of simple Laws would thus be able to reconcile the 
merely probable phenomena at the quantum level with the “macroscopic” and 
definite, law-like interactions of bodies of mass in space-time. Hegel would 
deny that such a reconciliation is possible. The idea being that scientists seek 
                                                 
25 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 86 
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to “let many laws collapse into one law”26 but are unable to achieve this, on 
dialectical grounds. 
The problem can be seen as follows: we construct one Law to explain a 
certain phenomenon, and a different Law to explain another. However, in 
their character as Laws, we must then construct yet another Law to explain 
how these two Laws relate to each other. Hegel is demanding unification, when 
all he takes himself to be getting from science (the Understanding) is an ever 
expanding number of seemingly incommensurable laws. We can see a similar 
argument in F.H Bradley's Appearance and Reality. Bradley states that the very 
idea of universals and particulars, or subject-predicate judgements is 
problematic. When we predicate something of a subject, e.g. “the sky is blue”, 
we require a relation to demonstrate how “blue” can be predicated of “sky”. 
But then this relation itself requires another relation to demonstrate how it 
links the initial judgement together. We are thus sent off on an infinite regress, 
constantly needing to compose new relations to account for the previous 
ones.27  
 So, Hegel talks of Laws becoming superficial. On the one hand, they 
are so phenomena-specific that they end up looking a lot like our appeal to 
Force: arbitrary and entirely dependent upon another Force for qualification. 
In other words, Hegel sees a problem in how we can map a general law onto 
specific phenomena, without thereby losing explanatory power. On the other 
hand, if we keep constructing Laws that are more and more general to 
encapsulate the “lower” Laws, we will eventually construct something so 
general that it is “just the mere Notion of law itself …”28 We would end up with 
something that has the form of a Law without any of the content. “The law 
becomes more and more superficial, and as a result what is found is, in fact, 
not the unity of these specific laws, but a law which leaves out their specific 
character …”29  
                                                 
26 Ibid. p. 91 
27 Francis Herbert Bradley, Appearance and Reality pp. 25-34 
28Op. Cit.  
29 Idem. 
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4.1.5 The Supersensible “Verkehrtewelt” 
 If we recall, the transition from Perceptual consciousness to the 
Understanding was tracked because unity in phenomena posed a problem for 
perception. However, the understanding strives for just this; unity is the aim 
of the Understanding, that form of consciousness that actively posits Force to 
relate phenomena, and Laws to explain Force. But Law, as with Force, comes 
out looking problematic, and it would seem at this point that a transition to 
another form of consciousness is required to overcome the problems 
associated with the Understanding. At this point though, Hegel thinks the 
Understanding makes one last attempt to salvage its explanatory power and 
this is where Hegel begins to adopt the Kantian notion of the “noumenon”, 
which Hegel terms the “supersensible”. Hegel thinks that this supersensible 
realm is either a realm of Forces and Laws underneath the appearances, or it 
is a realm where consciousness actively transcends appearances, so there is 
nothing there but the activity of consciousness. Hegel's argument going 
forward is reminiscent of the approach taken by Kant in his antinomies, and 
we can express it as a simple either-or: either we, (a) like Kant, deem the 
supersensible to be the noumenal aspect of reality, ultimately and essentially 
beyond knowledge; or we (b) conclude that the world of appearances is itself 
contradictory. Both routes for Hegel are equally fruitless. 
 Hegel introduces the easily misunderstood notion of the Verkehrtewelt 
– a “topsy-turvy” or “inverted” world. In this world, everything is the 
complete opposite of how it appears.  
 
According, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is like in the first world is unlike to 
itself, and what is unlike in the first world is equally unlike to itself, or it becomes like itself … 
[T]his means that what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, 
what in the former is black is, in the other, white.30 
 
                                                 
30 Ibid. p. 97 
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Here, Hegel seems to be following what Adorno terms Kant’s “duplication of 
the world”31 With this bizarre description, Hegel does not mean to paint what 
he thinks is a true picture of reality. He is setting himself up to demonstrate 
how perverse the notion of the noumenon actually is. The Understanding, by 
trying to account for phenomena with scientific explanations, winds up 
creating a world that is by its own standards inconsistent. The move seems to 
imply that Kant was stuck at the level of the Understanding all along, whereas 
what he should have realised was that whilst the Understanding cannot gain 
epistemic access to this world, Reason, as Hegel conceives it, can. Reason deals 
with the world as it is “in-itself-for-us".32 
 In keeping with the rest of this chapter thus far, Hegel introduces 
another supersensible world which is in conflict with the former. The former 
supersensible world is this scientific realm of Laws and Forces, whilst the 
second is the Verkehrtwelt proper. Now in the realm of appearances, the world 
as it is for consciousness, we are aware of changes in phenomena. This simply 
means that when, say, the north pole of one magnet is exposed to the south 
pole of another, the two magnets attract; there has been a change, in space, of 
the position of the magnets. The Understanding accounts for this change by 
constructing universal Laws, the content of which remains constant (like, for 
example, Einstein's idea that the speed of light c is constant). So, in the world 
of experience, we observe change over time. However, in the first 
supersensible world, we have unchanging and eternal phenomena: Laws. 
Hegel's second supersensible world, as the opposite of the first, contains again 
ever changing and differing phenomena: “Through this principle, the first 
supersensible world, the tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the 
perceived world, is changed into its opposite”33 If this second supersensible 
world is the reality of the world of Laws, then the apparently constant laws 
which we used to explain change in appearances are also subject to change. 
The Laws lose their character as universal by definition, since we are using 
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32 Ibid. p. 102 
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them to explain the specific and dynamic. Hegel’s claim is that at the level of 
the Understanding, consciousness will demand deeper and deeper levels of 
explanation; but the deeper the levels get, the shallower the explanations 
become. 
Unlike the world of Laws, Hegel seems to want to make the baffling 
claim that the second supersensible world is indeed real. This would mean 
that here, Hegel is taking the second route (b) mentioned earlier: that the 
world in itself is contradictory. However, Hegel is taking route (b) in order to 
demonstrate the absurdity of Kant's position. For if we propose a noumenal 
realm, we are in no way justified in saying what the properties of things in this 
realm are like. The noumenal properties of objects that are supposed to 
structure the appearance of phenomenal properties may be the complete 
opposite, or in no way similar, to their phenomenal counterparts. The 
existence of a noumenal realm leads to contradiction in reality.  
 
4.1.6 Implications for Transcendental Idealism 
When pushed to its limits in this way, transcendental idealism creates 
more problems than it solves, because it implicitly allows for the possibility of 
a contradiction at the ontological level. But it is quite perverse to say that 
contradictions exist. One might respond to this by saying that the noumenon 
does not in itself contradict the phenomena or vice versa. There would be no 
contradiction to notice if it were not for the appearance of phenomena in 
consciousness, and this, for Kant, is none other than the imposition of concepts 
upon the noumena. Or that the understanding and its conceptual structures 
are the condition for the possibility of any recognition of contradiction, and as 
pre-categorized, the noumena cannot intelligibly be said to contradict 
anything at all. However, the point can be pressed: if the imposition of 
concepts upon reality leaves space for the possibility of contradiction in reality, 
then why should we hold to such a distinction in the first place? Hegel's 
answer is that we really should not. We would be in a much less perverse 
position if we assumed that we experience reality directly, and that cognition 
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does nothing but create “a merely immediate and therefore effortless 
relationship.”34 Hegel seems to be attempting to show that from adherence to 
Kant's notion of the noumena, anything can follow, even a bizarre world of 
opposites. 
 This is the true power of Hegel's argument here. Kant was aware of 
such a situation, as alluded to in his antinomies, where Kant demonstrated 
that an attempt at knowing the thing-in-itself causes irreconcilable 
contradiction. 
 
Here reason tries at first, with the illusion of great plausibility, to establish its principle of 
unconditioned unity, but soon becomes entangled in so many contradictions that it must, 
with regard to cosmology, give up its claims to such unity.35 
 
But the problem, as far as Hegel sees it, is that if positing a “beyond”, a 
noumenal, creates such entanglements, then we should not abide by such a 
positing. For him, all of this unrest in the dialectic of the Understanding 
amounts to one thing: that the Understanding (science; transcendental 
idealism) is a stop-gap in the actual phenomenology of Spirit. The confusion 
indicates nothing else than that transcendental idealism is to be overcome (or 
“sublated”; transcended and preserved) by a new form of cognition.  
However, this does not remove the difficulty which motivated Kant: 
how can one reconcile the scientific world view with the moral/human one? 
That is: if we are to agree with Hegel, that what appears to us in consciousness 
is the way reality is in itself, then a major epistemological conflict still seems 
to exist; the conflict between scientific and human world views.  
 We should consider one important way in which the Phenomenology 
progresses – from one form of consciousness to another, it is this: the (very 
same) world appears differently to different forms of (the very same) 
consciousness. A useful way to compare this is by thinking of Heidegger's 
distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand (which will be 
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explained in more detail in the next chapter). When viewed theoretically, the 
world throws up all the structures of science. It becomes impersonal because 
our actual view of the object has changed. The mountain can either be a source 
of building materials, when viewed practically or “ready-to-hand” but when 
viewed theoretically, “present-at-hand”, it becomes a geological structure. 
This is not to say that we never apprehend the object as it is in-itself, but 
merely that any apprehension of an object is loaded with a significance, 
dependent on our practical context. When we want something from an object, 
or have a desire to put it to use, it gains a practical significance. However, 
when we merely want to examine an object to gain scientific knowledge, it is 
furnished with a theoretical significance. Nothing about the object has 
changed, merely the manner in which it is apprehended.36 A tree still 
maintains the same basic properties (of being tall, brown and with foliage 
[dependent on the season]), but it is loaded with a different significance for 
specific instances of observation or observers. But without a consistent 
apprehension of the tree as it is in-itself, it remains impossible to see how these 
varying instances could be unified. Hegel eliminates the need for a noumenal 
and sees the commensurability of these instances as lying within a dialectical 
process that is beyond the individual Spirit, but non-transcendental in nature; 
it lies within the interactions between multiple observers and hence, Hegel 
proceeds to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage. 
 That said, when looking at Hegel’s argument about scientific Forces 
from a modern perspective (having the advantage of living in a post-
Einsteinian age), we see that it is somewhat dubious. We seem to be learning 
more and more about the nature of forces themselves and the fundamental 
effects they have had on the universe as a whole. With the benefit of such 
hindsight, we might even question whether modern physics really does 
operate as Hegel describes it. This is a debate out of place in this thesis. The 
real point here is when we take Hegel to be opposing transcendental idealism 
in ‘Force and the Understanding’, there is a genuine and valuable argument.
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Heidegger and the Notion of Worldhood 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 We have seen how Hegel makes important moves towards going 
beyond the Kantian philosophy of his time. In his dialectic on Force and the 
Understanding, Hegel develops an argument that accuses Kantianism of 
material contradiction. We can – and must – distinguish between this type of 
contradiction and that of conceptual contradiction if we are to understand 
Hegel clearly enough. For Hegel’s dialectic makes definite use of the latter, 
showing how apparently opposed concepts inherently bleed into one another, 
such that, in the case previously discussed, the expression of some physical 
force turns out to be nothing other than the activity of the understanding when 
it attempts to explain observations regarding the world. But this contradiction 
lies merely in force and the understanding qua concepts. What this dialectic 
shows is that Kantianism, in its commitment to the idea of an unknowable 
thing-in-itself, is guilty of a more severe contradiction that Hegel succeeds in 
avoiding.  
 However, Hegel does not move beyond idealism completely. For him, 
the only notion of a thing-in-itself that makes sense is one which is merely the 
expression of some aspect of consciousness. The Absolute Idealism which 
Hegel espouses is one that unfolds in the Phenomenology; in other words, the 
whole of the Phenomenology is the description of consciousness as it proceeds 
towards greater and greater self-knowledge, and, by extension, greater 
knowledge of reality in itself. It becomes difficult to see how Hegel’s advances 
over Kantianism do not in the end collapse into a form of idealism that is even 
more ontologically suspect than Kant’s. For if reality is the reflection of the 
multitude of ways that consciousness apprehends itself, we seem to lose the 
epistemological gap at the cost of any account of a concrete world. But this is 
misleading. It is more accurate to see Hegel as attempting to bring all of reality 
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within the domain of the understanding. Not, as in Berkeley, by claiming that 
the understanding constitutes reality, but by showing that reality and the 
understanding are intimately tied together. In other words, the Kantian thing-
in-itself can be nothing other than an aspect of the understanding.  
 At the very least, Hegel’s engagement with Kantianism provides us 
with a way beyond representational theories of knowledge. It also allows us 
to salvage the a priori without being committed to the idea that we cannot 
know anything about reality beyond the use we make of these a priori 
categories.  The drawback is he still does not move beyond idealism. To 
achieve this, I propose a turn towards the work of Martin Heidegger, whose 
phenomenological investigations into the nature of object and world-
disclosure furnishes us with all the advantages of the Hegelian move beyond 
Kant, whilst also avoiding the collapse into any form of idealism.  
 This chapter aims to move beyond German idealism completely. We 
have already seen, through Hegel’s forms of consciousness, how the Kantian 
phenomenal realm fails to deliver on its promise to dissolve the tension 
between freedom and natural necessity. We saw Hegel develop forms of 
consciousness to compensate for this, Kant being one step in a teleological 
journey that brings us closer to Absolute self-knowledge. But as we have 
discussed, Hegel was still very much locked within the idealism of his 
predecessors, albeit in a different form. Introducing the Heideggerian notion 
of Worldhood allows us to see a way out of idealism on the one hand, and 
gives us the theoretical apparatus to conjure a new notion of freedom that can 
successfully dissolve the problem of freedom and natural necessity – that of 
Freedom-in-the-World.  
 To begin this turn of focus, I suggest we pay close attention to a passage 
in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Of ‘worldhood’, Heidegger says: 
 
That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for 
which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of 
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered 
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in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of 
the world.37 
 
There are two main reasons I begin with this passage. (1) It is a great example 
of Heidegger’s use of original terminology; he makes a very explicit attempt 
to avoid using the terms of other philosophers, which can be both fascinating 
at times, and frustrating at others. (2) Packed into this passage is, in fact, a 
succinct definition of exactly what Heidegger understands worldhood to be. 
However, to see this exactness, it is necessary to unpack both the terminology 
in the passage and the steps leading up to it.  
 
5.2 Hegelian and Heideggerian Phenomenology 
Firstly, we need to be sure about what “phenomenology” means to 
both thinkers. They use the same term in different senses. As we have seen, 
Hegel’s intention in the Phenomenology is to allow us to observe the different 
forms of consciousness; the development of consciousness as it advances in its 
understanding of the world, and, by extension, itself. Thus, “phenomenology” 
as Hegel conceives it is not a method but a movement, which he describes as 
“the way of the Soul which journeys through its own configurations as though 
they were appointed for it by its own nature.”38 Hegel is really only attempting 
to lead the philosopher through different modes of consciousness to the point 
where one is set to realise that all along, what we assumed to know about 
external objects was merely self-reference – that the thing-in-itself coincides 
with the thing as it is for-consciousness. In turn, the progress of philosophy as a 
whole coincides with the progress of consciousness at the level of Spirit. With 
that in mind, we can say that Hegel's use of the term “phenomenology” refers 
to “the absolute self-presentation of reason …”39 
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39 Heidegger, M. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit p. 30 
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His motivation for this is to “help bring philosophy closer to the form 
of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be 
actual knowing…”40 
This has little, if anything in common with the way in which Heidegger 
uses the term “phenomenology” in relation to his own project. On this very 
issue, Heidegger states: 
 
The Phenomenology has nothing to do with a phenomenology of consciousness as currently 
understood in Husserl’s sense – either in its theme or in the manner of its treatment, or above 
all in terms of its basic questioning and intention. This is true not only if this phenomenology 
of consciousness is given the task of universally grounding and justifying the scientificality of 
every conceivable science, but also if the transcendental phenomenology of consciousness is 
obliged to take on the task of exploring and grounding the constitution of human culture 
universally, with reference to consciousness.41 
 
So, where Hegel attempts to describe the forms of consciousness as they 
progress and develop, with the intention of making philosophy “actual 
knowledge”, phenomenology as Husserl conceives it is a method of 
understanding the intentional structure of consciousness – the peculiar fact 
that consciousness is always about something; it always has an object. Husserl 
was also not concerned with making philosophy more scientific per se, but 
instead he saw philosophy as having the power to ground the sciences; in a 
sense, his motivation was to make the sciences themselves more 
philosophically rigorous. It is this latter sense of the term “phenomenology” 
that Heidegger inherits.  
However, Heidegger is more sensitive to the subtleties of the Ancient 
Greek terms that go to make up the word “phenomenology”. This modern 
term is composed of the Greek verb φαινόμενoν, “phainomenon” (“to show”, 
to become “unhidden”), and the Greek noun λόγος, “logos” (“to say”, 
“speech”, “discourse”). Sensitivity to this composition allows us to see the 
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specific way in which Heidegger will use “phenomenology”. It is a method of 
letting “that which shows itself be seen from in itself in the very way in which 
it shows itself from itself.”42 In other words, phenomenology of this sort is 
concerned with things exactly as they are disclosed to some observer or other. 
These ideas of something becoming “unhidden” or “disclosed” will play a 
crucial role in the development of Freedom-in-the-world later in the thesis.  
That said, and despite Heidegger’s protestations in the passage above, 
there is an important way in which Hegel’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies 
are similar. They both place emphasis on self-manifestation. The main 
difference is that in Hegel's work we are presented with the self-manifestation 
of Reason, whereas in Heidegger, we are given an actual mode of doing 
philosophy, which dedicates itself to describing the manner in which objects 
are manifested in experience. In any attempt to bring these two thinkers 
together, it is essential to notice this difference, because it is a difference that 
determines the “arm’s length” at which we should also keep the two apart. 
There is also another possible confusion that I wish to allay here. One 
might question whether my selection of Heidegger to supplement Hegel is a 
somewhat arbitrary move. Or maybe one would wish to criticise such a move 
on the grounds that I may be guilty of trying to clear up a possible complexity 
in Hegel's thought with the possible complexity of someone else’s. This is not 
the case. What should be stressed is that the notion of “subjectivity” implicit 
in Heidegger's conception of World bears a striking similarity to Hegel's 
analysis of our relation to knowledge of the in-itself. Or more precisely: both 
thinkers attempt an abandonment of the traditional notion of “subjectivity” as 
a private realm, in favour of one which places the subject in the world 
essentially. I will present Heidegger's move in this respect later, but for now it 
suffices to say that this similarity is enough to justify the introduction of 
Heidegger in response to Hegel. 
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5.3 Readiness-to-hand and Presence-at-hand 
Any proper understanding of Heidegger's concept of World requires 
an understanding of one of his insightful distinctions – “zuhandenheit” and 
“vorhandenheit”; “Readiness-to-hand” and “Presence-at-hand”. To understand 
this distinction is essential because it is in highlighting these differing manners 
in which we grasp external objects that Heidegger argues we can come to a 
clear definition of the phenomenon of World. The importance that readiness-
to-hand will end up carrying is significant enough for me to dedicate a 
substantial section to showing what it is and how Heidegger thinks it can lead 
us to World.  
 But first, it is necessary to give ourselves an indication of why 
Heidegger believes an elucidation of World is needed, or what possible thing 
he could be aiming to clarify when he refers to World. As humans in the world, 
our mode of Being (the manner in which we exist) may be described as Being-
in-the-world. Therefore World is “one of the constitutive items of Being-in-
the-world.”43 However, Being-in-the-world is a way to describe an agents 
“Being”, as it is existing. It is an existential characteristic and thus World is 
classified as what Heidegger calls an existentiale – it is something that goes to 
make up part of our “existence-structure”.44 “Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a 
way of characterising those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather 
a characteristic of Dasein itself.”45 Dasein is Heidegger’s term for the human 
being, but he sees it as a less presumptuous term. For it pertains to the feature 
of a human being that it is “there” in the world, hence, “Da” (there) “Sein” 
(being) – “there-being”. Heidegger wants to be able to refer to the human 
being in such a way that our inherited assumptions regarding “human being” 
(such as “consciousness”, or “rational animal”) do not creep in to the 
phenomenological analysis itself.46  
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 That said, in treating the world in this manner, we do not necessarily 
need to make our investigation a purely subjective one. We can still inquire 
about World by treating the Being of entities in the world. If we fail to notice 
that Being-in-the-world “is a state of Dasein”47 then we immediately lose 
access to the World. “[E]ven the phenomenon of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, 
for instance, in romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the 
concept of world …”48 One of the crucial breakthroughs of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology is something that is retained in Heidegger’s 
existential analytic, and we see this retention nowhere more clearly than in the 
above statement regarding the avoidance of subjectivity.  
 It would be a naive misreading of phenomenology in general if we were 
to argue that it is too subjective – that in analysing one’s own experiences, all 
we achieve is a clarification of the structure of our own experiences alone. But, 
as mentioned, the phenomenology that Husserl developed (and was in some 
respects inherited by Heidegger) is safeguarded against such a misreading.  
 
I must develop a purely eidetic phenomenology and that in [this] alone the first actualization 
of a philosophical science – the actualization of a “first philosophy” – takes place or can take 
place. After transcendental reduction, my true interest is directed to my pure ego, to the 
uncovering of this de facto ego. But the uncovering can become genuinely scientific, only if I 
go back to the apodictic principles that pertain to this ego as exemplifying the eidos ego: the 
essential universalities and necessities by means of which the fact is to be related to its 
rational grounds (those of its pure possibility) and this made scientific (logical).49 
 
What is meant here is that, by focusing on the content of one’s own 
experiences, phenomenology is that procedure by which we achieve truly 
objective results. The phenomenological method of enquiry takes as its object 
phenomena that are so basic, that if they are true of one’s own experience, they 
must also be true of anyone else’s. By finding what is necessarily the case for 
the structure of my experience, I subsequently find what is necessarily the case 
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for any possible experience. By focussing on the meant content of my experience 
I am able to identify the structures of consciousness that make that content 
possible, and in doing so identify a priori the structure of any possible similar 
experience. Phenomenology allows us access to the universally applicable 
truths of the subject. As I only have my own subjectivity to observe, I must 
start with this single case. However, in finding what is most basic and 
primordial for my own subjectivity, I find what is most basic and primordial 
for any possible subjectivity. So, whilst the starting point of pure 
phenomenology is the experiences I have, or the Being that I am, its findings 
are held to apply universally – thus, any accusations of “subjectivity” cannot 
gain a foothold.  
 With that in mind, Heidegger's investigation into World will take the 
form of his “existential analytic” of Dasein. When we consider the Being of 
entities, we must do so as we encounter them in our everyday operations. This 
is when we are most “wrapped up” in the world. This relates to Heidegger's 
criticism of the idea that res cogitans (thinking substance) and res extensa 
(corporeal substance) can be distinguished neatly as thinking-thing and the 
object of thought. “For in our natural comportment toward things we never 
think a single thing, and whenever we seize upon it expressly for itself we are 
taking it out of a contexture to which it belongs in its real content …”50 Objects 
are cognitively present to us, Heidegger does not deny this. However, he 
thinks that when we are going about our everyday lives, thinking about, say, 
a wall, we in fact take that wall out of the context in which we initially 
encountered it – as part of a broader mass of other objects in the surroundings. 
In a manner of speaking, to “think” of a wall, in order to say, paint a certain 
section of it, we isolate the wall from the rest of the structure it is connected 
with, yet when we most immediately encounter this wall in our everyday 
dealings, we encounter it in its very connection with the rest of the structure. 
We do not just see a wall, but many walls, floors, skirting boards, shelves and 
whatever else. What is most primordial, for Heidegger then, is that initial 
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experience of the whole of the structure and, only on the basis of this, can we 
then isolate individual features of things.  
 
The walls are present even before we think them as objects. Much else also gives itself to us 
before any determining of it by thought. But how? Not as a jumbled heap of things but as an 
environs, a surroundings, which contains within itself a closed, intelligible contexture.51 
 
This is not to say that we gradually construct such a contexture as we 
progress through our everyday lives, but things are given to us primarily 
within this contexture. So “World” lies then in this contexture within which 
objects are most primordially encountered. In proceeding with a clarification 
of World, Heidegger believes it necessary not to concern ourselves with 
objects in the world as such, but the manner in which we grasp them as objects 
in the first place. So the phenomenological description of “World” will not be 
concerned with describing entities “in” the world as they appear to our senses. 
It is a case of describing these entities in their ontological dimension, which 
means “to exhibit the Being of those entities …”52 To highlight their 
intelligibility to the phenomenological observer and describe the structure of 
this intelligibility – the exposition of the Being of things.  
Heidegger thinks that the most immediate “things” we apprehend are 
articles of equipment. Clearly there are specific categories or contexts of 
equipment, “equipment for working, for traveling, for measuring, and in 
general things with which we have to do.”53 Despite this, we first encounter a 
totality of equipment (“zeug”), a whole of equipment which consists of the 
different types. This primary “seeing” of the equipmental totality is what 
Heidegger calls circumspection. This is our “practical everyday orientation.”54 
It is through circumspection that things are apprehended as articles of 
equipment. Equipment is not taken as a “theme” in thought; it is “non-
thematic”. When philosophers take particular objects as examples of certain 
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acts of thought (e.g. Descartes' wax) they are actually making the object their 
theme explicitly, thereby taking it out of the context within which it is actually 
most immediate to experience. “We say that any equipmental contexture 
environs us.”55 So our explication of Being must begin with the entities which 
go to make up our environment in everydayness. These will be entities with 
which we enter practical relations – tools, equipment, pens, mugs and so on. 
However, Heidegger’s main intention is to find the underlying possibility of 
us being able to enter practical relations in the first place. “In the disclosure 
and explication of Being, entities are in every case our preliminary and our 
accompanying theme; but our real theme is Being.”56 
 These objects, which we make our “accompanying theme” are not sorts 
of epistemological tools. We do not use them to analyse or make sense of the 
world in a theoretical way. “[T]hey are simply what gets used, what gets 
produced …”57 It is not a case of examining such objects and describing their 
ontical characteristics. As phenomenologists, we need to “determine the 
structure of Being which [these] entities possess.”58 
 Thus, we do not need to place ourselves in a particular mode or 
“mindset” so that we can “imagine” a situation where we are engaged 
practically with objects. We do not need to construct thought experiments. 
This is because, as a matter of fact, this practical engagement is “the way in 
which everyday Dasein always is …”59 The aim is not to interpret our 
everyday dealings per se, but to describe our dealings with entities. These 
specifically are the entities Heidegger gives the name “equipment” to. “The 
kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited … [T]his lies in 
our first defining what makes an item of equipment – namely, its 
equipmentality.”60 
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 For every instance of equipment, we can say of it essentially that it is 
“something in-order-to ….”61 For example, “this mug is used in order to drink 
from”, “this pen is used in order to write with ….” We can notice a “totality of 
equipment”62 by noting a series of “in-order-to's” that form a reference to 
different instances of equipment like links in a chain. “In the 'in-order-to' as a 
structure, there lies an assignment or reference of something to something.”63  
 
Equipment … [A]lways is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, 
paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room.64 
 
Heidegger thinks in this instance what we first proximally encounter is a 
room. But we do not encounter it as a spatial restriction “between four walls”, 
but “as somewhere to reside”. It is from this encounter that the arrangement 
emerges.65 What is so important for Heidegger here is that the totality of 
equipment, stuff with all its relations to other stuff, is encountered before we 
seize upon any individual item of equipment. No matter how quickly I seize 
upon, say, the hook in-order-to hang my jacket, my most immediate 
experience is of the totality of equipment arranged in the room. 
 So Heidegger thinks that “[e]quipment can show itself only in dealings 
cut to its own measure …”66 Thus, the hook for hanging jackets is most 
apparent when we put it to use “in a way which could not possibly be more 
suitable.”67 The equipment is constituted by its in-order-to structure, so when 
we use the hook in-order-to hang jackets, we enter into the most basic 
(primordial) relation with it, “and the more unveiledly is it encountered as 
that which it is – as equipment.”68 The act of hanging my jacket reveals the 
specific function of the hook. In fact, we can explicitly state that it is in virtue 
of its function that we can take the hook as exactly what it is.“[T]he 
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functionality that goes with … [something] … is exactly that which makes the 
thing what it is.”69 Thus, something with this mode of appearing, whereby the 
thing is revealed to us as what it 'is' in virtue of what it can be used for 
(equipment) is what we call ready-to-hand. It is only because equipment can be 
ready-to-hand that it can be manipulated. The external appearance of an object 
will not suffice to reveal its readiness-to-hand. I cannot merely stare at the 
hook and find it useful. The act of putting equipment to use is not blind.70 It is 
engaged, and this engagement imbues the object with its “specific Thingly 
character.”71 
 However, presence-at-hand is that mode of encounter we have with 
objects whereby we merely look at them or observe them for scientific or 
investigative reasons. We wish to make no use of them, we just aim to 
apprehend them. But as we have seen, Heidegger thinks that objects do not 
come to us in this manner, but to take an object in its presence-at-hand is to 
take it out of the context in which we first encountered it. When it comes to 
clarifying World then, the ready-to-hand will be given priority.  
 That said, the reader may well have been led into thinking that our 
everyday dealings “proximally dwell with the tools themselves.”72 This is not 
the case; what we actually concern ourselves with is the work we intend to 
produce (where Heidegger uses “werk” in quite a specific manner – as in “A 
work of art” and not “I have to go to work today.” We would read the latter 
sense of “work” as “arbeit”). “The work to be produced, as the “towards-which” 
of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind 
of Being that belongs to equipment.”73  
 Heidegger's craft-like examples help to clarify the arguments at work 
here. If I intend to produce a bench, I am going to need the things mentioned 
in the passage above. Whilst each piece of equipment has its very own in-
order-to structure (e.g. “hammer in-order-to bang nails into wood.”) their use 
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is motivated by a definite goal or end, which is the thing to be produced – the 
bench. What we end up with then is a referential totality. “The saw in-order-
to cut wood, the hammer in-order-to bang nails into wood, the plane in-order-
to shave the wood, and all of this in-order-to construct the bench.” But the 
bench is ultimately constructed in-order-to sit on. It is for-the-sake-of Dasein 
to sit on (this is a point we will come back to later). For now it is enough to 
note that even in the series of in-order-to's leading to the completion of the 
bench, we are referred to a broader totality.  
 
Hammer, tongs and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that 
they consist of these. In equipment that is used, 'Nature' is discovered along with it by that 
use – the 'Nature' we find in natural products.74 
 
In this situation, we are not to conceive of Nature as merely being 
present-at-hand. Nature becomes an expanse of usable equipment – it is 
ready-to-hand. It is easy here to read Heidegger as justifying some form of 
extreme environmental consumption. However, he seems to be making the 
simpler point that when we are engaged in production, Nature becomes an 
extended member of the referential totality. We can of course view Nature in 
its pure presence, when we have no practical concern with it – in its presence-
at-hand. When we do this, its readiness-to-hand is concealed. “The botanist's 
plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' which the geographer 
establishes for a river is not the 'springhead in the dale'!”75 The observation of 
nature for scientific purposes and nature as present for use offer up two 
distinct realms of intelligibility.  
 Heidegger also notes that the work to be produced carries with it a 
reference to the person who it is designed for. “The work is cut to his figure; 
he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges.”76 This need not be a particular 
individual, but it can, and more likely does, refer to the average, generalised 
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person who we may associate with the work. If I produce a javelin, I would 
have in mind a general conception of the athlete who would throw it. In fact 
if I didn't, the javelin may not even turn out to be fit for purpose. “Thus, along 
with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities 
with Dasein's kind of Being …”77 Importantly then, any work that we may be 
wrapped up in is ready-to-hand not only in the workshop environment, but 
also in the public sphere. In this public sphere, or public world, entities in the 
environment, accessible to everyone, direct us towards nature. The bridge 
directs or refers us to the river or crevice which it enables us to cross, the 
streetlights indicate what point in the day it is if they are on or off and “in the 
clock, we tacitly make use of the sun's position.”78 So it is not just the bare 
materials used in the construction of work, but the finished work itself which 
carries a reference to Nature.  
Presence-at-hand is revealed only when we abstract from our view of 
objects as ready-to-hand. “Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they 
are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially.”79 Despite this, we must still 
maintain that there could be no ready-to-hand objects without there being 
entities merely present-at-hand. “Does it follow, however … that readiness-
to-hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand?”80 We seem to hit 
up against a circular argument here: on the one hand, we have to “penetrate 
beyond”81 the ready-to-hand to reach presence-at-hand, yet the ready-to-hand 
seems to ultimately depend upon there being entities present-at-hand. What 
is more, Heidegger raises the question of whether readiness-to-hand, even if 
demonstrated to be more primordial than presence-at-hand, could even give 
us what we are looking for – the ontological significance of the concept of 
World. In fact, it seems that all our talk of entities within-the-world actually 
presupposes World (as is evident in the term within-the-world itself). “If, then, 
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we start with the Being of these entities, is there any avenue that will lead us 
to exhibiting the phenomenon of the world?”82 
 The goal then is to explain how we can get to the concept of World from 
the entities bound up in it. It is important to notice that the world is not an 
entity within-the-world, but it is a condition of these entities “showing up” in 
the first place. 
  
Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a 
possibility of Being in which the worldhood of these entities within-the-world … is … lit up for 
it, along with those entities themselves?83 
 
It is this route that Heidegger will take in clarifying the concept of 
world. By studying Dasein's concernful dealings, in which that worldhood 
which is bound up with these dealings becomes apparent, we have a platform 
upon which to build a concept of “World”. 
 The usefulness of equipment will depend upon a certain “mode of 
concern”84. If we need to hammer some nails into our bench and the hammer 
falls apart, then, according to Heidegger, we do not discover the hammer is 
useless just by looking at it. We discover it through the “circumspection of the 
dealings in which we use it.”85 The hammer is not fit for purpose, in the sense 
that it cannot perform its “in-order-to”, and therefore that link in the chain 
with regards to the work we are trying to produce is broken. The equipment 
becomes “conspicuous”.86 “This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand 
equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand.”87 We might think of it as a 
“dissonance” between the purpose of the equipment and its suitability for this 
very purpose. The conspicuous equipment becomes present-at-hand. It is no 
longer a “hammer” per se but a thing that “just lies there”88. The implication 
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here is that something appeared ready-to-hand has at the same time always 
been present-at-hand. 
 
Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the 
readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself – that is to say, the sort of 
thing we find when we put it back into repair.89 
 
 Heidegger states that when equipment is present-at-hand in this 
manner, it does not follow that it is a mere thing and the damage to it is purely 
just a change in its properties. Heidegger is not here explicit about why it does 
not follow, though presumably it is because the ready-to-hand withdraws to 
the present-at-hand. Something which was at one point fit for purpose could 
never take on the full status of the being of a mere thing, because even a broken 
hammer still refers us, in some sense, back to the fact that it was once a useful 
hammer.  
 That said, we do not just encounter equipment that is not fit for 
purpose. Heidegger sees something significant in the idea that we also come 
across missing equipment, things which “not only are not 'handy’, but are not 
'to hand' at all.”90 Despite the difference in situation, the mode of concern 
remains the same – we encounter the un-ready-to-hand. 
 Take for example the workshop where all the tools have a very specific 
place, demarcated by an image of each tool on the walls. We reach for a file 
only to find its image where the file should be. When we realise something is 
missing, all the other equipment ready-to-hand becomes “obtrusive”.91 The 
hammer next to the place the where the file should be is in the way, it imposes 
itself upon my concern precisely because it is not what I want.  
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The more urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in 
its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand become 
…92 
 
Things become so obtrusive that they seem to lose their readiness-to-hand, 
they are just “in the way”. The obtrusive becomes present-at-hand. Heidegger 
considers this concern a deficient mode. We treat the ready-to-hand 
equipment as “present-at-hand-and-nothing-more”93 only because what we 
urgently need is missing.  
 There is yet another way something can be un-ready-to-hand. We have 
already seen how something can be “conspicuous” or “obtrusive”. Heidegger 
also thinks something can be “obstinate”94. Here, something can be in full 
working order and not in fact missing, but are in the way of the completion of 
our project. There are also things that “call for attention” in the sense of 
something which needs to be attended to and “stands in the way of our 
concern.”95 Whilst I am working on the bench I might occasionally catch a 
glimpse of the door of the workshop which needs repairing. However, I keep 
putting it off for other things, like the bench. The door is obstinate because it 
does not fit in with my current concern – it is un-ready-to-hand, in the same 
way a sink full of dirty dishes might be when one is trying to read. This 
obstinacy actually disturbs us, because it reveals “that with which we must 
concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else.”96  
 What all these modes of concern have in common is that they “all have 
the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in 
what is ready-to-hand.”97 However, what is ready-to-hand does not become 
present-at-hand by being stared at. As we have already seen, this presence-at-
hand is all along bound up with readiness-to-hand. Whilst all our talk is still 
currently of entities within-the-world, these instances put us in a position to 
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bring into view the phenomenon we are currently striving to clarify – World 
or “Worldhood”.  
 As aforementioned, when something is unusable, its presence-at-hand 
is revealed. It is un-ready-to-hand. Whilst Heidegger's choice of the term here 
can seem awkward, it is actually very helpful. It enables us to see that 
something un-ready-to-hand does not completely lose its initial character as 
ready-to-hand. If it did, there would be no sense in using the term at all. We 
could just use “present-at-hand”. The use of “un-ready-to-hand” illustrates 
how equipment retains an element of our initial encounter of it being ready-
to-hand. The use of the “un-” still refers to “ready-to-hand” in the same way 
the “un” in “unusable” refers to something which would have been “usable” 
at another time or in a different context.  
 
[Readiness-to-hand] does not vanish simply, but takes its farewell, as it were, in the 
conspicuousness of the unusable. Readiness-to-hand still shows itself, and it is precisely here 
that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself too.98 
 
The Being of something ready-to-hand “is determined by references or 
assignments”99 such as the in-order-to structure. Heidegger thinks that in our 
everyday concern we actually deal with things in themselves (contra Kant of 
course). We encounter things in themselves in the kind of concernful dealings 
just touched upon, where we “make use of [things] without noticing them 
explicitly …”100  
Our practical engagement with objects is “passive” in the sense that 
when using, say, a hammer, we do not take the thing explicitly as a hammer – 
we merely use it. When something becomes unusable, it breaks down our “in-
order-to-towards-which”. “But when an assignment has been disturbed … then 
the assignment becomes explicit.”101 When the unusability of equipment 
occurs, and our absorption in the project breaks down, that “towards-which” 
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we were working on becomes explicit. In Heidegger's words, we “catch sight 
of the “towards-this” itself …”102 In this moment, the entirety of the things 
related to the project become apparent. 
 
The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality 
constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world 
announces itself.103 
 
 This goes without saying not just for the conspicuous, but the obtrusive 
also. When something is in its place it is so obviously there we have only ever 
implicitly noticed it. When we discover that it is not where it should be, “this 
makes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers.”104 
The absence of the equipment makes explicit what we needed it for, not only 
regarding the immediate in-order-to, but also the towards-which, the work 
itself we are trying to complete. This work and everything else revealed is 
nothing ready-to-hand or present-at-hand but is that upon which these modes 
are founded before all circumspection. (Heidegger uses the somewhat 
confusing expression “it is in the 'there'”105 to describe the references as being 
neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand.) 
 
 
5.4 Clarification of ‘Worldhood’ 
The world, then, according to Heidegger, “does not 'consist' of the 
ready-to-hand.”106 This is evident in the fact that the three modes of concern 
just covered reveal equipment as present-at-hand, so that it is “deprived of its 
worldhood.”107 This point is important because it highlights that the world is 
not founded by our practical engagements, but that these presuppose World. 
When we take objects as “inconspicuous”, “unobtrusive” or “non-obstinate”, 
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we are actually encountering the in-itself of entities according to Heidegger. 
In other words, when the ready-to-hand is encountered as “doing what it is 
supposed to”, and not standing out because it is broken, missing or 
recalcitrant, then we are in the presence of the object in-itself. It is taken as it 
in fact is. This means that if we try to locate the in-itself in the present-at-hand, 
we cannot reach any ontological clarification of the in-itself. “… [O]nly on the 
basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-
the-world be grasped ontologically.”108 This is important when considering 
the Kantian noumena. Under Heidegger’s picture, the reason why Kant was 
led to opening up a chasm between things as they are for us and things as they 
are in themselves, is because he passed over the phenomenon (in Heidegger’s 
sense of the word) of readiness-to-hand, in which things are most immediate 
to us.  
 But if the world can be revealed through the deficient modes of 
concern, “it must assuredly be disclosed.”109 By “disclosed”, it is important to 
see that Heidegger means something like a “laying open”, so that whilst we 
still have no explicit understanding of that which is disclosed, we are in a 
position to analyse it further. The content has been made available for further 
investigation. So the ready-to-hand discloses World, and it does so prior to 
those deficient modes of concern which reveal the un-ready-to-hand. “The 
world is therefore something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already was, and if 
in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never do more 
than come back to the world.”110 
 So the preceding analysis reveals that Being-in-the-world is being 
“absorbed in” a network of practical relations and “assignments”, and from 
this it seems to follow (for Heidegger) that we can become caught up in that 
familiarity with the world which facilitates our concern with the ready-to-
hand. So Heidegger sees it necessary to ask exactly what it is that we are so 
familiar with. “The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by the 
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possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection 'operates'; 
how are we to get a close understanding of this totality?”111 
 We have already seen that as a mode of Being of entities within-the-
world, readiness-to-hand must stand in relation to the worldhood of the world 
and it must do so ontologically. “In anything ready-to-hand the world is 
always 'there'.”112  World is a condition of the possibility for anything to be 
ready-to-hand. “Our analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter 
within-the-world has, in its very Being, been freed for our concernful 
circumspection.”113 In other words, what we encounter in experience has been 
“made available” for our circumspection. But we have seen already that the 
ready-to-hand is constituted by reference or assignment in the form of the in-
order-to and the towards-which. We need to ask how objects can “be freed” 
or “made available” for this kind of relation. 
 It should be borne in mind that the in-order-to of an object ready-to-
hand is not a property of it. The “hammering of the hammer”114 does not 
“belong” to the object like its colour, or shape or volume. Formally, we cannot 
represent the in-order-to as “the hammer is hammering” like we can for 
instance with “the hammer is solid”. If we consider “property” to mean 
something an object “possesses”, then there is no way the in-order-to could 
even be anything remotely like a property at all. “Anything ready-to-hand is 
at worst appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and its 
'properties' are, as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is 
appropriate or inappropriate …”115 A hammer is solid in virtue of its needing 
to be used for hammering. It is made with denser materials in order to perform 
its function. If it were made of glass, therefore not as durable, it would not be 
fit for purpose – hitting nails into wood would hardly be successful with a 
glass hammer. In fact, though it may look like a hammer, I would be confident 
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in saying that Heidegger would not consider it a hammer at all, seeing as it 
could not enter into the “in-order-to” that a hammer is supposed to.  
 Heidegger thinks that in the idea of the ready-to-hand being 
constituted by reference or assignment, lies the further idea that the ready-to-
hand has the character of “having been assigned or referred.”116 We discover an 
entity when we assign of it a certain role or function and “[are] referred [to it] 
as that entity which it is.”117 So, where any ready-to-hand entity is concerned, 
it is “involved” in something. This involvement defines the character of the 
ready-to-hand. “The relationship of the “with … in …” shall be indicated by 
the term “assignment” or “reference”.”118  
 
When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being 
is its “involvement”.119 
 
This involvement ontologically defines its Being or is what makes it 
intelligible as that which it is. That said, we can also see involvement when we 
consider the towards-which of the entity. With the hammer, “there is an 
involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in 
making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement 
in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of 
providing shelter for Dasein …”120 So when anything ready-to-hand can be 
said to have an involvement with something, the nature of this involvement 
is already implicit in our understanding. It is “for-the-sake-of” a possibility of 
our Being – whether we stay dry or not – that we can trace back through that 
series of involvements to the appropriate ready-to-hand item. Dasein is 
always at the head of any in-order-to chain. It is the towards-which proper 
and it is for the sake of Dasein that anything ready-to-hand comes to be 
involved. 
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[T]he totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there 
is no further involvement: this “towards-which” is … an entity whose Being is defined as 
Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs.121 
 
 But we do not just treat this final towards-which as any other. Due to 
the fact that its mode of Being can be defined as Being-in-the-world, we say 
that this final towards-which is a “for-the-sake-of”. According to Heidegger, 
only beings with Dasein's kind of Being can have and do things for the sake of 
something. “[T]he 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for 
which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue.”122 At this point, 
Heidegger reminds us that more work must be done to clarify the notion of 
“involvement” if we wish to properly understand World.  
 When we allow an entity to be involved, this involvement is what gives 
the entity its character as ready-to-hand. But in discovering something ready-
to-hand, the intelligibility of which is involvement, this involvement is only 
intelligible on the basis of a totality of involvements.  
 
In letting entities be involved … one must have disclosed already that from which they have 
been freed [for this involvement]. But that for which something … ready-to-hand has thus 
been freed … cannot itself be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of Being.123 
 
Entities are always “freed for the sake of” Dasein – or a possibility of Dasein. 
Thus, ultimately, what an entity is “freed for” is essentially not the same kind 
of thing that the entity is. When entities are freed for involvement, they are 
discovered as ready-to-hand. Thus, the entities here being referred to are what 
Heidegger calls “discoverable”. It is a possibility of the Being of entities that 
they are discovered as ready-to-hand. “The previous disclosure of that for 
which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to 
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nothing else than understanding the world – that world towards which Dasein 
as an entity comports itself.”124 
 Every totality of involvements, as we have seen, “stops” at Dasein. But 
this totality is intelligible upon the basis of a further “in-order-to” which 
Dasein assigns itself to. This in-order-to is what Heidegger calls Dasein's 
“potentiality-for-Being”. Dasein is always for-the-sake-of its potentiality-for-
Being, in the sense that it is always concerned with a possible way it may be. 
The different potentialities Dasein has will define its concern, thus allowing 
for any involvement to take shape.*  
 At this point, we can consider once again the passage cited at the 
beginning of this chapter: 
 
That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for 
which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of 
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered 
in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of 
the world.125 
 
Dasein understands, before any totality of involvements with the ready-to-
hand has coalesced, its potentiality-for-Being. It is its specific desire to “be” a 
certain way that motivates its letting entities be involved. But there is a context 
or a “wherein” within which Dasein understands its potentiality-for-Being. 
This context (“wherein”) in which Dasein locates its potentiality-for-Being is the 
phenomenon of World. Hence, before all else, Dasein is already in a world. 
Dasein always already understands itself in a world “with which it is 
primordially familiar.”126 This “primordial familiarity” is what constitutes 
Dasein's understanding of Being. 
                                                 
124  Idem. 
*    This idea will play a central role throughout Being and Time, as it can be both “authentic” and “inauthentic” 
– we can be pursuing a towards-which in both genuine and deficient modes of being. The former would be 
“authentic” whilst the latter would be “inauthentic”. 
125  Ibid. p. 119 
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 “World” then is that backdrop upon which Dasein “projects” itself in 
the possible way it can be when entering practical relations with objects. If we 
take the example of building shelter that Heidegger uses, that complex of 
relations and references which builds up is defined by this goal that Dasein 
has of building itself shelter. It wants to build shelter for-the-sake-of keeping 
itself dry. However, even this “for-the-sake-of” presupposes World. It 
requires, before all else, that Dasein already understands (however implicitly 
and “in the background” that may be) what possibility for itself it is trying to 
actualise. Thus, the background which Dasein presupposes when it seizes 
upon this possibility is World. Before we have even started thinking about 
which tools to use and what shape to make the shelter, we are already ahead 
of those moments, in a World, and everything we encounter as ready-to-hand 
presupposes that we are always already in such a World. “So far as the Dasein 
is, it is in a world. It “is” not in some way without and before its being-in-the-
world, because it is just this latter which constitutes its being. To exist means to 
be in a world.”127 
 
5.5 World and “Subjectivity” 
World then, as a background of prior familiarity and contexts, is the 
“cleared area” in which, according to Heidegger, we not only can, but must, 
have a meaningful encounter with any and all entities. Even scientific study, 
which sees itself as getting to the truth of the matter concerning things, will 
always presuppose World – an ontologico-existential phenomenon. Taken as 
such, does this mean then that Heidegger's concept of World is radically 
subjective, such that the world as we know it is founded upon the cognitive 
acts of the individual self? As such, are we given a conclusion that it is in the 
end unsatisfactory due to its subjectivism? Here, I will not only lay out 
Heidegger's case against such a possible criticism of World, but also show how 
Heidegger's response gives us a fresh concept of the subject (or at least an anti-
Kantian one). In giving us such a conception, we will then be able to see how 
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Heidegger's notion of World and the kind of “subjectivity” it implies coheres 
with Hegel's argument regarding knowledge of the thing-in-itself, thus able 
to combat idealism.  
First, we should recall that “World is not something subsequent that 
we calculate as a result from the sum of all beings. The world comes not 
afterwards but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word.”128 World comes 
before all theorising and it comes before all “handiness” – the ready-to-hand 
itself presupposes World. Hence, beforehand in the normal sense and before-
hand in the stricter, Heideggerian sense. “World is that which is already 
previously unveiled and from which we return to the beings with which we 
have to do and among which we dwell.”129  
 We already have an implicit and basic understanding of World in the 
context of the in-order-to, or what Heidegger refers to as the “contexture of 
significance [Bedeutsankeit].”130 Thus the issue of clarifying what World is 
becomes even more pressing. Heidegger has already ruled out that it is nature. 
Nor is World the result of nature. “...[W]orld is not the sum total of extant 
entities. It is … not extant at all. It is a determination of being-in-the-world, a 
moment in the structure of Dasein's mode of being.”131 
 By extension, we can say that world “exists”. It is not extant in the same 
way a pen, a chair or another person is. But by designating it as “a moment in 
the structure of Dasein's mode of being...”132 we mean to say it exists insofar 
as Dasein exists. Heidegger foresees a danger in such an account, and this is 
the danger mentioned briefly above: If World belongs to Dasein, and 
everything, like nature and the universe, presuppose World (so are thereby 
“intraworldly”), then is not everything purely subjective? Do we not just end 
up putting forth a position which is “of a most extreme subjective 
idealism[?]”133 
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 However Heidegger opposes such a move. Even if our concept of 
World did in fact lead to subjective idealism, this is not on its own enough to 
render the notion untenable. “For to this very day I am unaware of any 
infallible decision according to which idealism is false, just as little as I am 
aware of one that makes realism true.”134 Philosophy has not proven beyond 
doubt that idealism is false, but merely declared in one form or another that its 
conclusion is unsatisfactory – it seems not to give us a “comfortable” 
epistemological and ontological picture. We should also consider that maybe 
idealism is just “not tenable in the form in which it has obtained up to 
now...”135 This aside, the basic problem which motivated Heidegger's 
discussion of the world is “... to determine exactly what and how the subject 
is – what belongs to the subjectivity of the subject.”136  
 What a phenomenological analysis of World will give us is a new 
concept of the subject itself. To charge an account with subjectivism, however 
acutely it may be argued, will lead us away from the possible solution – such 
a move will prevent us from opening up the concept of “subject” and re-
thinking it. We should not, then, be anxious about idealism, but we must 
instead hear what it calls for when engaged with properly. If one thinks 
idealism is untenable, this need not mean that realism is the default 
alternative, but merely that we may not have an adequate conception of 
subjectivity. “The world is something which the “subject” “projects outward”, 
as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner 
and an outer? What can this projection mean?”137 
 Heidegger will again at this point tell us what it does not mean. It is not 
the case that the world is something located in the subject which I actively 
“throw out” (thus, Heidegger’s choice of the term “projection” here can be 
confusing at first glance). But World is something which is “cast forth” along 
with Dasein itself. It is not that the subject precedes World, nor that World 
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precedes the subject. “... [T]he Dasein itself is as such already projected.”138 We 
may be permitted then to think of World as a priori. “Two things are to be 
established: (1) being-in-the-world belongs to the concept of existence; (2) 
factically existent Dasein … is always already being-with intraworldly 
beings.”139 
 The point here goes back to the earlier point that the res cogitans/res 
extensa distinction is not adequately captured by the thinking-thing/thing-
thought distinction. To think of the “subject” and the extant as inherently 
separated is an inadequate conception of their relation. Or at the very least, 
conceiving of the subject and its thoughts as “fenced off” from the world 
cannot capture the manner in which Dasein “projects”. In already being-with 
the extant, the subject is “in” the world in a stronger sense than traditionally 
thought. Thinking accordingly takes place always already in the World. “With 
the projection, with the forth-cast world, that [phenomenon] is unveiled from 
which alone an intraworldly extant entity is uncoverable.”140 
 However, there is still a difference between Being-in-the-world and 
intraworldliness. For example, Heidegger has already demonstrated that 
nature is intraworldly. Its appearance presupposes World. “But for all that, 
intraworldliness does not belong to nature's being.”141 We approach nature as 
an extant being, as something that has always been there, completely 
indifferent to our experience of it. “Being within the world devolves upon this 
being, nature, solely when it is uncovered as a being.”142 It is a manner in 
which nature can be apprehended, not the manner. In other words it is a 
possible manner, not a necessary one. Therefore, the intelligibility of nature is 
not determined exclusively by our discovering it as intraworldly, but it is 
merely a possible way in which it can be uncovered.  
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 Unlike intraworldliness, with regards nature, “Being-in-the-world is an 
essential structure of the Dasein's being …”143 Insofar as Dasein exists, it 
already exists in the world and insofar as Dasein exists, its existence is 
determined by Being-in-the-world.  
 
World is only, if, and as long as, a Dasein exists. Nature can also be when no Dasein exists. 
The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest the essential peculiarity of the Dasein, 
that it projects a world for itself [and this] projecting … belongs to the Dasein's being.144 
 
 However, in and through “projecting” a world, Dasein is already 
“beyond itself”.145 The fact that Dasein is in the world rules out the possibility 
of a closed subjective realm of thought. The distinction between “inner” and 
“outer” is what becomes untenable under this notion of World and not the 
notion of World itself. Or rather, Heidegger's notion of World is bound to 
seem untenable if we impose upon it the traditional notion of a “subjective 
inner sphere”.146 But in that case, it is this notion we should aim to question 
and if we open the subject up and conceive of it as in the world, suddenly the 
problem disappears, and with it the necessity to explain the apparent “chasm” 
between subject and object. Thus, once again, we should remind ourselves: 
“So far as the Dasein is, it is in a world. It ‘is’ not in some way without and 
before its being-in-the-world, because it is just this latter which constitutes its 
being. To exist means to be in a world.”147 
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Heidegger on Freedom and Disclosure 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Heidegger has provided us with a deep definition of the phenomenon of 
Worldhood. Thus, from this we can begin to form a “worldly” notion of 
freedom. But before doing thus, we must understand what Heidegger has to 
say on the issue of freedom, and for this it is necessary for us to pay close 
attention to the way he attempts to unify Being-in-the-world in Being and Time. 
He does this by illuminating the primordial phenomenon of Care. What we 
will see is that Care is closely wrapped up with freedom and choice. 
 However, at this stage, a simple way to understand the role of freedom 
in Being-in-the-world is to view it as playing a role of unifying Being and 
World.  For him, to the extent that freedom is that which “moves” Being, “in-
the”, and the World, freedom is Being-in-the-world.148 Freedom, in our 
reading of Heidegger, has two primary features: it is “world-disclosing” and 
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“self-disclosing”. To see this, I propose that Heidegger's notion of disclosure 
as “uncovered-ness”, or “dis-covered-ness” be examined in its own right. This 
will also serve to shed light on the advantages of a Heideggerian view over a 
Kantian one; how Heidegger manages to overcome transcendental idealism, 
and German Idealism in general. 
 Whilst we will be focusing largely on the earlier work of Heidegger, it 
is important to see that this idea of freedom as disclosure even spills over into 
his later thought, when he eschews traditional philosophy (which he deems 
to be purely metaphysics) in favour of a more primordial “thinking”. Freedom 
thus becomes the “clearing”, which allows for the presentation of Beings, in 
their very Being, to Dasein. 
  
Future thinking is a course of thought, on which the hitherto altogether concealed realm of 
the essential occurrence of beyng* is traversed and so first cleared and attained in its most 
proper character as an event.149 
 
 What must be stressed, at this point, is that whilst freedom plays an 
important, even fundamental, role in Heidegger’s work, both pre and post 
“turning”, his work is not intended to be a pure exploration of the concept. 
For Heidegger, freedom merely “shows up” in his attempts to understand the 
sense-making activity of Dasein. This sets him apart from some of the later 
philosophers whose work drew upon Heidegger’s corpus. 
Sartre’s existentialism, for instance, was largely a phenomenology of 
freedom and his later theoretical work, Search for a Method, and the ambitious 
Critique of Dialectical Reason (to which Search for a Method serves as a preface) 
was a sustained attempt to situate the free individual of existentialism within 
the Marxist vision of socialism. The puzzle became how we could go about 
reconciling the radical freedom of individuals to “choose” themselves, with 
the idea that individuals belong to a class, and that only through a collective 
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effort can the subjugated class overcome their subjugators. Sartre became 
interested in how the radically free individual could take part in a collective 
struggle, the terms of which were not set by the free individual itself but were 
part of an historical process. Marxism gave existentialism the opportunity to 
become engaged with the political in a non-contradictory way, whilst 
existentialism showed us that a valid account of the individual ought to be 
richer than what Marx gave us. But underlying all of this was Sartre’s concern 
that Marxism presented itself as an argument against his radical conception of 
human freedom, one which he actually found challenging.150 
 However, the Heidegger of Being and Time had little to say about 
freedom directly. But something of the sort is present, even if it can only be 
glimpsed when looking closely at some of the other ideas in Being and Time. 
Despite Heidegger's reluctance to treat freedom directly, what will become 
clear over the course of this section, is that not only does freedom occupy an 
important space within the structure of Being and Time, but it sits at the very 
base of it. It is very much there, responsible for the general dynamic of Being 
and Time, though it sits “between the lines”. 
 It is worth considering that Heidegger’s notion of “facticity” includes 
some idea of freedom.  
 
Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain factual ‘Being-present-at-
hand’. And yet the ’factuality’ of the fact of one’s own Dasein is at bottom quite different 
from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is 
as a fact; and the factuality of such a fact is what we shall call Dasein’s “facticity”.151 
 
Despite the fact that Dasein never has any choice about its own existence, in 
terms of the fact that it exists, the whence of its existence, and the manner in 
which it makes use of all of these facts in order to make sense of the world, 
Dasein must in some sense be capable of choosing for itself once it does exist. 
Take, for example, one’s birth. It is not something that we are ever in a position 
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to choose. As a result, there are a whole host of other facts about ourselves that 
we are unable to choose: our family, class, society, culture, era and so on. 
However, we can, in a very meaningful sense, choose certain things about our 
lives even though we never made that initial choice to live in the first place. 
To be able to choose amongst a whole array of possibilities, or “potentialities-
for-Being”, and to be able to choose amongst these in spite of Dasein’s facticity, 
goes some way towards noticing that there is an idea of freedom at work in 
Being and Time.152 In fact, what we are about to see is that by bringing to the 
fore the kind of freedom Heidegger had in mind, one of the central notions of 
Being and Time, being-in-the-world, is in an important sense a genuine account 
of freedom itself, which is what was alluded to in the opening of this section. 
 To do this, we can turn to Heidegger’s lecture course on the work of 
Gottfried Leibniz, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where Heidegger is 
much clearer and more explicit with regards to what his thoughts on freedom 
amount to. As we shall see, Heideggerian freedom hinges on his notion of the 
purposive “for-the-sake-of”, which also acts as the basis for his investigations 
into worldhood. It is in noticing the worldly aspect of freedom – which is often 
overlooked in favour of the subjective aspect – that we can begin to get clear 
on freedom-in-the-world and the manner in which it can overcome the 
Kantian difficulties posed at the beginning of this work. I will show that at the 
heart of Heidegger’s work on the issue, is the foundation for a non-
transcendental, yet non-reductive account of freedom. 
 However, before moving on to the crux of freedom in Heidegger’s 
thought, it is essential that we get clear on the actual benefits of Heidegger’s 
thought over Hegel’s when it comes to working through the difficulties which 
Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena may pose. Thus, our 
first question should be: “How exactly does Heidegger give us access to the 
thing-in-itself?” 
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6.2 Heidegger and the Thing-in-itself: “Disclosed-ness” as a Theory of 
Truth 
When we examined Hegel’s novel solution to Kant’s distinction, we 
focused on Hegel’s idea that this distinction would seem to break down, or 
become untenable, when we consider phenomena that are unseen, but 
observable in an indirect way. Forces, for example, are such that their activity 
can only be observed in their interactions with tangible objects. We then 
construct laws, which explain the fact that it is not in a single instance that a 
force acts in such and such a way with objects, but that this is true in all cases. 
The strength of a law is that it applies universally. But for Hegel, force in-itself 
will turn out to be nothing other than the activity of consciousness when it 
attempts to construct laws. When we realise this, these laws will collapse in 
on themselves, because the laws, in turn, refer to the manner in which 
consciousness gains access to the phenomena. We end up needing an ever-
increasing number of laws to explain each individual observation of one law 
with the phenomena that a prior law is meant to explain. There is thus a 
circularity of reference, because forces are constructed to explain certain 
observations, and laws to explain the relation of forces and their interactions 
with objects. But both force and law refer to the very thing which was making 
the observation – consciousness. This whole process of self-reference allows -
- if we are to follow Kant’s argument through to its terminus -- for the fact that 
if forces and laws exist in themselves, they contradict one another at the 
material level, because taken in themselves they lose the reference back to the 
observing consciousness. Once this reference is lost, the possibility is opened 
up for one thing to be at the same spatio-temporal moment something else 
entirely. On Hegel's account, transcendental idealism, when approached 
dialectically, allows for A to be not-A. Hence, for Hegel, forces and laws turn 
out to be ideal in nature, lest we make use of them in an inherently 
contradictory manner.  
Heidegger’s solution to the Kantian problem is quite similar to Hegel’s 
strategy that we saw earlier. He is still going to hold onto the idea that the 
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observer is not completely passive. However, the crucial difference is that 
Heidegger is not an idealist. He wants to avoid attributing too much to the 
observer. Whilst Heidegger does not talk of Forces and laws in any great 
amount of detail, in those places where he does, he disagrees with Hegel’s 
conclusion, that they are ideal. For Heidegger, these phenomena can, in a very 
genuine way, be discovered in the world. This links to Heidegger’s notion that 
truth is “uncovered-ness”. 
 
The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows 
that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being – just as it 
gets uncovered as being.153 
 
The result of this definition of truth is that Heidegger takes himself to be 
overcoming correspondence theories of truth and representational theories of 
knowledge. 
 
Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real 
Thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less 
of the psychical thing with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between ‘contents of 
consciousness’ among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is the Being-uncovered 
[Entdeckt-sein] of the entity itself – that entity in the “how” of its uncoveredness... [Thus] 
“confirmation” signifies the entity’s showing itself in its selfsameness.154 
 
These two passages offer us the clearest glimpse of how Heidegger 
might disagree with Hegel with regards Force and the Understanding. Forces 
and laws, for Heidegger, will not be ideal, because their truth could not be 
based on the idea that there is some sort of relation between “contents of 
consciousness”. They are uncovered. In order for something to be uncovered, it 
must always already be in the world, available for uncovering and this 
uncovering, by Dasein, is a revelation of its actual Being in-itself. Heidegger’s 
very use of the term “uncovered” signifies the key feature of his argument. To 
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un-cover, or dis-cover (the prefix here playing the same role as it does in “dis-
robe”) is to reveal something as it actually is. 
So, unlike Hegel, Heidegger is vindicating the idea of genuine 
discovery, rather than the idea that discovery turns out to be nothing other 
than the activity of consciousness coming to a deeper understanding of itself 
and its own faculties. It is only on the basis of this fundamental uncovering 
activity of Dasein that anything like correspondence can take place. However, 
this uncovering activity is still nonetheless an activity of Dasein and as such, 
the Being of things that is uncovered is part and parcel of Being-in-the-world. 
Hence: “In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially and discloses and 
uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. Dasein is 
‘in the truth’.”155 
The sense that is to be made of the world and the things in it is always 
already available for discovery, forming part of Being-in-the-world itself. To 
be in the world is to be amongst things that are uncovered, wrested from their 
concealment in obscurity. The truth of a thing does not emerge “on the scene” 
as Dasein goes about uncovering things, but that truth is always available. But 
this is not to say that truths exist and are waiting to be dis-covered. Prior to a 
thing's being dis-covered, any notion of its being “true” or “false” fails to make 
sense. 
We can clarify this by looking at those moments where Heidegger does 
in fact broach the topic of Forces; albeit in a different context to Hegel. To 
return to the theme of forces and laws, there is a key passage from Being and 
Time which illuminates for us the moves being made in Heidegger’s account 
of truth: 
 
Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’; it does not follow that they 
were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any 
longer possible. Just as little does this ‘restriction’ imply that the Being-true of ‘truths’ has in 
any way been diminished. 
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To say that before Newton, his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before 
him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. 
Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in 
themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely 
as entities which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which 
belongs to ‘truth’. 156 
 
 From this, it is clear that for Heidegger, truth’s relation to notions more 
familiar to the Anglo-American tradition, such as logic or propositions is 
secondary. Dasein first uncovers, then it comes to form propositions on the 
basis of the things it has uncovered. On this account, a proposition cannot be 
true until the things which it describes have already been uncovered by 
Dasein in a more basic act of the understanding. We should consider the point 
by thinking about “levels” of understanding. Acting and interacting are 
primary, at a more basic level and only upon the basis of Dasein’s uncovering 
activity at this level can we then begin to move onto a level where talk of 
subjects, predicates and propositional truth are useful.  
 But if this is “true”, is Heidegger not still committed to some version of 
the thing-in-itself? If truth is such that beings can be whether or not Dasein 
exists (and Heidegger does indeed think this), yet, the Being of those beings – 
that which makes them intelligible – is dependent on Dasein’s existence, then 
the truth of beings would depend on Dasein, but their actual existence would 
not. To put it more simply (perhaps), if the truth of a thing is dependent on its 
being uncovered by Dasein, but its existence predates and will persist after all 
Daseins have perished, is there not then some aspect of things that Dasein has 
no access to? 
 It would seem that Dasein cannot have access to those things that it 
cannot uncover. By definition, Dasein cannot uncover anything at all if it does 
not exist. However, we know perfectly well that things can and will exist 
without human beings. And they can and do exist for centuries or millennia 
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before they are uncovered. Therefore, things must have some existence in 
themselves that is independent of their Being for Dasein. It would seem then 
that Heidegger’s thought faces an inevitable collapse into a Kantian 
distinction into things in themselves and things as they appear to us. This is 
no maverick argument, for Heidegger does indeed state that “Because the kind 
of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to 
Dasein’s Being.”157 
But these kinds of criticisms miss the novelty and power of Being-in-
the-world. If all humans were wiped out due to their own activity or some 
natural catastrophe, the earth and all of its fundamental structures would 
survive intact. Similarly, the earth as a heap of cosmic material, held together 
by gravity, was inhabited by creatures and entities before there were humans. 
But for Heidegger, the earth then was not a world, and in the event of some 
annihilation, it would no longer be the world that it is for us now. In fact, it 
would not be a world at all. This is because there would be no being of the 
kind that Dasein is, that is capable of being in the world. Nor is Heidegger 
concerned to prove the existence of the external world because, for him, such 
deliberations always presuppose that Dasein is in a world. 
From the quotation above, regarding the relativity of truth to Dasein’s 
kind of Being, we can also alleviate another related concern. If it is not possible 
to achieve truths that are not relative to Dasein, it follows that it would be 
meaningless to speculate about the properties of things that predate human 
existence. However, this move is invalid. All that the relativity of truth to 
Dasein really restricts us to is understanding that we can only speculate about 
these things in virtue of their historical relation to Dasein. It is precisely 
because these things predate our existence that we can speculate about them. 
The physical process of a palaeontologist uncovering a fossil from a dig in 
Mongolia runs in harmony with the ontological process of a Dasein 
uncovering a truth about some prehistoric organism. Indeed, it seems difficult 
to imagine a way of speculating about such a fossil and the organism it may 
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have belonged to without these speculations being related to Dasein. Once 
again, criticisms of this nature, whilst certainly important, nonetheless are not 
sensitive to the strengths of Heidegger’s theory of truth.158 The uncovering of 
a fossil, and all the properties that are revealed by this uncovering, uncover 
the fossil in the very way it always has been. “Uncovering” is the removal of 
obscurity from a thing, and the revelation of the thing as it always was and 
will be in and of itself, so long as it exists.   
When we consider this in relation to Hegel’s arguments of force and 
laws, we can anticipate the moves being made. Hegel conflates the 
phenomena of force with the activity of uncovering. This is his mistake. He 
does not see, as Heidegger does, that the descriptions of forces are descriptions 
of things that were always already active. Hegel takes them to be, at base, 
descriptions of consciousness becoming more informed about its own 
interpretative apparatus. Under this picture, forces are ideal in the sense that 
they are merely constructed to explain interactions between phenomena that 
are invisible. 
For Heidegger, as we see in his discussion of Newton, forces are 
uncovered. Prior to this uncovering, nothing “true” or “false” can be said of 
forces prior to their uncovering. The truth of forces is, only when Dasein 
uncovers – or dis-covers – them. Prior to this, there is no meaningful way to 
talk of truth and falsity in relation to forces. From this it does not follow that 
they only exist after they have been discovered. It just means that speculation 
can only begin after a discovery has been made. 
So, with all this having been laid out, how does Heidegger cut through 
Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena? It can be expressed in 
a very simple manner: for Heidegger, the noumena are the phenomena. When 
phenomena are uncovered, when they show themselves to Dasein, they are 
showing themselves exactly as they are in themselves. Hegel was at least aware 
of this point, when he talks of cognition as dealing with “the ray itself”159 
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rather than its refraction. Hegel fails to follow through this view of cognition 
to its full conclusion, instead relapsing back into a form of idealism. 
With all this being said, Heidegger was still sensitive to the virtues of 
German Idealism, and in particular, he does not ignore the fact that Kant 
noticed the finitude of human reason.160 But this finitude comes in the form of 
Dasein’s ability to uncover the very Being of things – the action of revealing 
things in themselves. The open-ness of Dasein -- that it is the kind of thing that 
can uncover, comes with certain structures and therefore, restrictions. 
However, these are not the kind of structural restrictions that prevent Dasein 
from having access to things as they are in themselves. They are in fact the 
very conditions which make Dasein the kind of being that it is and allow 
Dasein to tarry with Being-in-itself. 
This may sound like no sort of solution at all. But properly understood, 
it is a powerful argument. It is, in effect, a radical realism, when we consider 
the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. What the “in-the” amounts to is the 
affirmation of Dasein’s privileged access to the world. Dasein is not a subject 
which is consigned to somehow making its representations correspond to 
objects. It is a thing in itself which is in a world of things in themselves, to 
which it always already has access. This kind of access is the condition for the 
possibility of any meaningful interaction with entities whatsoever. In being in 
the world, the world has been, and will continue to be, uncovered for Dasein. 
“Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that 
which shows itself in itself, the manifest.”161 
 
6.3 Heidegger’s Account of Freedom 
Now that we have seen both what Heidegger takes Being-in-the-world 
to be, and the importance it plays in the way he overcomes the Kantian 
distinction, we can turn to how freedom emerges from it as a central notion in 
the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy. In Being and Time, freedom is contained 
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within other ideas in the work. But in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 
Heidegger explicitly alludes to how freedom functions in the idea of Being-in-
the-world. To see this, we should pay attention to a question Heidegger sets 
himself in the work: “What is the intrinsic connection between Dasein’s 
freedom, Being-in-the-world, and the primary character of the world, the 
purposive for-the-sake-of?”162 
It is worth noticing that The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic contains 
within it certain clues that will be relevant for this work. It is also one of the 
works that acts as a transition from the thought of the early Heidegger of Being 
and Time to the later Heidegger. It is useful here to take note of a passage in a 
later essay by Heidegger; “On the Essence of Truth”. Here, Heidegger clarifies 
his “theory” of truth, building upon what was said in Being and Time, and what 
we have just examined. The passage in question states: 
 
To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened 
up in an open region. Such being free points to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of 
freedom. The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of 
correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom.163 
 
 The reason I draw attention to this passage is not only formal. True, it 
does link nicely from the previous section to the analysis coming up. But more 
importantly, it shows a definite consistency between the early and later work 
of Heidegger. What we are about to see is that by paying attention to the 
argument given to us by Heidegger in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 
we can trace more closely how freedom is bound up in Being and Time. To then 
trace this forward into Heidegger's later work is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, by considering the observations in this section, and the 
importance of freedom in Heidegger’s “post-Kehre” work (highlighted in the 
passage above), we can see that for all the changes in Heidegger's corpus, at 
base freedom was and continued to be of central importance to him. However, 
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before we move onto this, it is worth pausing to consider just how striking it 
is that Heidegger barely mentions freedom in 1927’s Being and Time, but by his 
work from 1928 onwards (a mere year later), freedom becomes a central 
concept.  
We know from the analysis of Being-in-the-world that the for-the-sake-
of in Heidegger’s work refers to the fact that any and all projects that Dasein 
embarks upon are, in an essential way, defined by some future state of 
Dasein’s being. This means that if I were to, say, build a table, it would be for 
the sake of me having something more durable to work on when writing this 
thesis. However, the for-the-sake-of need not refer to examples of crafting 
something. Producing a painting, for example, is an act performed for the sake 
of some future possibility, one in which I can admire for myself, or share with 
others, a document of a certain aspect of myself or my view of the world. The 
act of setting my alarm for 7:00am is for the sake of getting up to work. The 
process of cooking a meal is for the sake of satiating the hunger my family and 
I are beginning to feel. I sit and play this game for a few hours, for the sake of 
forgetting my troubles and feeling more relaxed. For Heidegger, any and all 
acts that one performs conform to this structure. Therefore, Dasein, as a being 
that acts, acts always in a way that the act it performs aims to bring about a 
certain state of affairs; whether for itself or its world. Dasein always exists for 
the sake of some thing or other. The importance of this observation is easy to 
miss. It is not merely a formal observation; Heidegger thinks we can find 
content in such a notion, by asking “what is the final purpose for which 
humans exist?”164 What basic purpose are we all, universally, as Daseins, 
working towards? 
Such a question is ambiguous, because it gives the impression that its 
answer will be objective. But Heidegger notes that actually, the only way the 
question can be meaningfully posed and answered is by Dasein itself. It must 
be shown “why searching for an objective answer is in itself a, or, the 
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misunderstanding of human existence in general.”165 What Heidegger is 
arguing for here is the idea that there has been an historical confusion 
surrounding the question of purpose itself. He thinks we take for granted the 
fact that there is some objective purpose towards which we are all directed. 
However, this does not imply that there is no universal and objective end for 
Dasein. This will become clearer when we consider later the role of death in 
Heidegger's unique account of freedom. What we can do at this stage, is make 
a sharp distinction between what a purpose is and what an end is, under this 
picture. 
The most useful way to read Heidegger on this point, is to understand 
him as arguing for the idea that a purpose is the kind of thing that Dasein can 
define, whilst an end is the sort of thing that will happen inevitably. Therefore, 
there is only one end towards which all Daseins are headed; that of death. It 
being the universal conclusion to the existence of all and any Dasein. But, to 
ask about some objective purpose, towards which all Daseins are directed, is 
to ask about something towards which all Daseins choose for themselves; this 
is what we should understand by Heidegger's use of the term “purpose”. 
What is important about this distinction, is that it makes clear – in a way that 
Heidegger himself regrettably did not – what exactly he is criticising when he 
claims that the notion of some objective purpose is a major misunderstanding 
that philosophers have been susceptible to. 
Dasein is a being that has the unique position of being able to question. 
Thus, any question we pose, in this case that of purpose, is intimately bound 
up with the being that poses the question. But each individual Dasein is bound 
by its own facticity. Each self has its own unique circumstances. Hence, “truth 
about what exists is truth for that which exists.”166 Any instance of uncovering 
is an uncovering-of something for Dasein. What this means then, is that to 
inquire about the end purpose of any and all Daseins is immediately doomed 
to failure the moment it is posed. This is due to the fact that the terms of the 
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question, and as a result the answer itself, are structured by Dasein. An over-
arching purpose can only ever be defined and decided by any individual 
Dasein, through its own unique circumstances. 
For Heidegger though, this is not a statement of radical egoism. In 
essence, the purpose of something is entirely dependent upon the being which 
determines the purpose. “[I]t deals rather with the ontological-metaphysical 
description of the egoicity of Dasein as such.”167 It is concerned with the 
essence of Dasein’s individuality and this individuality makes intelligible any 
act of Dasein that runs contrary to its own self. Thus, for Heidegger, it is only 
in virtue of the fact Dasein exists as a self that it can then interact in an altruistic 
way with others. Though talk of “altruism” here is superficial, owing to the 
fact that Dasein exists as an individual self prior to any “I-thou” relationship. 
The claim being made can be broken down as follows: 
 
(i) Dasein is the kind of being that can put aspects of its own self 
into question. 
(ii) This questioning necessarily takes the structure of a question 
that is about this Dasein, for this Dasein. 
(iii) In virtue of this structure, the answer will inevitably never move 
beyond Dasein itself. 
(iv) Each Dasein is unique in terms of its circumstances/facticity. 
(v) To act contrary to itself, Dasein must question itself and its 
actions in accordance with the structure in (i)-(iii). 
(vi) Therefore, in order to make sense of any act that is contrary to 
its own self, Dasein must be related to itself primordially. 
 
This selfhood, however, is [Dasein’s] freedom, and this freedom is identical with egoicity, on 
the basis of which Dasein can, in the first place, ever be either egoistic or altruistic.168 
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The above quotation is very important. It is far too easy to read Heidegger as 
espousing some sort of selfish view of freedom, one in which Dasein ought to 
put itself before anything else. However, there is a much subtler, and I believe 
correct, reading of Heidegger on this point. For he is not saying that altruism 
is not possible without egoism, that “kindness” in general is not possible at all 
without “selfishness”. The argument Heidegger gives us states, in no 
uncertain terms, as we can see from the quotation above, that notions such as 
“egoism” and “altruism” would be equally without meaning were it not for 
the fact that at a prior and more primordial level, Dasein is an individual to 
which all truths first relate. It is this condition of self-relation, or, the 
“relativity” of truth to Dasein which was considered earlier, which acts as the 
basis for the idea of freedom, as far as Heidegger is concerned. 
 Thus, returning to the idea of the for-the-sake-of, we can say that this is 
what defines selfhood – that is, existence as a self in general. “To be in the 
mode of a self means to be fundamentally towards oneself.”169 For Heidegger, 
it is a key misunderstanding of Western philosophy that to be “towards 
oneself” is just one out of many modes of existence. One key exception to this 
would be Hegel, who, as we have seen, saw the relation between 
consciousness and reality as necessarily being one of self-knowledge. Despite 
this, Heidegger will strive to avoid such radical claims, in order to avoid the 
trap of idealism. For him, a key structural feature of Dasein is not that it is able 
to make an object out of itself as opposed to some other thing in the world. In 
a simpler way, we can think of Heidegger as denying that Dasein “studies” 
itself in the same way it does other things. Fundamentally, existence is this 
being-towards-oneself primordially. This makes any relation towards another 
thing or being possible in the first place. 
 
[O]nly because this being is, in its essence, defined by selfhood can it, in each case, as factical, 
expressly choose itself … The “can” here includes also its flight from choice. What then is 
implied by this … choosing oneself expressly or of fleeing from the choice?170 
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We see here a more explicit comment on how freedom and facticity relate to 
one another; a point which was raised at the beginning of this section. The 
issue with basic determinism, under a Heideggerian account, is that it takes 
facticity – the idea that we have no choice in the fact that we exist – as 
something which makes any notion of meaningful choice untenable. For a 
determinist, purely because we were never in a position to make the initial 
choice to be born, means that we cannot have any true say in the features of 
our existence after our births. If we can have no say in the circumstances into 
which we are born, it must follow that we can have no say in the way that 
these circumstances will play themselves out in life. 
 Heidegger, on the other hand, sees in facticity one of the very 
conditions of meaningful choice in the first place. The only thing facticity 
really implies is that we have no say in being a self; the self being the kind of 
thing that has circumstances. However, it is precisely because we are a self that 
Dasein is faced with the task of having to “expressly choose itself.” We can 
imagine that Heidegger may accuse a determinist of being someone who tries 
to vindicate the idea of fleeing from choice. To say “there is no point in thinking 
about choosing oneself because this is not actually possible” would be, for 
Heidegger, a convoluted way of saying “I do not want to choose”. If a being 
is factical, then it must choose itself or flee from choice (which is still a choice). 
This is because factical Dasein is the kind of being that is defined by selfhood 
and for Heidegger, (and those “existentialists” he inspired) selfhood implies 
choice or the flight from choice. 
 At this point, a very important concept emerges from the discussion of 
choice; that of possibility. The idea of choosing oneself would not make sense 
without understanding that to make a choice is to choose between one 
possible way of being or another. Or, to put it in the terms of Being and Time, 
to choose between one “potentiality-for-Being” or another. In addition, we 
know from the discussion of Being-in-the-world that being in a world is only 
possible on the basis of a primordial understanding of Being. This being-in 
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also acts as the ground for being-with others. Knowing this will help to further 
clarify Heidegger's argument that being an individual self is the foundation 
for being anything like an egoistic or altruistic self. 
 We must take care to note that Dasein, as a condition of its facticity, is 
always already in a world. This amounts to saying that before any theorisation 
about the existence of an external world, or how one should act in the world 
can take place, Dasein presupposes that it is primordially in a world in the first 
place. All of these further analyses, the kind in which Western philosophy has 
tended to get caught up, completely overlook this in-ness. Dasein is first in a 
world, then it tries to understand the world. However, as a being “always 
already” in a world, amongst or alongside others, Dasein’s act of choosing its 
own self is by extension a choosing of its being-with. The choices we make 
about ourselves will affect others insofar as other people are part of the world 
in which such choices are made. To choose to be a certain way oneself is to 
choose to act a certain way towards others. The self is such that the type of 
person one is, is only intelligible as a self-amongst others. For example, how 
could one be a kind person without other people who benefit from or 
experience that kindness? “Only because Dasein can expressly choose itself on 
the basis of its selfhood can it be committed to others … Only because Dasein 
… exists in selfhood … is anything like human community possible.”171 
 The very idea of choosing to be a certain way is bound up with the idea 
of choosing to be a certain way amongst and for others. Thus, choosing oneself 
is “equiprimordial” – or equally fundamental – with choosing the way one is 
with and towards other people. This is another, perhaps more critical, reason 
why Heidegger deems talk of egoism and altruism superficial at best. On the 
one hand, to choose to be resolute in selfishness is to choose a way of being 
with others. To be selfish is always already to assume an attitude towards 
other people, because the notion of “selfishness” itself would make no sense 
were it to be attributed to a solitary existing individual. Only when an agent 
puts themselves before others is it menaningful to attribute “selfishness” to 
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such an agent. Immediately the notion of other people is smuggled into the 
choice, thus pulling the rug from under the very idea of egoism. On the other 
hand, to choose to be a kind and altruistic individual, putting the wellbeing of 
others before one's own, is at the very same time choosing a way to be as an 
individual. It is, at base, considering oneself initially. Heidegger is not 
attempting to de-value kindness and altruism, or even to uphold selfishness 
and egoism; he is trying to say that at the most basic level, these notions break 
down. 
 To summarise, Dasein essentially exists for-the-sake-of-itself. This for-
the-sake-of is such a basic feature of the structure of Dasein that it is neither 
selfish nor altruistic; both of these ideas are abstractions from Dasein's 
fundamental structure. 
 This for-the-sake-of is only possible if a being is free; only a free agent 
can exist for-the-sake-of itself. “[N]ot in such a way that there was first 
freedom and then also the for-the-sake-of. Freedom is, rather, one with the for-
the-sake-of.”172 All of this, taken together, is freedom. If selfhood is defined as 
being for-the-sake-of-oneself, then freedom is nothing other than being able to 
choose potentialities-of-being for-the-sake-of Dasein itself. Freedom makes 
possible, in the for-the-sake-of, commitment. Thus, Dasein is responsible for 
itself precisely because it exists for-the-sake-of its own being. “Selfhood is free 
responsibility for and toward itself.”173 I can freely choose for myself and 
undertake projects for-the-sake-of some result or other, but with this freedom, 
comes the weight of knowing that my choices will inevitably affect my 
circumstances, and as such, the future choices I can make. This process of free 
self-determination will go on and on (as will the responsibility it brings) until 
it terminates when I eventually pass away. This is essential to selfhood itself. 
The self, under this account, could be “nothing” other than the result of the 
choices that have been made and the effects they have had. Reading 
Heidegger this way enables us to see why his work had such a profound effect 
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on the structure of radical freedom that Sartre was concerned with, 
particularly in Being and Nothingness. 
 It is here that we can begin to understand the strength of a 
Heideggerian account of freedom. Dasein, as we know, is always already in a 
world. For Heidegger, Dasein “projects” this world, not in an idealist sense, 
but in the sense that things are disclosed to Dasein, or uncovered by it, in 
virtue of the kind of self it has chosen to be. When I see a table, for instance, 
the intricacies of the joints and woodwork are not, in any meaningful sense 
disclosed to me as they are, because I am not a carpenter. Not being a carpenter 
is a choice I have made for myself. I must take responsibility for the fact that, 
if I was asked to build a chair, it would not be fit for purpose, because I have 
not chosen to acquire the skills necessary to build such a thing. However, I do 
play instruments. Thus, when I hear music, things about the composition of 
the song are disclosed to me precisely because I have chosen to acquire certain 
skills for myself, and these features may not be disclosed to the carpenter. This 
does not mean that we cannot share in those things we have discovered, but 
that in the first place, things are disclosed to a Dasein who is, on the basis of 
certain choices, already concerned with the thing in question; or already opened 
up for such disclosure. (An important point which we will return to later). 
 This account of freedom puts us in touch with reality in such a way that 
it informs our choices without thereby determining them. This means that 
rather than being determined by the world the self is in, the self is instead the 
kind of being that can allow itself to be guided by the world in the choices it 
makes for itself. This does not amount to determinism of any sort, and instead 
offers an account of freedom which is not subject to the arguments of the 
determinist.  
 The point here is that things in the world are disclosed to Dasein 
because Dasein has chosen to be a certain way. Therefore, the mode of our 
being-in is determined by the choices we have made, or those we have fled 
from, as a result of the structure of our selfhood. This allows Heidegger to 
conclude that the very fact that Dasein is always already in a world, and 
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projects itself accordingly, owes itself to the fact that Dasein is, in a very 
meaningful sense, free to determine itself. As such: 
 
Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing other than freedom, freedom no longer 
understood as spontaneity but as defined by the formulation of Dasein's metaphysical 
essence...174 
 
6.4 Freedom in Being and Time 
 We are now in a position to see how freedom emerges in Being and Time. 
All of the concepts discussed thus far are tightly intertwined with a central 
concept in Being and Time and to see this, it is necessary to take notice of the 
notion of Sorge – “Care”. Heidegger turns his attention to Care as a result of 
his observation that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is “primordially and 
constantly whole.”175 This is motivated by a similar desire for unity as Kant 
had, in his attempts to unite the phenomenal self with the noumenal self.  
 
Accordingly Dasein's “average everydayness” can be defined as “Being-in-the-world which is 
falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being 
is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others.”176 
 
 With all of these terms and observations seemingly spiralling out of 
control, Heidegger needs a way to not only rein them in conceptually, but also 
to make them match up with Dasein's basic experience of itself as being a 
whole. This is the role that Care occupies. However, Heidegger does not 
arbitrarily pull this concept out of his sleeve in order to clean up; Care is in 
fact glanced in Heidegger's discussion of Anxiety. Anxiety, for Heidegger, 
should be considered in itself and is different from fear insofar as there is 
really nothing in the face of which one is anxious. Fear has a very real source. 
Walking through the park, noticing the German Shepherd coming towards 
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me, fills me with fear. It triggers my phobia of dogs, and as such, there is 
definitely something I can point to and say, “I am afraid of that!” 
 Anxiety differs because: 
 
That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterised by the fact that what threatens is 
nowhere… Therefore that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction 
within what is close by; it is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive 
and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere”177 
  
 Precisely because there is nothing in the world which one is anxious in 
the face of, Heidegger concludes that it is “Being-in-the-world itself … in the face 
of which anxiety is anxious.”178 Dasein experiences anxiety because it is in a 
world and in particular, a world determined by possibilities; possibilities 
which are nothing until they are actualised. Dasein is anxious in the face of 
nothing because it is anxious in the face of mere possibilities, between which 
it must choose. Thus, “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taking a hold of itself.”179 
 We should be careful, as Heidegger certainly is, not to confuse the 
phenomenon of anxiety as discussed here with that of psychology. For 
Heidegger, “only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, 
does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically.”180 Suffering 
from an anxiety attack is, to be sure, a real phenomenon. But it is grounded in 
a more basic, ontological angst. 
 For Heidegger, to experience an incapacitating excess of anxiety is 
possible only because, at the ontological level, Dasein is constantly trying to 
evade the experience of not “being at home” in the world.181 At the most basic 
level, Dasein has to come to terms with the fact that it must choose. Anxiety 
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thus ensues. This primordial anxiety is the foundation for the physiological 
anxiety that comes to mind when one considers anxiety attacks. Heidegger 
does not wish to downplay physiological anxiety and the cognitive evidence 
in support of it. But for Heidegger, all psycho-physical conditions have their 
foundation in more primordial phenomena that issue from Dasein's Being-in-
the-world. 
 Care becomes the basic phenomenon that makes one anxious in the face 
of having to choose for oneself. It is, by extension that which makes one 
anxious about having to choose our mode of Being-with, because, as we have 
seen from the argument in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, choosing to 
be a mode of Being-in is on equal footing with choosing our Being-with. This 
whole phenomenon sets Dasein up in a peculiar way, which Heidegger 
describes as “Being-ahead-of-itself”.182 
 
Dasein is always 'beyond itself' [“über sich hinaus”], not as a way of behaving towards other 
entities which it is not, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This 
structure of Being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote as Dasein's 
“Being-ahead-of-itself”.183 
 
Dasein can preliminarily be defined as ahead of itself because it is always 
concerned (Fürsorge) about some possibility of itself and its Being-with. Thus, 
freedom not only shows itself as world-disclosive, but as self-disclosive. The 
freedom to choose some future potentiality-for Being discloses to Dasein not 
only what it can come to be, but also what it currently is and previously was. 
Care is what holds these things together in the self-same Being; the Being-in-
itself of Dasein is Care. For Heidegger, the only kind of Being that “can Care” 
is a free one. 
 This discourse on Care and as such, freedom, also allows Heidegger to 
illuminate more of the crucial phenomena studied in Being and Time: Death; 
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Authenticity; Temporality; and Das Man. Whilst we do not need to dwell for 
too long on such developments, it is useful to have a brief look at how freedom 
as Heidegger conceives of it relates to these other phenomena.  
 Dasein is “free for” its own death. To be free for one's death is, for 
Heidegger, a refreshing and ultimately authentic mode. To realise that the one 
possibility that will, universally, become actualised is death, is to free oneself 
for it; to free oneself for the end. As such, choosing other possibilities becomes 
an activity of choosing with full knowledge of the end of all choice – death. 
This is what Heidegger means when he says that authenticity involves being 
resolute in the face of death. Whilst Macquarrie and Robinson use this term 
(“resolute”), they do so as a translation of the German term “Entschlossenheit”. 
The literal translation of this is to be in a state of “unlockedhood” or 
“unclosed-ness”. 
 To be resolute, for Heidegger, is to be opened up, without closure, to take 
stock of one's life as a whole – this includes the certainty of one's own death. 
What is the purpose of mentioning this? So that we can see the significance of 
resoluteness as being free. What we saw when we briefly examined the 
consistency of freedom between Heidegger's work after Being and Time, was 
that Heidegger conceives of freedom as being world-disclosive. This is 
fundamentally, for the later Heidegger, an opening and this open “clearing” 
can be defined as Dasein's freedom-for disclosure. Even in Being and Time the 
idea of freedom and “openedness” are intricately connected. To be resolute, 
to be “un-closed” is to be open for one's Being-a-whole; to be free to choose in the 
face of one's death. Freedom is thus very much displayed in Being and Time. 
 What about some of the other key concepts? To start with, “Das Man”, 
roughly, “the They” is to be thought of as an inauthentic mode, whereby 
Dasein “falls” into merely “doing as they do”, “going about life as one does”. 
This mode conceals the certainty of death, and blocks Dasein's access to 
authenticity. It closes Dasein off from taking its life as a whole, by dragging 
Dasein into the fallen mode of “doing as they do” – which is to go on with life 
in blissful ignorance of death as a determinate feature of human life. The 
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“They” close Dasein off from achieving authenticity, the freest mode. Once 
again, freedom is present in one of Being and Time's central concepts, purely 
because this concept, the They, prevents Dasein from being open for its 
potential for authentic freedom. 
 We also glimpse freedom in the notion of Time itself. The “Being-
ahead” of Dasein is possible only on the basis of the final “towards-which”; 
this turns out to be death. This process, for Heidegger, is the essence of 
ontological time, or “Temporality”. Death makes possible, as the end point of 
human life, our experience of a future, and thus, our ability to be ahead of 
ourselves in possibility. The very fact that we are “destined” to die means that 
we can project ourselves forward. Our demise opens up a future for us. What 
we see here is that, far from being very separate concepts, all of these 
phenomena are visible only on the basis of the primordial phenomenon of 
freedom. Therefore, freedom is a central concept throughout Being and Time, 
which is not evident at first glance. 
 
* * * 
 
 In essence, what Heidegger is offering us is a conception of freedom 
that is nothing like a mere freedom from restraint. The conventional debate 
between proponents of free will and determinists hinges on a conception of 
freedom as “freedom-from”. The former arguing that fundamentally, the will 
is free from either all, or, enough restraint that it can meaningfully choose for 
itself. The latter would argue that ultimately, physical, biological, social 
restraints, or a combination of them all are such that choice itself turns out to 
be illusory. Heidegger subverts this entire debate by giving us an account of 
freedom that sits beneath all of this. He places freedom at the very heart of the 
structure of the individual, to such an extent that debates regarding free will 
and determinism, like that of egoism and altruism, turn out to be superficial 
abstractions from the true meaning of choice and freedom. 
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The phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be torn asunder; 
so any attempts to trace it back to special acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge and 
addiction, or to construct it out of these, will be unsuccessful.184 
 
Here Heidegger is saying, quite explicitly, that the phenomenon of care cannot 
be reduced to any psychological phenomena, such as drives, urges or 
addictions. Nor can it be reduced to subjective ones, that of will or wishes 
(desires). 
 
If Dasein, as it were, sinks into an addiction then there is not merely an addiction present-at-
hand, but the entire structure of care has been modified. Dasein has become blind, and puts 
all possibilities into the service of the addiction.185 
 
The implication of this is that the phenomenon of Care, as the essence of 
Dasein and the basis of choice, makes possible in the first place the kinds of 
notions that are made use of in the conventional debate surrounding free will 
and determinism. Things such as addiction do not determine choice, or restrict 
it in some way, but instead Dasein chooses those possibilities that serve and 
perpetuate the addiction. But overcoming addiction is not some unheard-of 
event, we know it happens regularly. To choose possibilities that do not serve 
the addiction is testament to the fact that Care, and as such freedom, operate 
regardless of addiction. 
 What people who are involved in the debate between free will and 
determinism miss, under a Heideggerian picture, is that Dasein, “man”, the 
human being, is first and foremost choice-making beings and only secondarily 
can anything like a will that is “free” or determined, sober or addicted, make 
sense at all. The conventional debate thinks of freedom as something that one 
has. What sets Heidegger's view apart from the conventional one, is that he 
takes freedom to be the most crucial aspect of the self and thus it becomes 
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absurd to talk about the self as “having” freedom. Without freedom, there is 
no self, or anything like a “will” at all. 
To close, I should like to draw attention back to that important passage 
in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where Heidegger states that “Being-
in-the-world is accordingly nothing other than freedom...”186 
 It is here that I locate the point at which we can come to a new 
understanding of Being and Time, one in which freedom plays a central role. 
But it is also here we can make more sense of Heidegger's project as a whole, 
from beginning to end. 
 Firstly, the definition of Being-in-the-world as freedom allows us to see 
that Heidegger understands freedom to be world-disclosive. Dasein is free 
insofar as it is open to the disclosure of things in themselves. However, this 
disclosure owes itself to the fact that Dasein is able to determine itself. Freedom 
is thus both Dasein's being-open for disclosure and the way in which Dasein 
determines – in its self-determination – what “shows up” in this opened-ness. 
 On the other hand, freedom is at once also self-disclosive. In being able 
to determine itself, Dasein must always consider itself and those things about 
which it aims to retain or revise. To do this authentically is to view one's life 
as a whole, including the certainty of death. Thus, any choice that Dasein 
embarks upon discloses to Dasein the way that it already is and as such it is 
always disclosed in this process. When thought about in this way, freedom 
becomes that which allows “Being”, “in the” and “world” to hang together as 
they do in Being and Time. 
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 Part Three 
Concerning Freedom-in-the-World 
and Facticity 
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Freedom-in-the-World 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an alternative view of freedom, 
one which is capable of contributing, in a meaningful way, to the problem of 
freedom and natural necessity: the problem outlined at the beginning of this 
work. However, so far, time has been spent carefully laying the foundations 
for this alternative view. So, what are these foundations? 
First, I have argued that it is of critical importance that whatever view 
I propose, this view is able to defend itself against Kant’s transcendental 
ontology. The reason I attach such importance to this, is because it is Kant’s 
ontology that founds his solution to the problem of freedom and natural 
necessity. To expand, not only does Kant state in a compelling way the tension 
between freedom and natural necessity, but he is generally held as offering us 
a rigorous way of opening up space for freedom in a world that is still subject 
to causality and the laws of nature. When the world is considered as it is in 
experience, the descriptions of the sciences maintain their validity. However, 
when the world is considered as it is in itself, we find a space for a rational, 
and therefore responsible agent, capable of making the kind of decisions 
necessary for ethical conduct. The problem with this, as we have seen, is it 
leaves us with the undesirable conclusion that there remains an aspect of the 
world which is beyond knowledge and sense. 
Thus, any foundation that could be laid would have to be ontologically 
sound, and the hope has been to construct a picture of freedom that is not 
committed to the same transcendental ontology as Kant. Initially then, I 
turned to Hegel, as someone who not only held an interesting view of 
freedom, but who offered the history of philosophy valuable resources in 
criticising the work of Kant. I analysed the early sections of the Phenomenology 
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of Spirit, in order to locate compelling arguments against transcendental 
idealism. What I found instead was a complex set of closely related arguments, 
and whilst on the one hand, they made great leaps towards a move beyond 
Kant, on the other, they were still committed to a version of idealism, one in 
which the unity of thought and its object is the condition for the possibility of 
knowledge.  
It was because of this commitment to idealism that I turned to the work 
of Martin Heidegger, the aim being to offer an account of freedom that can 
exist in the same world as the entities of science, whilst still being irreducible 
to scientific description. Hegel made moves beyond Kant by showing how 
ultimately there is nothing about reality that cannot be known, for knowledge 
itself presupposes that the subject is already intimately related to objects. 
Heidegger retained this insight of Hegel’s, but importantly, through the 
deployment of his “fundamental-ontological” phenomenology, was able to 
avoid idealism. A careful reading of Heidegger’s notion of Worldhood, and 
Being-in-the-world, as presented in his Being and Time, was carried out, in 
order to bring to the fore how Heidegger was able to move beyond both Kant 
and Hegel, by leaving idealism behind altogether.  
This close reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time had another, perhaps 
more critical purpose. It offered up a new way of thinking about freedom. By 
showing how a proper understanding of Worldhood subverts the traditional 
distinction between subject and object, where else could freedom exist if not 
in the world itself? In order to understand this, it was necessary to get clear 
about the manner in which a being that is in the world essentially, could 
experience itself as free. This led me to look closely at Heidegger’s theory of 
truth as a (the) form of disclosure. It became apparent for Heidegger as his 
thought developed, that disclosure is the essential feature of Dasein – the 
“human” being and “world discloser”. But it also became apparent to him that 
the structure of disclosure, if it is to be consistent with the notion of 
Worldhood, could not be dependent on subject or object. Freedom thus 
became the very structure of disclosure, and with this, I was able to note two 
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important features of an account of freedom which could stand up to both 
Kant and the determinist: that it is (a) world-disclosive and (b) a fundamental 
structure of the self. 
It is with these two points in mind that we are able to say not only what 
Freedom-in-the-World is, in the sense in which I envisage it, but also how it 
can stand up to transcendental accounts of freedom and those accounts that 
attempt to reduce freedom to some psychological or physical fact of nature, 
thus rendering it illusory. This will be the goal of the current section. 
 
7.2 Why Freedom-in-the-World? 
 There are two main reasons why I have chosen the term “Freedom-in-
the-World”. However, one stylistic benefit of it is that it references the 
Heideggerian foundations of the account that I aim to present. 
 The first main reason is that “in-the-World” implies non-
transcendence. There is no other “world” or “aspect” in which freedom 
appears and is justified. On the contrary, it is in the very world that the self 
inhabits that we can locate freedom. As such, “World” captures in a 
satisfactory way the non-transcendental account I am offering.  
 Secondly, it captures the non-reductive nature of the account. By 
adhering to a Heideggerian notion of World, we are able to not only avoid the 
transcendentalism of Kant, but also avoid a total collapse in the opposite 
direction – that all phenomena can be reduced to something purely natural, in 
which case freedom turns out to be nothing other than some folk 
misunderstanding of a neural, psychological or physical phenomenon or 
cluster of phenomena. Whilst this account in no way aims to discredit the 
findings of modern sciences (this is something I would deem philosophy 
incapable of achieving in most cases), it does aim to show that determinism, 
(which is, in the contemporary context, generally based on the scientific mode 
of thought in its attempts to reduce freedom to some further and underlying 
mechanical description) is actually indebted to the very phenomenon that it 
claims to be able to reject. 
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 Thus, at this point, I aim to demonstrate four key features of Freedom-
in-the-World: 
 
(a) The non-transcendality of Freedom-in-the-World 
(b) The irreducibility of Freedom-in-the-World 
(c) Freedom-in-the-World as Disclosure of World 
(d) Freedom-in-the-World as Disclosure of the Self 
 
Once this has been achieved, we can then move on to see how Freedom-
in-the-World as a concept can engage with contemporary developments in 
free will and determinism. I take this opportunity to raise a certain caveat about 
the explanations of the account I am about to lay out. This chapter will make 
use of situations as examples to explain the features outlined above. This is 
because I am arguing for an account of freedom which accurately captures the 
everyday life of any human agent. The explanation of Freedom-in-the-World 
will go some way towards its application in a non-abstract, less theoretical 
context. One key strength of this account is that it matches up with the way 
things are for human agents in the everyday context, something that is often 
overlooked when the focus is purely theoretical. When we take this point 
seriously, the move away to the theoretical underpinnings of Freedom-in-the-
World, to the notion itself, works this way just because of the very worldliness 
of the notion. It is worldly, and as such, it is not only able to describe, but also 
demands it be explicable in, the situations in which an agent in the world finds 
themselves.  
 
7.2.1 Non-Transcendentality 
Given the resources that we have inherited from Heidegger, to answer 
this question will require us to remind ourselves of what was said in the 
section where we analysed his notion of Worldhood. The difference this time 
is that far from offering a careful reading of the relevant sections, we are now 
in a position to see how Heidegger’s notion of Worldhood can ground a non-
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transcendental conception of freedom; that we can begin to see how 
Worldhood operates within the context of the debate that we have been 
involved in and are attempting to contribute to.  
That said, I feel it useful to remind ourselves of a certain passage in 
Being and Time that initially helped us clarify what Worldhood is: 
 
That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for 
which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of 
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered 
in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of 
the world.187 
 
By now this passage has become quite familiar. This is due to its importance 
for our purposes. What we were able to establish upon the basis of the above 
piece of text, is that Dasein is fundamentally concerned with its own potential 
to be a certain way or other. This is also supported by our reading of later 
sections of Being and Time and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. However, 
this primordial concern is not without meaning; it is wrapped up with a whole 
“matrix” of relations, objects, people and states-of-affairs. What allows my 
concern with possibilities for myself to be intelligible, is that these possibilities 
are given to me in such a way that they constantly refer to this complex matrix. 
We initially termed this phenomenon a “backdrop”. Whilst that term sufficed 
at that point, we now know Worldhood represents something more vital than 
this. Dasein is not an actor on a stage, performing in front of some lifeless 
background or green screen. Instead, Dasein is intimately concerned with the 
World, as it forms the basis of its ability to choose certain things for itself. 
Dasein is fundamentally and primarily in the world insofar as it is most 
immediately an acting being. When I sit in my chair, I do not need to reflect 
on the nature, essence or properties of a chair in order to do so. I just do it. 
When philosophers in the past have focused on the properties of a chair, or a 
table, or any other object, they are abstracting from this fundamental 
                                                 
187 Ibid. p. 119 
99 
 
familiarity that Dasein has with the world. An example of this kind of 
abstraction and the issues it leads to can be found in the following passage 
from David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where he 
states: 
 
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, 
which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image 
which was present to the mind. These are obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who 
reflects, ever doubted, that  the existences,  which we consider, when  we  say this house and 
that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or  representations  of 
other existences, which remain  uniform  and independent.188 
 
 In abstracting from the original context in which he finds himself, Hume is 
led to the conclusion that the mental life he experiences is nothing more than 
a set of mere copies of things which exist outside of his mind. But in the case 
of Heidegger, the crucial meaning of the term “in” testifies to the fact that 
Dasein is in a world and is always acting and operating prior to thinking, 
reflecting and theorising. Thus, Dasein is an agent before it is an observer. The 
history of philosophy has played out in a way that misses this crucial 
preliminary stage of action, or at least attempts to account for it in the terms 
of observation. For Heidegger, the reverse is in fact a more accurate depiction 
of the human being. We do, act, cope and perform before we observe, 
meditate, think and reflect. 
 For example, there are two distinct possibilities that I could be 
concerned with in this moment. One is the possibility that I could go on 
holiday and as such, I can think about all of the potential states-of-affairs that 
such a realised possibility could lead to. The other possibility is that I can 
decide instead to spend that money on buying a car and in this “possible 
world” other states-of-affairs present themselves to me as possibilities. In both 
of these conceived outcomes, I project my potentiality-for-Being one way or 
the other only into the circumstances that I can conceive – circumstances that 
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have been disclosed to me in virtue of prior choices that have been actualised. 
However, the very idea that my choices can affect my future, and be projected 
in the manner described above, is the basis for Worldhood. Things in the 
world present me with possibilities, but those possibilities are tied to a very 
real, and truly disclosed world, one in which I am forced to act and project. 
Another important feature of Worldhood is the idea that one is “always 
already” in the World. What this is amounts to, is the thought that before I 
could really contemplate the possibilities I can choose between, there are 
always things which I require to actualise these possibilities. Thus, to complete 
the doctoral thesis, I need certain things: a computer, books, access to papers 
and journals, supervisors, an institution to submit to, an examiner and so on. 
All of these things make it possible for me to choose to complete a thesis, as 
without them, it would be difficult to see how completion of the thesis would 
be attainable. However, these things have their own significances and “place” 
within the World. They are disclosed to me as for-the-sake-of completing a 
thesis, but this for-the-sake-of does not exhaustively define them. They can all 
be for-the-sake-of other things, and the manner in which they relate to me goes 
to form a crucial aspect of my World. As such, even before I am aware of the 
necessity to choose, I am wrapped up with things in such a way that I am 
always already “ahead” of the choice, in the World, and this is so of necessity, 
if the notion of me having to make a choice is to be intelligible.  
 Thus, the process of making a choice is not something that takes place 
in an abstract way, but is always “grounded”, insofar as the terms of the choice 
and the things which make the choice tenable are things that I am always 
concerned with.  
 World is thus not something thoroughly subjective, abstract or 
transcendent. It is that upon which anything is intelligible. We have seen how 
all modes of understanding, whether practical or theoretical, presuppose 
World at every instance. But we should also be sensitive to the fact that World, 
however closely it is tied to the self, is not something that is “overlayed” by 
the self onto some indifferent backdrop. This gives us a clue when it comes to 
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our rejection of transcendental idealism: for if the subject is conceived as 
privileged or private in any way, we are suddenly bogged down with the idea 
that objects and the world they are in is something passive and meaningless, 
and it is this very meaninglessness that gives rise to the noumena – that objects 
have an aspect which is beyond, which transcends, human cognition, in virtue 
of the subject’s structure as a meaning-giver.  
 The real strength of this notion of World is that it enables one to locate 
the subject within the world it understands. By paying heed to the way the 
self goes about its life, developing its projects and not merely encountering 
objects, but relating to them and interacting with them, we refuse 
transcendentalism the room it needs to assert itself. Freedom then, as 
structural (a point we will return to) is also in the World, precisely because the 
self is. The need to make freedom something transcendental becomes less 
pressing, for it sits at the heart of the self, and the self moves amongst things 
in the world in virtue of its very structure as a self.   
Due to freedom occupying a space in the human world, we are able to 
say that it is non-transcendental. There is no need for us to have recourse to a 
transcendental realm or aspect in order to explain freedom without conflict 
with the physical or scientific understanding of reality. This is because the 
scientific understanding of reality is every bit as much an activity within the 
world as choosing what one has for breakfast. Both of these activities 
presuppose the ability of the self to choose certain things, and it could only do 
this if it were already in a World, a world which is populated with objects 
which are disclosed to the self in one way or another. Thus, freedom is a 
phenomenon in the world as much as the boson is.  
 The key difference is that, whilst a boson, a hammer, a river, a mountain 
are all disclosed to the self, freedom is the condition of disclosure in the first 
place. Thus, whilst freedom is in the World, it cannot be reduced or explained 
in the same way that an object of physics or geography can. This is due to the 
fact that freedom makes these kinds of study possible. 
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7.2.2 Irreducibility 
To imply that scientific theories completely underpin determinism 
would be misleading. However, I would argue that they best represent the 
sentiment of determinism in the modern age, not only within, but also outside 
of philosophical discourse on the topic. Thus, it is “reductive determinism” 
that I wish to test against the notion of freedom-in-the-world. To do this 
satisfactorily, I will lay out what I take reductive determinism to be. 
The theories of modern physics adhere to a key principle: that of 
explaining phenomena within a closed physical system. As creatures within 
such a system, the human being itself ought to be explicable in the same 
fundamental way as the motion of some particle or other; this includes the 
actions of an agent that would appear prima facie to be a free agent. Thus, with 
this motivation towards explanation, it follows that the theories of scientific 
discourse see human actions as events or phenomena that are necessarily 
determined by preceding events or phenomena that lie beyond the control of 
the acting human.  
For example, take the statement: 
 
(1) I hit the man who was harassing my partner.  
 
On the face of it, this statement is a rather simple causal explanation of events.  
A random man was harassing my partner, so my reaction was to hit him. It 
was in virtue of his actions, we might say, that I choose to throw a punch. Now 
whilst I have no control over the behaviour of the other man, I can, it would 
seem, choose to hit him or not in response. However, for scientific 
determinism, this is not really the case. My “choice” to throw a punch is in fact 
inevitable, when we take into account not only the actions of the other man, 
but the neurological and psychological set up of my own self. The thought 
being that the psychological set up was impacted upon by events in my past 
over which I had no control, and that these in fact reduce to the behaviour of 
neurons in the brain – over which I also have no control. Further, the 
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movement of neurons in the brain follow the laws of physics, which are set up 
to predict the behaviour of any and all physical objects in a closed system. 
Thus, there is a chain of reduction all the way down to a level of objects and 
laws, and at no point in this chain can I, or any human agent, have any actual 
impact.  
When expressed in this way, whilst it is clear that it is one amongst a 
few variations of determinism, reductive determinism represents in a broad 
way something that all forms of determinism have in common: the 
fundamental inability of the human agent to author or impact upon events in 
its life.  
With this laid out, we can say how freedom-in-the-world can contribute 
to such a discussion of reductive determinism, therefore answering the 
question of how it is non-reductive.  
Freedom-in-the-world cannot be reduced to any physical, 
psychological or biological factor. This is, as we have seen, largely what 
reductive determinism attempts. Such a move would be valid if freedom were 
conceived of as the kind of thing one could have or not have, feel or not feel. A.J. 
Ayer expresses it as follows: 
 
… [I]f these philosophers are right in their assumption that a man cannot be acting freely if 
his action is causally determined, then the fact that someone feels free to do, or not to do a 
certain action does not prove that he really is so. It may prove that the agent does not himself 
know what it is that makes him act in one way rather than another: but from the fact that a 
man is unaware of the causes of his action, it does not follow that no such causes exist.189 
 
The point to be taken here is that if an agent “feels” free, it does not 
follow that the agent is actually free. Put another way, a feeling of freedom 
does not constitute the knowledge that one is free. This feeling in no way rules 
out those physical causes that are ultimately responsible for the action, and by 
extension the feeling of freedom itself. If freedom is conceived of as a feeling 
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that we have, this feeling can be reduced to some phenomenon the kind of 
which we would have no control over. Let us return to (1) to emphasise this.  
In (1), I may have felt at the time that I chose to hit the man. I am likely 
also to feel other things, such as anger. One might respond by saying that a 
feeling of freedom is not the same as the experience of a basic emotion. This 
seems to me to be unreasonable, especially when we take reductive 
determinism in its strongest form. The determinist can reduce both the anger 
I experience in (1) and the feeling of choice in exactly the same way. If I am 
quick to anger, it is because of some psychological fact that was likely caused 
by events in my early life. This psychological fact reduces further to the 
behaviour of neurons, which in turn is captured by the same physical laws 
that govern the movement of electrons. Why would freedom, conceived of as 
a feeling, not be reducible in the same manner? The feeling that I had of 
making a choice in (1) looks to be reducible to a psychological fact, in turn a 
neurological one, and again, in turn, a physical one. 
By following the move above, the reductive determinist could show 
that no-one has freedom by showing that what appears to be freedom is just a 
“folk” misunderstanding or explanation for some complex physical 
phenomenon. So how can Freedom-in-the-World escape such a reduction? 
It lies in the fact that, rather than conceiving of freedom as something 
felt, and the notion of choice being something we feel as though we have, we 
are instead conceiving of freedom as something that belongs to the very 
structure of the way we interact with and understand the world within which 
we find ourselves.  
Once we have realised this, we are also able to see that determinism, 
and in fact all scientific understanding presupposes freedom in the first place. 
In order to do science, things must be disclosed, but in order for things to be 
disclosed, one must be free. It is important to see that a critique of science is 
not the concern when the above point is made. The findings of science are 
valid, true and left intact by this argument.  What is being scrutinised is the 
conviction that the free will can be reduced to more basic scientific facts. These 
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attempts become less coherent when it is noticed that such reductions 
themselves require the action of a will that is free. 
 
7.2.3 World Disclosure 
In order to give an account of this aspect of Freedom-in-the-World, 
there is the demand that we pay attention to the phenomenon of disclosure 
itself; or more accurately – the notion of disclosure as that which allows 
phenomena to “show up” to the self. Preliminarily, we can state that things 
are disclosed in such-and-such a way, and the manner and aspect under which 
things are disclosed is dependent on the kind of self one is. To talk about a 
“kind of self one is” is to talk about something which is necessarily chosen.  
In the previous chapter, a distinction was drawn between a purpose 
and an end. We claimed that whilst an end is inevitable and unable to be 
defined by the self, a purpose is something that is, by definition, chosen by it. 
Recall, then, the role that purposes occupy in the everyday activity of the self. 
To build a table is an act for the sake of actualising some future state in which 
the self has a sturdy platform on which to work. However, there is more 
involved in this process when we pay closer attention to it. The purpose I have 
defined for myself, that of having something sturdy to work on, has given me 
the option of building a table for the attainment of this purpose. This requires 
certain tools and materials. I need wood, nails, saws, hammers and so on. But 
even more, I need the appropriate tools and materials. I require things that are 
fit for purpose (in the special sense of the term “purpose” that is being used 
here). So, I need the right type of nail, the most suitable kind of wood, the 
correct weight of hammer, the proper rigidity of saw. These things all show 
up in virtue of the activity that I have chosen to perform. However, they show 
up to the exclusion of other things. Other tools and materials that are not fit for 
this specific purpose are not disclosed to me.  
When we consider this description, we can begin to see how freedom 
is world-disclosive. The possibilities that the self chooses to actualise for itself, 
thereby defining purposes, form the basis for the kinds of things that show up 
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for it, and the aspect under which they show up. By this I mean, if a hammer 
turns out to be too small for the job, it is only in virtue of the fact that it is not 
fit for purpose that this property of being too small is actually disclosed to me 
– but only in the context of this specific purpose.  
However, this kind of purpose-disclosure relation does not merely hold 
for the kinds of examples such as the one above. It holds for every human 
action, insofar as all human actions are driven by purpose, from the most 
mundane and everyday to the most complex. We can recall from the previous 
chapter the brief example of setting an alarm in order to get up for work on 
time. There could be an instance whereby the batteries in the clock run out 
whilst I sleep, and so my alarm fails to wake me and I end up being late for 
work. In this context, the property of the batteries being flat is disclosed to me, 
and in response to this I can act on the need to buy new ones, in order to make 
sure I get up for work the next day on time. On the contrary, when the batteries 
work fine, and are therefore fit for purpose, they are not disclosed to me. 
When I enter a room, I do not have to think about the properties or status of 
the door knob, I just turn it, in order to enter the room for whatever purpose I 
need to be in there. However, if the door knob is broken, it is disclosed to me 
as being broken, unfit for purpose and I need to begin to consider what I can 
do to get in the room.  
Let us take the process of a scientific experiment. A physicist sets 
himself or herself a purpose, by having a general hypothesis that they seek to 
confirm or falsify by conducting a certain set of tests or observations. This 
defining of an initial purpose throws up all the necessary pieces of technical 
equipment required to conduct the experiment. The supercomputer, the 
magnets, the accelerators, the large energy cells, the controls. These things are 
disclosed to the physicist in virtue of the experiment that he or she wants to 
conduct. Further, this experiment is designed and conducted in order to prove 
or disprove the specific hypothesis, which in this case is the purpose. But once 
the physicist leaves the laboratory for the day, a whole new host of things are 
disclosed to them, to the general exclusion of the experimental equipment. 
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Suddenly the physicist finds his or herself back in the world of cars, traffic 
lights, food, families, television and so on, as they resume those activities 
which are involved in the purposes of leading a standard domestic life.  
After a while and regardless of the experiment and the conclusions that 
will be drawn from it, it is difficult to see how any of the mundane things in 
everyday life will suddenly be disclosed to the physicist as particles, quanta, 
strings and fields. The mug of coffee does not cease to be a mug of coffee even 
after the physicist has determined that its underlying structure is a bizarre 
realm of interacting and counteracting bits of matter and waves. This is 
because the act of drinking a mug of coffee in order to satiate the desire for 
caffeine in the morning would be made impossible if things were disclosed in 
the structures of quantum physics. The “string” is not fit for purpose; the 
handle, meanwhile, is. The only time the structures of quantum physics are fit 
for purpose are in those actions that require their disclosure for the 
actualisation of that specific purpose. In other words, the only context in 
which the structures of quantum physics make sense, is the context in which 
they serve the purpose chosen by the physicists, which is their study and 
application. Now, this is not to say that it is only in these contexts that the 
particles exist; they exist exactly how the physicist describes. It is just that they 
are not disclosed to the self outside of the contexts of the purposes in which 
they are required.  
Furthermore, and related to this, it is difficult to see how a labourer 
would have all of these pieces of experimental equipment disclosed to him or 
her in the same way and under the same aspect as the physicist, because the 
labourer has never set for themselves the purpose of conducting an 
experiment in particle physics. The labourer is ignorant (not to be taken in a 
derogatory sense) of the equipment in the laboratory precisely because they 
have not chosen for themselves the same things as the physicist.  
What these examples enable us to see is the impact that the choice of 
purposes and direction that the self makes for itself directly impact the kind 
of things in the world which are disclosed to it. In claiming that freedom 
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encompasses the fundamental choice of the kind of self one is, we have also 
shown that this choice of self is intimately tied up with the actual disclosure 
of things in the world. Ultimately, it is in virtue of their choices that the 
physicist and the labourer experience the world the way they do. It is because 
they are both free agents that they were able to make these choices of self and 
purpose, and it is owing to this that freedom itself discloses the world in such-
and-such a way to free agents. 
 
7.2.4 Self Disclosure 
Insofar as the world is disclosed to the self in virtue of the kind of self 
one is and the kind of purposes one has defined for themselves, everything 
that shows up and is disclosed “says something” about the kind of self one 
has chosen to be. Thus, disclosure not only discloses things as they are, but 
also things as they are in having been chosen by the self in the actualisation of 
its purposes.  
To see this, we ought to return to some of the examples that have been 
discussed already. When we consider again the physicist and his or her 
situation – that of setting up an experiment to test a certain hypothesis – we 
should be reminded of that equipmental contexture that is disclosed to himself 
or herself: that context of tools and devices needed in order to conduct the 
experiment. In that same example, we contrasted the world disclosure of the 
physicist with that of the labourer. For the physicist, the particle accelerator, 
magnets, supercomputers and so on are disclosed to them under a certain 
aspect. This aspect owes itself to the choices this person has made to actually 
be a physicist; to be the kind of agent who pursues their interest in those 
phenomena and structures which lie at the heart of and are the structure of 
nature. This carries with it wider implications pertaining to the kind of person 
the physicist has chosen to be. The physicist may be hostile to philosophy or 
hold the kind of philosophical positions consistent with the notion that nature 
and all things in it fundamentally conform to laws – including human beings. 
They may also reject religion, opposing the idea of faith in favour of reason. I 
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say “may” so as not to paint a shallow caricature of physicists, but merely to 
indicate the certain conceivable possibilities that would be available to this 
kind of agent. The key is to see that the choice to be a physicist is the choice to 
be a certain kind of self. This kind of self is constantly “fed back” to the self in 
the form of the things in the world that are disclosed to it. Thus, Freedom-in-
the-World discloses a world in relation to the choice of self, but in so doing, it 
discloses the self and its choices along with every instance of world disclosure. 
Being is in the world insofar as it is in its own world, and for this world to be 
its own, in this case the self must have chosen and actualised one set of 
possibilities over another.  
When the labourer sees the physicists’ laboratory, whilst it is clear that 
the builder will at least recognise the equipment as being for scientific 
purposes, they will not experience the same disclosure of these objects as the 
physicist. The equipmental contexture will not carry the same significance, 
precisely because the builder has chosen to be a different kind of self. Instead, 
the builder may have disclosed to them things about built structures in the 
world that the physicist would not notice: bad brickwork, the onset of 
subsidence in a house or sound structural practice, the use of certain materials 
and so on. This is because, in choosing to be a builder, the world is composed 
of the things that hold the most significance to such an agent. The builder’s 
world and the physicist’s world differ in these respects, in virtue of their 
choices to pursue the kind of things necessary to become this kind of person 
or other. Despite their differences, there are certain key ways in which the two 
worlds of these two different agents will be similar. Their domestic lives and 
all the things such a context discloses are likely to share features. So it is not 
that the world of a builder and the world of a physicist cannot overlap in 
certain ways. It is more the case that a great deal of their worlds will differ 
substantially and this is so in virtue of the kind of agent they are, which is 
something that is necessarily chosen and chosen freely. 
What these examples serve to demonstrate is the fundamental, 
structural freedom at the heart of the self. A human being chooses itself, and 
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in so doing, it experiences the world as a context disclosed to it in order to 
actualise possibilities for itself. In choosing itself, its possibilities and therefore 
the world that is disclosed to it, the self is disclosed along with all the context 
of things. To borrow a term from Sartre, the self is “reflected”190 back to itself 
along with every instance of world disclosure, and this is so in virtue of its free 
choice of self. 
 
7.3 Clarification and the Argument from the Facticity of the Free Self 
The position on the free will that has been constructed thus far has, as 
we have seen, some crucial virtues. Rather than conceiving of it as being a 
“freedom-from” or a “freedom-to”, what has been established is that freedom 
is itself that which allows for “meaning” or “sense” to take form; it is a 
condition of the possibility of intelligibility in general. Therefore, without this 
fundamental freedom, the space for determinism is not even opened, meaning 
that it in fact hinges upon freedom in the first place. Our scientific theories, 
philosophical positions, acts of understanding, practical everyday behaviour 
and relation to ourselves and to each other depend upon this deep-seated and 
fundamental freedom. As such, attempts to reduce freedom to some other 
phenomena fall short of giving a complete account, as they fail to recognise 
their own debt to freedom – that these very attempts at reduction require the 
activity of a free will. 
But this freedom, as the condition of intelligibility, is nowhere outside 
of the world we inhabit; it is, as has been demonstrated, non-transcendental. 
Freedom instead makes possible any and all disclosure of things and beings 
within the world. It is the structure of the context within which things show 
up for us, without itself being beyond that context. In a sense, it is the space 
between the subject and the object (in actual fact, this kind of freedom makes 
such a distinction seem less useful) and is not completely reducible in either 
direction. In virtue of this, neither is freedom beyond either of these; the self 
                                                 
190 Sartre, J.P. Being and Nothingness, pp. 276-327 
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and the world are correlated to the extent that things show up for the free will 
and only for the free will. 
It is this point that I think enables us to see how correct Hegel’s 
assessment is when he states: 
 
…  [F]reedom is just as much a basic determination of the will as weight is a basic 
determination of bodies … Will without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is actual 
only as will or as subject191 
 
It is a fact of any corporeal body that it has mass. The same point can 
be made when we consider the relation between the self and its freedom. If a 
will exists, then it is necessarily free. Wherever there is talk of the will, or the 
self, it makes no sense to talk of these things as being utterly determined. Or 
at least, if it does make sense to talk of the determined will, it is only so due to 
the fact that it is an essentially free will that is making the point. 
At this juncture, it is worth considering a potential criticism of what has 
been argued in the preceding sections. Given the examples used, particularly 
to describe the situation of world and self-disclosure, it might be argued that 
this account of Freedom-in-the-World is guilty of conflate the choice of self 
with the choice of occupation. Or perhaps that the occupation one chooses for 
oneself is ultimately the most important way in which things are disclosed. I 
believe this thought arises purely out of the examples I have given thus far, 
and not, I would argue, out of anything inherently questionable about the 
account itself.  
To see this, we may consider the way in which other people are 
disclosed to the self. This has little, if anything at all, to do with the work that 
one does, but still has everything to do with the kind of self one is. What if the 
physicist from the previous examples also suffered some form of social 
phobia? Thus, encounters with other people are a challenge to be overcome; 
others are disclosed to her as threatening, judgemental and untrustworthy. In 
                                                 
191 Hegel, G.W.F Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p. 35 
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this instance, it makes no sense to say that this has anything to do with the fact 
that our individual makes a living from studying matter and its conditions. In 
fact, it is likely the case that such a phobia preceded this occupational choice. 
However, what can be said is that no sane individual would ever choose to 
have a social phobia. In what sense then is such an issue related to the choice 
of self?  
 It is correct to say such a phobia could not sensibly be chosen. That said, 
it is part of our physicist’s facticity. It stems from events in the past in which 
her experiences of other people were so negative that she now feels as though 
strangers pose a threat. This is not to say that an aspect of her selfhood has 
been determined, in the sense in which the determinist would want to have it. 
Instead, what we can say is that the physicist is in the position to redefine this 
aspect of themselves. Not doing so is a choice the physicist makes for herself, 
every bit as much as actually seeking treatment for the issue. Whilst the selves 
we are, are not initially chosen, which forms our facticity, all aspects of the self 
fall under our power to change or embrace.  
The point being espoused here is that things are not primarily disclosed 
to us in virtue of the occupation we choose. Such a criticism, whilst 
understandable, misses the subtlety of the point that the showing up of things 
in the world owes itself to the freedom of the will. Our occupation is just one 
aspect of the self we have chosen or continue to choose, and it is just one way 
in which things are disclosed. Those of us who choose not to work, for 
whatever reason, are still subject to the disclosure of things in the world in 
virtue of their freedom of will. 
There is another criticism we may consider, relating somewhat to the 
discussion of facticity. This criticism I feel is more demanding on this 
conception of freedom and as such, I will spend considerable time attempting 
to defend Freedom-in-the-World against it. Whilst I will lay out a set of 
premises which define this criticism, there are, in fact, two subtly different 
strands of the criticism, each demanding its own response in turn.  
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 The general theme of the criticism may be expressed as follows: the 
point that things are fundamentally disclosed to us in virtue of some deep 
freedom of self can be granted. Its non-transcendentality and non-reductive 
status may also be granted. However, it must also be granted that the very 
coming into existence of such a self was not a choice that could be made, but 
instead determines the kind of choices that we can make (we may call this 
facticity).  
But, if both of these things are allowed, and if the choice of self is given 
its full power as described by Freedom-in-the-World, and if facticity is 
allowed also (and it seems it must be, for it is empirically and logically true 
that one does not choose oneself before birth) it follows that the things one 
chooses for oneself are at the very least influenced, or at most, determined by, 
the kind of self one is as aspects of the self that one could not have had any 
choice in. Our freedom to choose ourselves would, in the end, have to have 
been determined by our factical existence, which by definition we did not 
choose.  
This criticism is powerful because it allows Freedom-in-the-World to 
stay intact. It does not deny its relation to disclosure, its non-transcendentality 
or its ability to overcome attempts at reduction. What this argument does is 
expose a point that our account instead has to allow for, that of facticity. This 
is why I think it appropriate to label this criticism “the argument from the 
facticity of the free self”. We can formalise it as follows: 
 
(1) Freedom-in-the-World is: 
a. Non-transcendental 
b. Non-reductive 
c. Responsible for the disclosure of things and beings 
(2) Freedom-in-the-World is a feature of our factical existence (we never 
chose to be free) 
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(3) Therefore, the things we cannot choose for ourselves determine the 
things we can choose for ourselves. In what sense then is the self 
actually free? 
 
(1, a-c) are clauses that have been established so far and are admitted by the 
critic. (2) is a clause that again, both this account and the critic agree upon. But 
the critic points out that if (2) is true, it leads to the situation in (3). If Freedom-
in-the-World is to maintain its strength as an account of the free will, it must 
now be able to defend itself against the charge in (3). If it cannot, the critic will 
be in a position to question at the very least what advances Freedom-in-the-
World actually makes over determinism, or at the most, the critic will be in a 
position to once again find ground to establish a space for determinism in our 
account.  
 With that said, it is worth noting two varied ways in which such a 
criticism may be expressed. The first would be for the determinist to push the 
concern that the circumstances into which we are born in turn constitute our 
wants and desires. Thus, it is not enough for the free will to have the power to 
choose between possibilities; for the will to be free, it must also be in a position 
to outright define these possibilities themselves. In more formal terms: where 
the wants and desires of an agent determine the things she will choose -- “A 
chooses action-x ‘in-order-to’ sate desire-y” -- if it cannot be shown that A also 
determines y, there is no sense to the claim that A chooses x freely. This variant 
of the argument from the facticity of the free self I will label “Version 1”.  
 The second, and slightly different way the determinist’s concern may 
be raised is by making reference to the circumstances into which one is born 
in relation to the very way the agent is. So, rather than referring to wants, 
desires and their impact upon choice, the determinist may argue that merely 
being a certain kind of person is enough to push home the idea that we are not, 
when all is said and done, in free control of our actions. For if one cannot 
choose the circumstances of their birth, it seems difficult to argue that choices 
are made by the agent freely, if the environment into which they are born is 
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such that it causes them to be a certain way – and thus to want and desire 
certain things. When expressed in this way, even if we could successfully 
mount a defence against the first concern, we would still need to 
accommodate the latter scenario. We may think of individuals with an anti-
social personality disorder, whereby abuse or childhood trauma have caused 
such agents to act in certain ways and make certain choices that we may deem 
extreme or immoral. However, it is, according to the determinist, not solely 
the agent’s fault, because they did not, after all, choose to be born into an 
abusive or traumatic environment. In keeping with the labelling outlined 
above, I will call this concern “Version 2”.   
 Now whilst both of these criticisms express slightly different concerns, 
and as aforementioned, are demanding of slightly different responses, upon 
closer examination they both follow the trajectory of the argument from the 
facticity of the free self, in premises (1-3). Neither argument denies the 
structure of Freedom-in-the-World in (1, a-c); nor does either argument 
deviate from premise (2). As such, it also follows that neither argument 
deviates from the conclusion in (3). What I propose to do at this stage is answer 
both versions of the argument from the facticity of the free self. In the case of 
Version 1, I believe an answer is already available to us, in the form of Harry 
G. Frankfurt’s argument in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. 
But, to anticipate the moves that will be made somewhat, Version 2 will 
ultimately fail to find a satisfactory answer in the work of Frankfurt. Version 
2 is also usefully discussed by Susan Wolf in her work on sanity and 
responsibility. At this stage, then, we will turn to the work of Frankfurt.   
 
7.4 First and Second-Order Desires; Second-order Volitions 
We have, in the previous section, laid out “Version 1” of the argument 
from the facticity of the free self. One way to think of this potential criticism, 
is in terms of “levels” of choice or decision making. On one level we may 
choose to satiate certain desires or wants, but the determinist may still argue 
that in order to be free, there is the second demand that we ourselves are the 
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sources of such desires or wants. If we cannot in any meaningful sense decide 
what we want, rather than wanting things for reasons beyond our control, 
how can we be truly free? The determinists’ concern is thus pushed to a level 
of decision making that is, upon first examination, difficult to accommodate 
within the project of Freedom-in-the-World.   
However, it is debatable as to whether this kind of freedom is even 
something we would want or is even intelligible.  What may be more useful 
in response to this concern is to maintain that the only kind of freedom we 
could want is the freedom to have this second level of decision making in the 
first place, even if it turns out that such a second level is not authorship, but 
just another kind of decision, want or desire. 
Let us take an example, from the aforementioned “Freedom of the Will 
and the Concept of a Person” by Harry G. Frankfurt. He states that humans 
seem to be unique in their ability to not only want and desire certain things, 
but also to be able to form desires about the very kind of desires they want to 
have and are motivated by.192   
Frankfurt gives us the example of someone who wants to be the kind 
of person who is moved to act by “the desire to concentrate on [their] work.”193 
From this it follows that the person in question already has the desire to 
concentrate on their work. Thus, this first-order desire “A wants to concentrate 
on their work” is necessarily one of A’s desires. However, Frankfurt points out 
that “the question of whether or not his second order desire is fulfilled does 
not turn merely on whether the desire he wants is one of his desires. It turns 
on whether this desire is, as he wants it to be, his effective desire or will.”194 
So, if it turns out that what moves A to act is his or her desire to concentrate 
on their work, then at the time of action, A does in fact want “what he wants 
to want.”195  However, we can imagine a situation where A wants to 
concentrate on his or her work, but rather than that desire being the driving 
                                                 
192 Frankfurt, H.G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” in Free Will (ed). Watson, G. pp. 82-83 
193 Ibid. p. 86 
194 Idem. 
195 Idem. 
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force of his or her actions, it is instead some time constraint which is pushing 
A to act. In this instance, even though that important first-order desire is still 
very much one of A’s desires, it cannot be said in such a case that A wants 
what they want to want. This is because what A wants is to be motivated to 
action by their first-order desire for concentration alone. Frankfurt’s point here 
is that someone like A, or human beings in general, want certain desires to “be 
[his or her] will.”196 Wanting certain desires to be one’s will is subtly different 
from merely wanting certain desires. 
 Take, for example, a therapist, whose job it is to offer treatment to drug 
addicts. The therapist decides that in order to be in a better position to help 
his patients, he ought to understand what is like to be an addict; he wants to 
know what it is like to want to take drugs. Thus, unlike addicts, who are 
motivated to take drugs purely for the sensation they experience when they 
are under the influence of such a substance, the therapist could be “moved all 
the way” to act by his second order desire to want to have the first order desire 
to take drugs.197 As such, it is not the case that the therapist merely wants to 
take drugs, but he has a deeper desire also – he wants to want to take drugs; he 
has a second order desire to want an addiction. But despite having all the 
requisite desires in place, this does not mean that the therapist will actually 
take drugs. It is sufficient for him that he is able to relate to his patients’ first-
order desires to want drugs. Thus, “[w]hile he wants to want to take the drug, 
he may have no desire to take it; it may be that all he wants is to taste the desire 
for it.”198 In this case, the therapist clearly wants to have a certain desire (the 
desire to take drugs) but he does not want this desire to be his will – he does 
not want this desire to motivate him to act.  
 In order to clearly distinguish between these cases, Frankfurt labels 
instances where one wants a certain desire to be their will, “second-order 
volitions”.199 It is, in Frankfurt’s view, definitive of a person that they exhibit 
                                                 
196 Idem. 
197 Ibid. pp. 84-85 
198 Ibid. p. 85 
199 Ibid. p. 86 
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second-order volitions; as such, a second-order volition is a sufficient 
condition for personhood.200 “It is logically possible, however unlikely, that 
there should be an agent with second-order desires but with no volitions of 
the second order. Such a creature, in my view, would not be a person.”201 
 In such cases, creatures (which Frankfurt calls “wantons”202) would 
have first-order desires and may even have second-order desires (that they 
want to want certain things), but do not have a preference as to whether or not 
they want a particular desire to be their will – to motivate them to act. 
Frankfurt includes in this category of creatures higher animals and children. 
It may even include adult human beings who have certain illnesses or 
disabilities. For our purposes, it suffices to see that Frankfurt makes such a 
distinction, but we need not dwell on whether or not he is correct in his  
assertion that personhood consists in the ability to have second-order 
volitions. What I think is worth noting here is Frankfurt’s later claim, that the 
“concept of a person is not only, then, the concept of a type of entity that has 
both first-order desires and volitions of the second order. It can also be 
construed as the concept of a type of entity for whom the freedom of its will may 
be a problem.”203 
 Thus, when we talk of freedom of the will, as has become clear 
throughout the course of this project, we are not talking about a creature who 
can “do what they want”. Instead, we are talking of a creature who is able to, 
on some level, evaluate their wants or desires. As Frankfurt says, “a person 
enjoys freedom of the will [if]… he is free to want what he wants to want.”204 
                                                 
200 Idem. 
201 Idem.  
202 Idem. 
  In fact, Frankfurt states: “I am far from suggesting that a creature without reason may be a person. For it is 
only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of 
forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person’s will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a 
rational being.” [Ibid. p. 87] However, from what I have tried to establish regarding Freedom-in-the-World, such 
a statement (that the structure of a person’s will presupposes reason) is not something that is so clear. The 
phenomenon of disclosure points towards the idea that reason itself presupposes freedom of the will.  Thus it 
seems that we can have perfectly rational beings that are not free, but we can never have a truly free being which 
is not by extension also rational. So whilst the human being is certainly a rational animal, its essence consists 
more in the freedom of its will than its reason. However, this does not extend the range of things that can be 
considered a “person". 
203 Ibid. p. 89 – Italics are my own 
204 Ibid. p. 90 
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So, whereas freedom of action  may  consist in  being free to act on  one’s 
desires, having freedom of  the will  turns out to consist in being able to have 
concern, in the requisite way,  for our desires  themselves; being able to 
evaluate which desires motivate our actions; being able to be an issue for 
ourselves.205 
 
It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person 
exercises freedom of the will.  And it is in the discrepancy between his will and his second-
order volitions, or in his awareness that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a 
happy chance, that a person who does not have this freedom feels its lack.206  
 
From what Frankfurt is saying at this point, it is the case that freedom of the 
will is something that is not only the capacity to have second-order volitions, 
which in turn affect our desires and our motives for action. It also turns out 
that this capacity is completely contingent -- it is a matter of luck that we are 
able to have our will and our wants coincide. Rather than take this as a 
negative, this in fact is an assurance of freedom, for it seems that nothing could 
be as free as a will which is lucky to be free and is utterly aware of its luck in 
this regard. Then suppose that there is someone who “enjoys both freedom of 
action and freedom of the will. Then not only is he free to do what he wants 
to do, but free to want what he wants to want. It seems to me that he has, in 
that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or to conceive.”207  
 At this point then, let us return to our initial concerns, those which 
motivated the introduction of Frankfurt’s account of second-order volitions. 
There was space for the determinist to raise the worry that if we are to be truly 
free, then we cannot be satisfied with only freedom of choice.  What is also 
required is that we are ultimately the author of the possibilities we have to 
choose between. By thinking about this concern in terms of levels of choice, 
we are able to change the terms of the argument to read as follows:  
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(1) The will that is free is free to choose how to act.  
(2) But the will that is free ought also to be free to choose the choices it has 
available to it.  
(3) People are not free to choose the choices available to them.  
Therefore:   
(4) People do not have freedom of the will.  
 
With this in mind, the determinist is concerned to show that as a result of the 
birth of the self, there are circumstances into which all people are born which 
cannot be chosen. As a result, it follows that the choices a person can choose 
throughout the course of their life are determined by the circumstances of their 
birth.  The determinist then, can argue that freedom of the will is only allowed 
in cases where a being is able to choose the circumstances of its birth. 
However, this is never the case and therefore, human beings do not have 
meaningful freedom of the will.   
 But Frankfurt’s distinction between first and second-order desires and 
second-order volitions changes the scope of freedom of the will. Essentially, 
the determinist is asking for too much with the argument above. He or she is 
demanding a concept of the freedom of the will which would not be 
intelligible. To be sure, we cannot choose the circumstances of our birth. 
However, what we can choose, according to Frankfurt, is which of our desires 
turn out to be the ones which motivate us to act. Thus, we are the kind of 
beings which are not only able to choose certain things for ourselves, but we 
are the kind of beings who can, at the very least, determine what it is that 
motivates us to choose certain things for ourselves. In this context, this is the only 
kind of freedom we could hope for, but it is the only kind of freedom worth 
wanting. For the kind of freedom that the determinist seems to think is 
necessary for freedom to actually exist is utterly unreasonable. A defensible 
and intelligible conception of the freedom of the will ought to be able to 
accommodate the fact that we cannot choose to be born; what the determinist 
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is guilty of is overstating the importance of such a fact, at least in a certain 
context.  
 The determinist can, when all is said and done, press the issue of our 
lack of choice in being born, by insisting that it is not merely the case that this 
lack of choice determines the appearance of future choices: that in fact, it 
determines the kind of being we actually are. If this is true, then it will turn out 
that our lack of choice in our births in turn determines the kind of things that 
we want to want – in other words, what it is that we want to motivate our 
actions is a desire that is determined by the kind of being that we are; which 
we have no primary say in. Thus, we can move to Version 2 of the argument 
from the facticity of the free self.    
 The argument from the facticity of the free self on its own is powerful. 
However, I feel that by referring to the work of Frankfurt, we have been able 
to show that at least one version of the argument is weakened.  
 However, Frankfurt does not present us with an argument proper 
against facticity. Indeed, Version 2 of the argument is still a major concern, 
and it is one that any account of the freedom of the will should be able to 
accommodate. What Frankfurt does allow us is a platform from which we can 
introduce other work, the challenges and worries of which can furnish us with 
the necessary tools and context to overcome the challenges posed by Version 
2 of the argument from the facticity of the free self.  
Not, simply, for the sake of argument, but also when we consider what 
we as a society have taken ourselves to have learnt about the nature of the 
human psyche and its response to environmental trauma. As such, Version 2 
is deserving of a thorough examination. I propose to do this by turning to a 
contemporary debate in free will and determinism; the debate between Susan 
Wolf and those philosophers she deems as being proponents of a “deep self 
view”. One of these thinkers she targets is Frankfurt himself. That said, in 
particular, I will also focus on Wolf’s criticisms of the work of Charles Taylor, 
as he has the most obviously Heideggerian notion of a “deep self” and makes 
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use of many of the same resources from Heidegger as our account of Freedom-
in-the-World.  
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Sanity and Freedom 
 
 
 
8.1 Sanity and Insanity of the Self as Facticity 
 The most obvious outcome of freedom-in-the-world is that questions of 
freedom and responsibility for ones’ choice of self are intimately tied up with 
practicality and action. The only sphere within which choosing oneself at a 
deep level makes sense is the sphere within which the self acts. To choose to 
be a certain kind of agent plays itself out in the world. What we noted in the 
previous section was a potential drawback of such an account, which I termed 
“the argument from the facticity of the free self”. Susan Wolf, in her paper 
“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, I think perfectly exemplifies 
the motivation which leads to the argument from facticity.  
 Now, whilst I have said that Wolf presents us with a paradigmatic 
example of Version 2 of the argument from the facticity of the free self, it is 
important to point out that she is not espousing a form of determinism. 
Instead, Wolf provides us with a substantive account of freedom, one in which 
there is a prerequisite that we are in touch with reality in such a way that 
reality informs our choices rather than determines them (see p.86). This differs 
from Frankfurt’s procedural account, in which freedom has little, if anything, 
to do with the manner in which the self is in touch with the world it finds itself 
in.  
Wolf wants to draw our attention to the fact that circumstances beyond 
our choice our control, that in turn effect the kind of person we will become, 
present limits to our freedom. These limits lead to the conclusion that the kind 
of freedom that has previously been espoused (say, by the likes of Taylor) is 
unnecessary for us to be satisfied with the selfhood that we do, as a matter of 
empirical and practical fact, possess.   
Wolf also uses the example of lawyers who may need, for reasons of 
legality in a court of law, to ask questions about freedom and responsibility. 
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In this way, her argument exemplifies that worldly dimension within which 
we need to demonstrate the validity of Freedom-in-the-World as a useful 
concept. For Wolf then, the legal ramifications are important to consider, for: 
 
Their questions are questions of specification: Does this or that particular person meet this 
or that particular condition? Is he mature enough, or informed enough, or sane enough to 
be responsible [for his actions]?208 
 
In other words, if one were to worry about the metaphysical essence or 
conditions of freedom, one ought to worry about the manner in which these 
worries translate in the everyday, non-metaphysical sphere. “Once the 
significance of sanity is fully appreciated, at least some of the apparently 
inescapable metaphysical aspects of the problem of responsibility will 
dissolve.”209 Wolf intends to demonstrate that self-revision is only a tenable 
condition of freedom when the more mundane requirement that the agent be 
sane is also met. But this sanity, in an important sense, is not the kind of thing 
that can be chosen by the agent. Thus, Wolf takes issue with a few 
philosophers whose views she labels “Deep Self Views”, though for the 
purpose of this work, I will stick to the implications of Wolf’s argument for 
Charles Taylor. This is because Taylor argues from Heideggerian premises, 
the likes of which we have made use of in our account of Freedom-in-the-
World. Wolf identifies a central claim that all Deep Self Views share: an agent 
is free if, and only if, the agent is self-determined in a deep sense.  
 Before we take a closer look at Wolf’s argument, it is necessary to see 
what Taylor’s account actually commits itself to, and in what sense it is related 
to Heidegger. In “Responsibility for Self”, Taylor wants to understand 
whether or not there is a conception of responsibility which is essential to the 
structure of the self. We may think of such a point as wanting to attempt to 
answer the question:  
                                                 
208 Wolf, S. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” p. 46 in Schoeman, F. (ed.) Responsibility, Character 
and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (pp. 46-62) 
209 Idem. 
125 
 
 
Does being a self, in some deep sense, consist in being responsible (at least in part) for 
the kind of agent we are or desire to become? 
 
To tackle this, Taylor invokes Heidegger’s definition of “Dasein” in 
Being and Time: “The being of any such entity is in each case mine … [A]s 
entities with such Being … its Being is that which is an issue.”210 The point for 
Heidegger, as for Taylor, is that we are the kind of agents for which the fact 
that we are, and the way that we are, are things we have the capacity to 
scrutinise: we are the kind of agents whose very agency itself can be “an 
issue”. So it is not merely that we can evaluate things, but we can analyse these 
evaluations themselves and check whether or not they are the kind of 
evaluations we want to have. For example, if I want to be the kind of agent that 
others take seriously, I can assess those evaluations I have which lead me to 
avoid conflict of all kinds. However, to have others take me seriously, I must 
sometimes enter into a conflict with another, and so I find that the desire to 
avoid conflict is not the kind of desire that the kind of agent I wish to become 
will have. This puts me in a position to change accordingly. Thus, by taking 
Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as his lead, Taylor constructs a view which 
fits into Wolf’s categorisation of a Deep Self View: a truly free and responsible 
agent is one who has the ability to revise and evaluate their actions, and the 
desires that lead to these actions. Putting this ability to use, the agent can 
revise themselves in a deep sense.211 
 One of the key things Taylor inherits from Heidegger is his 
commitment to the idea that the self is always already wrapped up in its 
commitments, states-of-affairs, concerns and meaningful encounters. In such 
a way, the human being is in a crucial sense defined by all of these things, but 
at the same time is free to redefine them in accordance with new commitments, 
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states-of-affairs, concerns and meaningful encounters, as they occur in the life 
of man.  
 
[W]e have to think of man as a self-interpreting animal. He is necessarily so, for there is no 
such thing as the structure of meanings for him independently of his interpretation of them; 
for one is woven into the other. But then the text of our interpretation is not that 
heterogeneous from what is interpreted; for what is interpreted is itself an interpretation; a 
self-interpretation of experiential meaning which contributes to the constitution of meaning. 
Or to put it another way: that of which we are trying to find the coherence is itself partly 
constituted by self-interpretation.212  
 
The above passage is directly inspired by Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, a term 
that has become a major part of understanding Heidegger’s work within this 
thesis as well. The fact that Dasein is, on Heidegger’s account, the kind of 
being which is concerned with itself, is emphasised here by Taylor. To be 
concerned with oneself, as a human being, is to be concerned with all of those 
features which go towards making us specifically human. Now whilst these 
can come under the category of commitments, states-of-affairs, concerns and 
meaningful encounters, one thing is always evident about all of the above: that 
they are intelligible to Dasein/the Self, and as such, have meaning. However, 
this meaning is, as admitted by Taylor, at least to some extent constituted by 
us, or those processes by which we come to understand and interpret 
ourselves. If Dasein is the kind of being that can question itself, it follows, from 
what is being said, that this kind of self-questioning, or self-interpretation, 
actively goes towards making the Self what it is. 
 This is in fact consistent with Heidegger’s entire philosophical 
development, whereby human experience is only intelligible in virtue of Being 
but Being owes itself to the existence of the human being. As we have seen, 
the two are correlated; they are not completely distinct, but neither is one 
absolutely dependent upon the other. To put it in a clearer fashion, the 
meaningful terms which Dasein/the Self uses to apprehend its experiences 
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(“intentional” terms; ‘fearful’, ‘anxious’, ‘pleasant’, ‘content’) are 
unintelligible without the reference to the worldly state-of-affairs that are tied 
to the experience. For example, to say “There is a moth in the room and I am 
afraid” not only captures the basic fact of there being a moth present, nor the 
experience that wells up within me when I see it. It also captures, in an 
important sense, the actions that I perform in response to it. I may shuffle out 
of the room, plead with my housemate to get rid of it, have a facial expression 
of panic. However, these reactions are such that they only make real sense as 
forming an account of my experience of fear. They could never adequately 
occur during my experience of being happy. These reactions are in an 
important way, intimately bound up with my experience, though part of 
understanding my experience is a recognition that my reactions are 
themselves part of that very experience. It is difficult to understand how an 
agent could properly recognise their experience of fear if the vocabulary that 
captures such an experience were unavailable to them.  
 Ultimately, what this means is that the vocabulary I use to capture my 
experiences goes some way towards my actual meaningful apprehension of 
those very experiences themselves. For Taylor, recognition of this is critical to 
understanding the process of self-interpretation and re-interpretation.213 For 
the vocabulary that the self makes use of in order to categorise and apprehend 
its experiences makes sense precisely because of the role these elements of 
vocabulary play in a wider set of semantic contexts. For example, ‘panic’, 
‘presentiment’, ‘afraid’ capture what they do in virtue of the role they play in 
descriptions of the experience of fear. The implication of this for Taylor is that 
this vocabulary can be more and more accurate; it can encompass more 
expressions and become more refined. As selves, we can refine the range of our 
intentional language.  
 If we become more adept at the adoption of intentional language, we 
are able to apprehend our experiences in ever sharper ways. Therefore, we are 
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able to utilise terms that are more and more appropriate for our experiential 
content.  
 What this means then, is that those commitments, states-of-affairs, 
concerns and encounters that the self is wrapped up with, derive at least part 
of their significance from the range of intentional vocabulary available to the 
self. This does not mean that without an intentional vocabulary one is unable 
to feel, say, brute fear. It would be unreasonable to claim that a cat cannot 
experience fear of a wolf. What Taylor is really trying to get us to see, is that 
in such a situation, a cat’s experience of its own fear is not intelligible to it, 
precisely because it lacks the intentional vocabulary necessary to capture the 
things it is experiencing. What is unique for the human self, is that its 
experiences can become more significant in relation to the range of language 
available to it. The intelligibility of ones’ experiences depends upon the depth 
of one’s intentional vocabulary.  
 We can highlight this by imagining a case where someone suffering 
from a mental illness is attending a counselling session with a therapist. The 
more accurately the patient is able to report his or her experiences, the more 
accurate in turn the diagnoses of the therapist will become. A patient with a 
limited vocabulary will be less able to articulate their fears, anxieties and other 
emotional states. It then becomes difficult to see in what sense such a patient 
would be able respond to these emotional states in the requisite way, where, 
by “requisite way”, we mean a manner in which the patient can work towards 
a resolution of his or her psychological issues. Thus, the inner mental life of 
the self is bound up with the range of intentional vocabulary the self has 
available to it. This leads to the possibility of being able to improve one’s 
vocabulary and as such, improve the ability to apprehend one’s experiential 
content. The deeper the apprehension, the more profound the revision of self 
can be.  
 
 Wolf does in fact see a major benefit in the kind of view Taylor puts 
forward: Deep Self Views tend to cohere with our everyday understanding of 
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what it is to be responsible for our actions. An agent who commits a crime as 
the result of brainwashing cannot be said to be responsible for his or her 
actions on the basis of the fact that in a deep sense, his or her self was not the 
absolute author of the criminal act–the “brainwasher” is ultimately culpable.  
 
In cases of people in these special categories, the connection between the agent’s deep 
selves and their wills is dramatically severed – their wills are governed, not by their deep 
selves, but by forces external to and independent from them.214   
 
The Deep Self View also enables us, in a crucial way, to differentiate between 
humans and animals. As far as we know, it is not that animals lack this 
connection between deep selves and their wills, but that they possess no deep 
selves at all. They are the vehicles of forces which impel them to act, but also, 
lacking a deep self, are (presumably) oblivious to this fact. In a sense then, we 
might say that self-awareness is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition 
for freedom. An organism can be self-aware whilst still lacking the capacity to 
recognise that their selves can be corrected – that they can transcend the given 
conditions that manipulate their selves and be the absolute author of their own 
acts. In other words, an organism can be self-aware and not free, but an 
organism cannot be free and not self-aware. 
 Wolf notes also that there is a theoretical sense in which the Deep Self 
View is fruitful – “[i]t responds to at least one way in which the fear of 
determinism presents itself.”215 The prevalent position of modern non-
philosophical thought is that we, as part of a causally determined universe, 
are bound by physical events that extend far beyond our births. Therefore, 
facts of our agency are merely psychological facts and so our selfhood is 
essentially beyond our control, ultimately reducible to events and constraints 
that we in no way authored. Freedom, under this view, is an illusion. We have 
seen in the previous section how Freedom-in-the-World can overcome such 
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an account, and the Deep Self View of someone such as Taylor adopts a similar 
strategy.   
 The plausibility of determinism affirms that whilst our behaviour is 
determined by our desires, these desires are, in turn, determined by external 
factors. Our desires are ours in a merely prima facie sense. We saw the 
discussion of desires come up, and a way to incorporate them into an account 
of freedom, in our discussion of Frankfurt. But another useful example of this 
“desire-determinism” in action is in economics, where Version 1 of the 
argument from the facticity of the free self might be expressed in the following 
way: One can deem the success or failure of an economic system to be 
demonstrated by the ability that individuals within the system have to satisfy 
their own preferences. A good (or at least functional) economic system is one 
in which individuals are free to follow and satiate their desires. However, 
these desires will usually have been pre-determined by factors external to the 
individual. I can go to a supermarket and choose from a wide array of 
deodorants, in order to make myself smell better. The current economic 
system allows me to do just that: I have a desire to smell pleasant, and that 
desire can be satisfied. But there seems to have been no point in my life where 
I chose the initial desire to smell pleasant. This desire was forced upon me by 
advertising and other people in the same system. I have been conned; coerced 
into spending money on a product to satisfy a desire that I am not even the 
origin of. Thus, desire-determinism is this very notion: that I am free to satisfy 
my desires, but these desires are the kind of things I have no real say in – they 
have been determined by external factors.  
 The Deep Self View enables us to clearly differentiate between kinds of 
desires which are externally determined, and kinds which are genuinely 
authored by an agent. “Determinism implies that the desires that govern our 
actions are in turn governed by something else, but that something else will, 
in the fortunate cases, be our own deeper selves.”216  The determinist can still 
maintain that something must be responsible for this “deeper self” and in 
                                                 
216 Idem. 
131 
 
order to avoid the inconvenience of an infinite regression of deep selves, this 
“something” must be an external force. Wolf says that for Taylor, there is the 
possibility that the agent performing the initial evaluation can in turn be 
evaluated by a still deeper self. This type of move, as far as Wolf is concerned, 
serves only to “[push] the problem further back.”217 However, Taylor’s point 
is more that this initial deep self can become more “articulate” about its 
desires: it can acquire a better or more in depth vocabulary of “strong 
evaluation” and so, the argument goes, the more robust the evaluative 
vocabulary, the deeper the self-evaluation will be.218 From what we have said 
about this kind of vocabulary, it becomes apparent that a Deep Self View of 
this sort does not push the problem deeper and deeper, but merely that the 
one Deep Self can become more adept in its self-evaluations. 
 That said, let us assume that determinism is false. In this case, I may 
well be equipped to explain my behaviour in terms of my desires and my 
desires in terms of my deep self. However, I still had no say whatsoever in the 
brute existence of my deep self. Heidegger deems this phenomenon “Being-
thrown” or “throwness”: the uncomfortable, dizzying realisation that our 
actual existence is not something we desired, asked for, or chose. The basic 
facts of our selves are ultimately dependent upon our family, society and 
culture and this cluster of influences and dependencies are facts we can take 
no deep responsibility for. Thus, we are “thrown” into the world.219 At first, 
the acceptance of throwness and facticity seems to give us a useful way to 
incorporate the determinist concerns within a system of deeper freedom. But 
what it seems to do, upon closer examination, is leave the account wide upon 
to yet more concerns.  
So, the Deep Self View cannot settle the worries raised by determinism, 
because even if determinism were shown to be false, the worry of our Being-
thrown would not be overcome. However, Wolf wants to argue that as long 
as we are free to revise and re-create this deep self, at least in terms of the order 
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of its desires, we can be satisfied, that this capacity, at least initially, offers us 
all the freedom we could hope for. 
 
If you are free to control your actions by your desires, and free to control your desires by 
your deeper desires, and free to control those desires by still deeper desires, what further 
kind of freedom can you want?220 
 
At this stage, Wolf is not satisfied with the rhetorical question she poses. There 
is, in her view, a deeper freedom we could want, and this deeper freedom is 
the real foundation of responsibility. The Deep Self View, that is, cannot offer 
us a complete picture of what it is to be a responsible agent. She constructs a 
useful and troublesome counter-example for proponents of the Deep Self 
View. 
 She takes as her example a fictional dictator, who is of the brutal and 
psychotic kind, called Jo. Jo has a favourite son, JoJo, who is given privileged 
access to his father’s daily routine of torture, murder, imprisonment and 
generally inhuman acts. When JoJo grows up, he indulges in the same kind of 
acts as his father before him. JoJo is not in any way manipulated into these 
actions; they very much stem from his own desires. Importantly, these desires 
are the desires that JoJo, in his capacity for free agency, chooses to have. “When 
he steps back and asks “Do I really want to be this sort of person?” his answer 
is resoundingly Yes, for this way of life expresses a crazy sort of power that 
forms part of his deepest ideal.”221 
 In other words, JoJo meets all the conditions laid out by the Deep Self 
View, but his deep self is essentially corrupt. So, in Heidegger’s sense, JoJo has 
been thrown into a culture of inhumanity and brutality, and as an adult, his 
actions are authored by desires that his deep self fully endorses. In what sense 
then is JoJo responsible for his actions? Given his upbringing, it seems unlikely 
that JoJo’s deep self would have developed in any other way than the way that 
it in fact has. JoJo has grown to become exactly the kind of monster we would 
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expect of anyone thrown into the situation JoJo is in. On a smaller scale, we 
can also imagine a child born to an abusive family. Were the child to grow up 
to have psychological difficulties that affect the desires this individual has and 
were these desires to lead to bizarre or unethical actions, we would not blame 
them entirely for this behaviour (though legally speaking we often do, an issue 
beyond the scope of this piece).  
 The Deep Self View, whilst enabling us to distinguish normal deep 
selves from manipulated deep selves (i.e. victims of brainwashing), provides 
no basis for distinguishing between a sane deep self and an insane deep self. 
“[W]e cannot say of JoJo that his self, qua agent, is not the kind of self he wants 
it to be. It is the self he wants it to be. From the inside, he feels as integrated, 
free and responsible as we do.”222 In order for JoJo to be responsible for his 
deep self, he would quite literally have had to have created himself and this is, 
of course, impossible; not merely for JoJo but for any of us. The crux of Wolf’s 
argument on this point is that it is a mistake to think of responsibility as 
requiring “literal self-creation.”223  
 
Not all the things necessary for freedom and responsibility must be types of power and 
control. We may need simply to be a certain way, even though it is not within our power to 
determine whether we are that way or not.224  
 
Sanity is thus not a type of power or control, but it is a way in which our self 
is. We are sane (or insane), rather than having the power to be sane, or the 
power to determine our sanity (or insanity).  
 
The desire to be sane is thus not a desire for another form of control. It is rather a desire that 
one’s self be connected to the world in a certain way – we could even say it is a desire that 
one’s self be controlled by the world in certain ways and not in others.225 
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Legally speaking, the McNaughten Rule states that a person is sane if (1) 
he/she knows what he/she is doing and (2) he/she knows that what he/she 
is doing is, as the case may be, right or wrong. Thus, (1) implies the cognitive 
capacity to comprehend one’s actions and (2) implies the capacity to situate 
one’s actions within a normative framework. To be sane, then, is the 
“minimally sufficient ability to cognitively and normatively recognize and 
appreciate the world for what it is.”226 We can be in control of our desires, but 
we must also be subservient to the kind of desires one should have in the “real 
world”– sanity is the desire to actually be controlled by the real world in the 
right way.227 Thus, the Deep Self View, taken in conjunction with the condition 
of sanity as laid out by Wolf, can overcome the metaphysical problems that 
can arise in discussions of responsible agency.  
 The “Sane Deep Self View” provides us with the basis to distinguish 
between our own cases and the cases of individuals like JoJo. JoJo is not 
responsible for his actions because although the link between his desires and 
his deep self remains intact, the deep self that his desires are linked to is insane. 
JoJo meets condition (1) because he is cognitively able to comprehend his 
actions. However, he fails to meet condition (2), for his comprehension of the 
“rightness” or “wrongness” of his actions is evidently not in line with the way 
the world in fact is. He lacks the ability to place his actions in their proper 
normative framework. 
 But Wolf is not satisfied just to match up the condition of sanity with 
our pre-theoretical intuitions. These intuitions themselves require defending 
in light of yet more worries. Firstly, issues of freedom and responsible agency 
cannot be alleviated by the view that JoJo’s mistaken normative self-
evaluation is completely beyond his control. It is this very issue of the 
unavoidability of his erroneous valuations that needs to be overcome. “If 
JoJo’s values are unavoidably mistaken, our values, even if not mistaken, 
appear to be just as unavoidable.”228 (Again, Heidegger’s notion of “Being-
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thrown” rears its head here). It should be noted though, and Wolf does just 
this, that in the case of anyone with a sane deep self, if we turn out to be a bad 
or immoral agent, it does not follow that we turned out this way of necessity. 
In the case of JoJo, his turning out to be immoral is the result of an insane deep 
self, which he could not help but develop. But in the case of a sane agent, in 
order to be sane, the agent must have the moral resources to comprehend the 
wrongness of their actions. What this means is that, our lack of literal self-
creation at the deepest level should not be a worry. “Whereas JoJo is unable to 
control the fact that, at the deepest level, he is not fully sane, we are not 
responsible for the fact that, at the deepest level, we are.”229 It is then, largely 
a matter of chance, a condition of our Being-thrown, whether or not we 
develop a sane or an insane deep self. But if we are lucky enough to be sane at 
the deepest level, then we are, by extension, lucky enough to have the capacity 
to revise or re-invent ourselves. However, seeing as we are sane, we are 
morally responsible for those aspects of ourselves we revise or re-create, 
should the actions that stem from them turn out to be wrong.  
 Wolf’s argument so far has shown that self-creation, aside from being 
empirically impossible, is in fact not even that desirable an ability.  
 
What we do have reason to want, then, is something more than the ability to revise 
ourselves, but less than the ability to create ourselves. Implicit in the Sane Deep Self View is 
the idea that what is needed is the ability to correct (or approve) ourselves.230 
 
At this point, Wolf anticipates two objections to the Sane Deep Self View: 
 
(1) [H]ow, in light of my specialized use of the term “sanity”, [can we be] so sure that “we” 
are any saner than the non-responsible individuals?231 
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(2) One may be worried that my view too closely connects sanity with being right about the 
world and fear that my view implies that anyone who acts wrongly or has false beliefs 
about the world is therefore insane and so not responsible for his actions.232 
 
When it comes to (2), Wolf admits that her definition of sanity is 
normative. In this case, we might be justified in questioning why Wolf only 
cites the vilest of crimes. If insanity is the absence of a recognition of the 
rightness or wrongness of an action, which is what the McNaughton Rule 
implies, then any action which falls outside sound practice can be deemed 
insane. We can think of a whole host of real examples, from the actions of lone 
serial killers to the mass killings of dictators.  
 The stronger criticism is (1), and Wolf’s response is unconvincing. She 
merely cites the notion of “widespread intersubjective agreement”233 
regarding the normative framework which enables us to operate in the world. 
This response seems to reveal pragmatism at the core of Wolf’s position. 
Simply put, the majority of people share the same values with regards to 
actions and so if someone consistently and unrepentantly acts contrary to 
these values, we are justified in questioning their sanity. Wolf agrees that one 
day, in response to the changing nature of the world, our normative 
framework may need revising accordingly. However, at least, as sane selves, 
we have the capacity to carry out such a revision.  
This response does not seem to answer the first worry, but merely 
reassures us that what we are doing now, what we have reached “widespread 
intersubjective agreement” on, is working for us as long as we are sane. Some 
other framework may work better for us in the future, but only a sane self can 
bring about the necessary changes to this framework.  
That said, one may simply need to re-word (1) in response to Wolf: how 
can we be so sure that this “widespread intersubjective agreement” has been 
reached between sane selves? Also, would the revisions Wolf talks about 
necessarily be carried out by sane selves, or would it in fact take an insane self 
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to recognise the eventual dysfunction of the things we have reached 
intersubjective agreement on? Or put more clearly, would it not be the case 
that a self who recognised our normative framework is no longer working for 
us, be deemed “insane” at the start? Asking these questions, we can be led to 
think of a situation whereby an individual has a sane deep self but is not, in 
the empirical and metaphysical sense, free.   
 
8.2 Implications for Freedom-in-the-World 
 Before we can consider in detail how we may defend Freedom-in-the-
World against the argument from the facticity of the free self, we ought to see 
exactly how Wolf’s account affects the one I have laid out thus far. I have said 
that we can consider Wolf’s position as fitting the criteria of the argument from 
the facticity of the free self. It must be made clear how this is so. Let us remind 
ourselves of the premises of such an argument: 
 
(1) Freedom-in-the-World is: 
a. Non-transcendental 
b. Non-reductive 
c. Responsible for the disclosure of things and beings 
(2) Freedom-in-the-World is a feature of our factical existence (we never 
chose to be free) 
(3) Therefore, the things we cannot choose for ourselves determine the 
things we can choose for ourselves. In what sense then is the self 
actually free? 
 
It is clear enough that Wolf is not concerned to argue against Freedom-in-the-
World, but instead against the idea that the self is fundamentally free at some 
deep level without also being sane. However, this is what Freedom-in-the-
World claims; that as selves, we are free to re-determine ourselves as we see 
fit, which directly impacts the manner in which things in the world are 
disclosed.  
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 That said, as a factical feature of our existence, we have no choice in the 
fact that we are free in this way: the very notion of freedom itself would be 
unintelligible were it not for the Worldly Freedom we experience. What goes 
along with this is a whole myriad of other features of our selfhood that we 
cannot choose: our body, race, family, class, environment, society and so on. 
These things constitute the boundaries within which we can choose certain 
things for ourselves. Thus, it follows that if things we cannot choose go 
towards making possible the things we can choose, then there is no real sense 
to the idea that we are fundamentally free at a basic level.  Instead, we are 
merely free at a superficial level, which owes itself to the underlying processes 
of our structure as beings which conform to the laws of nature. 
 How does this fit in with Wolf’s argument? (2) and (3) can be 
adequately captured within Wolf’s example of JoJo, the dictator’s son. 
Crucially, JoJo did not choose the environment into which he was born. As 
such, he could not have had any authorship in the kind of self he was to 
become. In being exposed to the brutality of his father’s regime, he became 
exactly the kind of agent one would have expected him to become; one which 
is completely disconnected from the suffering of others. And yet, as a result of 
this fundamental lack of choice, JoJo does not even wish to be any other way 
than the way he in fact is.  
 We can say then, that the environment into which JoJo was born 
constitutes his facticity. He had no choice in any of these things. However, in 
virtue of this lack of choice, he became the kind of self that chose the same 
things for himself as his father before him; what is more, he would not choose 
to be any other way. Under our account, his Worldly Freedom is such that 
things in the world, including other people, are disclosed to him as things over 
which he has dominion. He thus chooses for himself according to this 
disclosure, but we must bear in mind that such disclosure occurs in virtue of 
the kind of self JoJo fundamentally is. What Wolf’s account seems to expose is 
that JoJo could not possibly have chosen this fundamental or “Deep” Self, and 
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as such, the things that are within his power to choose are exactly the sort of 
thing JoJo would inevitably choose, in virtue of the facticity of his Deep Self.  
  What is an even more pressing issue for Wolf is whether or not JoJo’s 
Deep Self, and by extension any of our Deep Selves, is sane or insane. This is 
a – if not the – most crucial feature of our facticity. A sane or insane agent 
chooses things in virtue of this condition, and on our account, it would also be 
fair to say that things are disclosed to the agent in virtue of this condition. 
However, empirically, our sanity is not the kind of thing we can choose. As 
aforementioned, it is a feature of our facticity.  
 What all of this means for our account of Freedom-in-the-World is that 
at the most primordial level of selfhood, we are determined by the world 
around us. But this determination in turn determines the kind of self we will 
become, and thus the manner in which things are disclosed and the choices 
we will make for ourselves. As a result, in light of premise (3), which states 
that if the things we cannot choose determine the things we can choose, then 
there is no meaningful sense in which we can say an agent is fundamentally 
free. It would seem that instead, an agent is fundamentally determined, and 
the only thing we have by way of freedom is the ability to respond and be 
responsible for the way these determinations shape the rest of our lives.  
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8.3 In Defence of Freedom-in-the-World 
8.3.1 Revisiting Heidegger: “Thrownness” and Facticity 
 It seems undeniable that there are features of our selfhood which 
cannot be chosen. One of these features is our sanity (or insanity) which we 
acquire through our experience of life from within our own horizon – a 
horizon which also cannot be, at least when considered empirically, within the 
ability of the agent to author.  
  With this in mind though, we should not be led to think that such 
arguments undermine the account of Freedom-in-the-World that has been 
developed throughout this work. In keeping with the Heideggerian 
foundations examined in Chapter 4, we ought to remind ourselves that 
facticity, far from denying the possibility of the freedom of the will, in fact 
opens up the space for it, by constituting the structure of the potentialities-for-
Being that are Worldhood. For a Heideggerian account of the freedom of the 
self, facticity is accommodated and included along with Being-in-the-World, 
and this is where we can begin to see how facticity need not concern us as 
much as may seem at first glance: 
 
… Being-in-the-World has the function of a rigid framework, within which Dasein’s possible 
ways of comporting itself towards its world run their course without touching the 
‘framework’ itself as regards its Being. But this supposed ‘framework’ itself helps make up 
the kind of Being which is Dasein’s… Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, 
Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the “they’s” inauthenticity. 
Thrownness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein, for which, 
in its very Being, that Being is an issue. Dasein exists factically.234 
 
Here, Heidegger is describing, firstly the fact that Being-in-the-World acts as 
a “framework”, a set of conditions within which the Self is disclosed and 
within which also things are disclosed to it. The self, as Dasein, cannot 
fundamentally break with or alter this basic “framework” which is the World; 
it cannot “touch” the framework. However, as we have seen, through the 
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phenomenon of disclosure, this framework, whilst belonging to each 
individual self, also helps to constitute the self. What this amounts to then, is 
the idea that the World into which we are “thrown”, is not within our power 
to fundamentally choose. This is precisely what Heidegger means when he 
uses the term “thrown” – Dasein, the self, finds itself in a time and a place that 
were not of its initial choosing, and these things form facticity, which itself 
creates the World that belongs to each self. It is this “movement” that 
Heidegger describes as “thrownness” that allows us to formulate in the first 
place what facticity is and the effects it has on our selfhood. However, for 
Heidegger, this thrownness “belongs” to each self individually. We are all 
thrown uniquely into the World. As such, it is our own throwness – our own 
facticity. As selves, our situations are unique to each one of us, and each form 
a framework which allows us to determine ourselves in the World.  
 However, this should not lead us to think that because the self must 
exist within boundaries, or a “framework” it did not initially choose, that it is 
fundamentally determined. For, 
 
… [F]alling into the world would be phenomenal ‘evidence’ against the existentiality of 
Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated “I” or subject, as a self-point from which 
it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object… If, however, we keep in mind 
that Dasein’s Being is in the state of Being-in-the-World, as we have already pointed out, then 
it becomes manifest that falling, as a kind of Being of this Being in, affords us rather the most 
elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality. In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-
for-Being-in-the-World is the issue…235 
 
The confusion regarding whether or not this factical existence of the self 
constitutes a fundamental determinism, only arises when one takes the self to 
be something like the traditional concept of a “closed off subject”. The very 
reason I have drawn upon Heideggerian resources in constructing this 
account is because of the manner in which it avoids having recourse to such a 
                                                 
235 Ibid. pp. 223-224 
142 
 
traditional conception. This is precisely what the analysis of Heidegger in 
earlier chapters aimed to demonstrate.  
 When we consider that the self is always already in the world, the issue 
of its factical existence becomes less pressing for an account of the free will. To 
see this in a clearer way, we should look at premise (3) of the argument from 
the facticity of the free self. It states that our factical existence determines the 
choices we can make. But when we consider properly the structure of Being-
in-the-World, and the fact that the self is always already in a world, this 
premise does not stand. For all that facticity really determines is the 
“framework”, and this means that it in fact only determines the range of 
possibilities that the self can navigate. This does not inhibit one’s ability to 
choose between those possibilities.  It only inhibits the self in the sense that 
one has to choose or not choose between possibilities. Therefore, the only thing 
facticity really determines is possibility itself. Or otherwise put, facticity 
constitutes possibility, but not the choices one actually makes in situation. 
Thus, we are “thrown” into possibilities, but this does not prevent us from 
choosing between them; it does not prevent us from choosing one set of 
possibilities over another. Nor does it restrict us from abstaining from the 
choice completely. The facticity of the free self then, does not amount to a 
deeper determinism, but merely the necessity for the self to operate through 
and within various potentialities. The only thing the self is “determined” to 
do is choose, but the choices that it can make are still entirely free and 
authored.  
 There is also something else that should be noted from this return to 
Heidegger, and it is to do with the notion of facticity itself as it has been 
understood. Let us look again at Heidegger’s definition of facticity in Being 
and Time: 
 
Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain factual ‘Being-present-at-
hand’. And yet the ’factualty’ of the fact of one’s own Dasein is at bottom quite different from 
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the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a 
fact; and the factuality of such a fact is what we shall call Dasein’s “facticity”.236 
 
As we discussed earlier, in the definition above, Heidegger is alluding to the 
fact that Dasein has a factual existence; as does “some kind of mineral”. 
However, what is different about the factuality of Dasein’s existence from that 
of a mineral lies in Dasein’s ability to understand, evaluate and interpret its 
own factuality. Thus,  
 
The concept of “facticity” implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in 
such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those 
entities which it encounters within its own world.237 
 
It is crucial to understand that whilst facticity does affirm the fact of our 
existence -- and as such, our throwness -- it also attests to the idea that in 
recognising its own facticity, the only place in which the actions of the self 
have any meaning, and as such, where our freedom is intelligible, is in the 
world, which includes the factual existence of objects within it. Thus, properly 
understood, facticity is not a determinist concern to be accommodated or 
overcome, but it is actually part of the structure of Freedom-in-the-World 
itself. Freedom is only intelligible within a world and facticity is Dasein’s 
peculiar ability to take up the fact of its existence within itself and be the judge 
of its own life.  
 
8.3.2 Freedom-in-the-World and the Sanity of the Self 
At this stage, one may not be completely satisfied with the response to 
Wolf that was laid out. The concern can be raised that by re-situating the 
debate upon the basis of our findings in the work of Heidegger, we could be 
seen as setting up Wolf against an interlocutor she has no intention of 
responding to. However, what the previous portion allowed us to see was 
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how Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-World, which we drew upon for our 
account of freedom, can ultimately ground a defence of the concept against 
the argument for the facticity of the free self, in the form of Wolf’s argument 
regarding the Sane Deep Self. Also, in criticising Taylor, who espouses a 
broadly Heideggerian position, it seems fitting for us to go back to the primary 
source himself (Heidegger) in order to find clues and insights which have 
perhaps been missed by his interpreters.  
With this done, I now intend to formalise a response to Wolf by 
working purely within the confines of the notion of Freedom-in-the-World, 
with a view to demonstrating that when the will is considered free in the 
manner I have argued it should be, sanity becomes an unsatisfactory 
foundation for free responsibility.  
The argument above attempted to establish that far from allowing the 
determinist to press home their criticism based on events beyond our 
choosing, facticity is itself the very ground of possibility.  
Wolf is correct in her assertion that we should not look for “literal self 
creation”. She is also correct when she states that to be free may only need to 
consist in being a certain way, rather that being conceived of as a type of power 
or control.238 But Freedom-in-the-World is not espousing a conception of the 
self as a literal self-creator. The very fact that the freedom we do have is 
conceived of as “worldly” attests to this. We cannot create ourselves “from 
scratch”, but we must learn to cope with the range of possibilities that are 
available to us as factically existing selves. Freedom-in-the-World is precisely 
the way that we, as selves, are. Freedom does consist in being a certain way. 
Now, whilst the range of possibilities, or boundaries, or “framework” are 
indeed factical, this does not imply that the determinist is correct. The 
argument from the facticity of the free self overlooks a certain fact regarding 
the account of freedom as Worldly. Freedom-in-the-World accommodates the 
facticity of the free self by asserting that one’s factical existence is the basis 
only of possibility and there is a sharp distinction to be made between 
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possibility and choice. For example, there may be three possibilities for me 
today: I may work; abandon my work and go out with friends, or; work for a 
bit longer and then go out with friends. These are what I can choose between. 
The facticity of my situation does not imply that my choice is already made. It 
only constitutes the form of the possibilities themselves, insofar as these 
possibilities are structured by things and entities within the world that I find 
myself in. Determinism conflates the brute fact that there is a world around 
the agent, with the inability of the agent to act freely within such a world. It 
does so because it does not recognise the manner in which the agent, or the 
self, is actually in the world, amongst things, entities and possible ways to 
choose to interact with these things and entities. Thus, as Wolf rightly argues, 
to be free consists in merely being a certain way. However, where Wolf will go 
on to talk of sanity as being that way of being, Freedom-in-the-World gives us 
a way of saying that we only need to be in a world.  
Thus, facticity does not determine choice; merely possibility. We are 
still free, insofar as we are free to choose which possibilities we want to 
actualise for ourselves. This is, as Heidegger would put it, our “mode of 
Being”. In virtue of the fact we are in a world, we are in and amongst things 
and possibilities.  
As Wolf herself admits with reference to her fictional dictator JoJo, 
“from the inside, he feels as integrated, free and responsible as we do.”239 So 
from within, the “insane” self interprets themselves as being every bit as free 
as the “sane” self. In fact, in JoJo’s and similar cases, it may also be the case 
that they recognise themselves as having the very same kind of sanity as the 
other members of society, even if it is difficult to see how such a belief could 
be justified. 
In virtue of our Freedom-in-the-World, we always feel perfectly sane, 
precisely because we are always choosing from possibilities that are part of 
our “Being-in”. It is difficult, though not impossible, to imagine what it would 
be like to be disclosed to oneself as insane, for it would imply that whatever 
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we choose for ourselves could never be justified even to ourselves. This is 
evidently not what it feels like for any of us to choose between possibilities.240 
As when, in the previous chapter, I argued that determinism is 
unintelligible without the activity of a free will, the same goes for notions of 
“sanity” and “insanity”. This is because these notions are constructed in the 
world, along with all others. What underpins the ability for individuals to 
form notions in the first place is that we are free and in the world primordially. 
That said, it makes sense to talk of sanity and insanity when it comes to 
responsibility – on this point, I agree with Wolf. It does seem that the most 
sensible way to think of ourselves as being responsible for our choices requires 
that those choices be made by a sane agent. Also, from what has already been 
established, it is also sensible to think of the determination of someone’s 
insanity as falling within the remit of the wider society, where a code of laws 
and acceptable practice have been laid out. However, these codes, laws and 
acceptable practices must have been formed by agents whose freedom is in 
the world and if the determination of responsibility is to fall on intersubjective 
agreement, it seems that this agreement is based on a prior freedom, which is 
Freedom-in-the-World. Such a worldly freedom is that mode of being that we 
all are “in”, and things like determinism, sanity, insanity and responsibility 
are only intelligible in virtue of this mode of being. 
Ultimately, the phenomenon of disclosure, both of the agents that we 
are and the world we are in, can still be argued as opening up the space for 
freedom that has been laid out in the preceding chapters. Facticity, which can 
now include Wolf’s version of sanity, does not pose a problem for this account 
of freedom. This is because our “thrownness”, the very fact that we are in a 
world, does not deny us freedom, but, on the contrary, gives us a truly 
meaningful and intelligible freedom. We cannot help but be free agents and 
this is because we cannot help but be in a world. 
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8.3.3 Intelligible Freedom 
Interpreting facticity as something which opens up this account of 
freedom to determinist concerns misses what is crucial about the structure of 
freedom as it has been formulated here. On this point, Wolf actually helps, 
rather than hinders the project. For she notices that if freedom is going to make 
sense anywhere, it is going to have to be within the realms of action, 
responsibility and practice. However, Wolf’s point of contention with freedom 
of the will as conceived in the work of Taylor and Frankfurt is not “where” 
freedom makes the most sense, but that it is sometimes the case that 
individuals are not free. But by establishing that freedom is something which 
is equiprimordial with our being in a world, we are able to argue that the only 
condition that would make an agent not free is not being in a world. However, 
this would mean being non-human or being deceased. In other words, to be 
consistent with the notion of freedom-in-the-world that has been developed 
here, we ought to see that if one is in a world, one is by extension also free. If 
the determinist wishes to argue that there are clear cases where an agent is not 
free, these cases must demonstrate agency without worldhood, and this is 
unintelligible.  
Wolf is merely able to demonstrate cases of agency without 
responsibility (as in her example of JoJo). Someone like JoJo is still entirely 
capable of choosing for himself or herself and is thus free to that extent. 
However, JoJo is not sane therefore not responsible, and this lack of 
responsibility prevents JoJo from understanding his freedom properly. JoJo is 
unable to take his facticity up within himself like a responsible agent can. His 
freedom, whilst he has it, is unintelligible to himself, for his connection to the 
world he is thrown into is dramatically severed by the circumstances in which 
he was raised. 
What does this mean for Freedom-in-the-World then? It means that 
because the structure of this freedom includes within it facticity, properly 
understood, it is the only sense in which freedom can truly be deemed 
intelligible. The goal of an account of freedom should not be to outright 
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disprove determinism, but to show that determinist concerns rest upon 
freedom itself, or that freedom can be extended to include those concerns 
without conflict. 
Freedom-in-the-World is the kind of account that takes worries 
regarding the factual nature of the world and ourselves and makes these facts 
part of its own structure. It does so by noting how the very disclosure of facts 
is something that rests upon a will which is free.  But now we come to see that 
also, there is no other space for freedom to be considered intelligible at all 
except for in a world. This may seem like an underwhelming point at first 
glance, but its strength lies in its subtlety. For what is implied by such a point 
is that a transcendental account of freedom is not necessary, but also that it is 
often the case that determinist concerns interpret the world as something 
which contains no space for an account of freedom. What I have been able to 
show through Freedom-in-the-World is that, on the contrary, the world is the 
only place where freedom can be intelligible. Freedom-in-the-World is thus 
comprehensible freedom, and both versions of the argument from the facticity of 
the free self overlook a crucial feature of facticity, or at least misinterpret it. 
Facticity does not just point to the immutable fact of our existence, but also to 
our ability, as free agents, to make this fact into a problem and to evaluate and 
change ourselves in response.  
 
8.4 Closing Remarks 
What has been attempted above is not a rejection of Wolf’s position, 
given that we can agree with and accommodate the vast majority of her insight 
within the scope of the vision of freedom that I have constructed. Instead, it 
has been established exactly what Freedom-in-the-World is and a potential 
criticism was raised. This criticism I termed the “argument from the facticity 
of the free self”, owing to the empirical observation that we are not the kind 
of agents that can create ourselves from the ground up. The argument from 
the facticity of the free self aimed to demonstrate that because we are born into 
a set of circumstances we had no choice in, anything we choose for ourselves 
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is not a free choice; it is a choice based upon those prior and pre-determined 
circumstances. 
I referred to Wolf because I feel her depiction of an insane dictator, and 
his lack of choice in his being an insane “Deep Self”, illuminates and 
supplements the argument from the facticity of the free self in a clear and 
relatable format. Through considering Wolf’s argument we were able to see 
an example of how Freedom-in-the-World might run into problems, as a 
concept, when trying to account for the facticity of the self. In doing this, I have 
been able to demonstrate that the conclusion of the argument from the facticity 
of the free self is unable to establish determinism in a form that undermines 
Freedom-in-the-World. This is because when the determinist makes such an 
argument, they take facticity to be the kind of thing that literally determines the 
choices we make. We have seen though, that an important feature of the 
definition of facticity is our ability to have our factual existence disclosed to 
us and to interpret ourselves in relation to this disclosure. As such, all facticity 
really does is allow space for possibility, and as agents that are always already 
in the world, we are free to choose between possibilities, and as such, to choose 
the kind of self we want to be. Beyond this, the kind of selves we are and desire 
to become disclose the world and things in it to us in such a way that it is a 
“framework” within which we can actualise the possibilities available to us. 
With all these things considered, facticity, far from being a danger to 
any notion of the free will, is in fact constituted by freedom-in-the-world. The 
phenomenon of being “always already in” a world amounts to facticity itself; 
we have no choice but to be and act in the world. We are “thrown” into the 
world – as Heidegger terms it. But as agents in a world, our facticity, rather 
than implying that we are determined, is something that can be taken up by 
the agent and acted upon. Facticity facilitates possibility, and possibility 
allows an agent to choose.  
As we have seen, this does not imply fundamental determinism. 
Instead, the very intelligibility of determinism implies freedom. This is 
because determinism, as something that can be understood, requires 
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disclosure to make sense. But we have established that disclosure requires the 
freedom of the agent. Thus, when Heidegger claims that our potentiality-for-
Being is an issue for us, we can see that this kind of insight is only available to 
an agent who is free in some deep sense. On this point, Taylor tells us that, 
 
…  [B]eyond the de facto characterisation of the subject by his goals, desires and purposes, a 
person is a subject who can pose the de jure question: is this the kind of being I ought to be, 
or really want to be?241 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the history of Philosophy, the issue between whether or not the 
Will is free has been a topic of extensive debate. Traditionally, a conflict arises 
between those who hold to the idea that the human agent has a will, and as 
such, is capable of making choices for and about itself; and those who believe 
that the very notion of choice itself is false. Those in the former camp tend to 
argue that the will is free because it has the ability to choose; an agent can and, 
indeed does, (so the argument goes) choose, from the mundane choices of food 
or leisure, all the way up to choices regarding the kind of action one chooses 
and the kind of life one wishes to have. For all this, though, members of the 
former class cite the “mechanical” nature of the universe we inhabit and seek, 
in ever more compelling ways, to subsume the human being itself into the 
makeup of such a model of reality. In so doing, the members of the latter camp 
aim to show that our experience of making decisions, whether it be about the 
food we eat or the person we are, come out looking illusory. That in fact, what 
we ought to see is though we seem to choose, this seeming can be reduced and 
explained in terms of things about ourselves that are beyond our power to 
choose: our body (including, and for some, most importantly, our brain), the 
time into which we are born, our family, culture and so on. All of these things, 
taken together, form a set of conditions, which we did not choose, that precede 
and in fact determine the “choices” we make.  
When we consider such an argument in its fullest, we are led to 
conclude that we cannot help but “choose” the things that we do, even though 
it seems as though we have control over our actions. “Choice” becomes a facile 
notion, one which is nothing other than our simplistic way of interpreting the 
very complex activities of the brain and its prior conditioning by the things to 
which it is exposed.  
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 What has been attempted in the preceding work was a resituating of 
the debate between these two camps. We introduced the problem in a general 
way and suggested that a compromise may be found in the work of Kant, 
whose transcendental idealism is capable of retaining the legitimacy of   
scientific discourse and the essence of the human being as a free and 
responsible agent.  
 However, certain difficulties arose when considering transcendental 
idealism, in particular, that things as they are in themselves are unknowable 
and as such, conclusions about the actual nature of reality cannot be made. We 
then turned to the   work of Hegel, whose early sections of his Phenomenology 
of Spirit, in particular his dialectic on force, can be accurately read as a criticism 
of Kantian epistemology. That said, Hegel still could not prevent relapsing 
back into a form of idealism himself, and also developed, as a result, a rather 
conservative notion of freedom. 
 At that point, it became   apparent that a   satisfactory view   of freedom 
could not be based on idealist premises, as it meant that any notion of freedom 
would be committed to placing freedom “outside” the world in which the 
human being acts. It became necessary to understand, in more detail, what 
exactly “world” or “worldhood” amounted to; the thought being that in doing 
so, we would find a way to incorporate freedom within the world.  
To this end, we turned to the work of Heidegger, whose analyses of 
Worldhood put us in a position to understand how we may construct a non-
reductive, non-transcendental freedom. We found that far from being 
something “added on” to human beings as a sort of power or property, 
freedom was fundamental to our interpretation of the things around us. It 
allows relations and contexts to form, for things to be significant in one way 
or another, in the form of disclosure. Therefore, we take freedom as being that 
which allows of the possibility of the world to be disclosed to us in the first 
place; it defines the manner in which things and people are disclosed to us, 
and as such, allows us to be.  
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With freedom thus occupying such a fundamental role, we were able 
to understand that determinist arguments themselves were dependent upon 
the freedom of the agent; such arguments are only intelligible upon the basis 
of a free will which structures and utters the arguments.  
What this work developed aside from a worldly notion of freedom but 
the idea that such a notion can help to dissolve traditional arguments between 
proponents of the free will and determinists. The work attempts to offer, in a 
careful way, a picture of a free agent which is also at the same time in a world; 
that the freedom of the agent and the world it acts within are correlated. It 
does not propose a “phenomenology” of freedom but instead, uses the insight 
of previous phenomenological investigations (in particular those of 
Heidegger) as a starting point for a further discussion regarding the worldly 
nature of freedom itself.  
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